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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL ~W. CT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN Ml]) FOR THE COUNf\ct ~VERCE 





(1£D~0 b£;~1'UJS 6(.,j 
Defendant. ) 
THIS MATTER IS SET FOR A FINAL PRETRIAL CONFERENCE ON TUESDAY, THE 
LQ·H'bAY OF lSLptttVvt;eJ(20jl, AT 3:30 p.m. A JURY TRIAL IS TO 
COMMENCE ON THURSDAY, THE 8-r00AY OF ~t tt,~ 20ll-, at the 
hour of 8:30 a.m. before the Honorable Judge ~~lll . 
THE PROSECUTOR, DEFENSE COUNSEL, AND D FENDANT MUST BE PRESENT 
PROMPTLY AT 3:30 p.m. FOR THE FINAL PRETRIAL CONFERENCE AND REMAIN UNTIL 
EXCUSED BY THE COURT. 
THE FOLLOWING CASE SCHEDULE IS HEREBY ORDERED: 
~ ALL MOTIONS MUST BE FILED WITHIN 21 DAYS OF THE DATE OF THIS ORDER. 
~ DISCOVERY MUST BE COMPLETED 21 DAYS PRIOR TO THE DATE OF TRIAL. 
~ PROPOSED JURy INSTRUCTIONS MUST BE SUBMITTED TO THE COURT 5 DAYS 
PRIOR TO TRIAL PURSUANT TO IDAHO CRIMINAL RULE 30{b) AND, AT THE 
PRETRIAL CONFERENCE, THE PARTIES MUST PROVIDE THE COURT WITH A 
DISC OR E-MAIL CONTAINING PROPOSED INSTRUCTIONS IN FINAL FORM. 
(discs will be returned at the end of trial) 
DATED THIS 5 day of __ ~;t-'L""-.:::l('-L~ b=1~'--___ --- 20_':........\'----
MAGISTRATE JtdbGE X IES TO: l J'\ i.e V\vu,"\ \ 
• Prosecutor \.IV • 
-X Defense Counsel-,-(S"-4U1J-,-=O-=~"""V,--,r\L""",f? ,-""L.l-\I\~ _____ _ 
--X D~~AL NOTICE AND PRETRIAL ORDER 
SE JUDICAL DISTRICT, STATE OF l[ 
COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
PRETRIAL MOTION, ORDER, AND JUDGMENT 
-IE STATE OF IDAHO VS. GEORGE J. BESAW JR. 
DDRESS:  Lewiston, ID 83501 
.O.B.  S.S.N. , 
CASE NO. CR2011-000~\9L ED 
D.L.N. JJL '0 1'''' q. 1\7 
[CKET NO. 42178 AGENCY: Idaho State Police 
The prosecutor or defendant moves the Court as follows: 
( ) For a bench warrant; defendant failed to appear. 
( ) bond set at $ ____ _ 
( ) any existing bond forfeited. 
() For default judgment; defendant failed to appear 
() To amend the charge to ayiol4i.On of Idaho Code ____ _ 
(f) To set this matter on -@8 i! !:::m , at for: 
C71 continuance (I) with waiver of speedy trial ()Trial by ( )court or by ( ) jury 
() To dismiss the charge in the interests of justice. 
() Posted bond of be forfeited and the case closed. 
() I waive my right to Jury Trial 
1. Defendant understands the consequences of a guilty plea: 
eX) The plea is voluntary. (X) Defendant has been informed of maximum and minimum penalties. 
(X) Defendant waives the right against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to trial by jury and the right to confront 
witnesses against defendant. (X) Defendant has been informed of the nature of the charge. eX) NO promises have 
been made other than the plea bargaining agreement set out below. (X) Defendant understands that this court IS NOT 
bound by the agreement. eX) Defendant gives up the right to appeal the judgment. (X) Defendant understands that 
he/she has the right against compulsory self-incrimination during any court ordered evaluation. 
MY CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS WERE GIVEN TO ME AT ARRAIGNMENT. I UNDERSTAND THOSE RIGHTS AND 
GIVE THEM UP. I PLEAD GUILTY TO THE CHARGE(S) SET FORTH ABOVE. I ADMIT TO THE TRUTH OF THE 
ALLEGATIONS AND AGREE TO THE RECOMMENDED SENTENCE. 
[II. Plea bargain and/or RECOMMENDED sentence: 
( 
( )Fine $ ___ --'I$ ____ suspended () Jail __ ----->/ ____ suspended ( ) Community Service ____ _ 
( ) 
With the following recommendations: 
( )Report to the Probation Department within 48 hours of today's date. 
( )Commit no Crime. 
( )Sign a probation agreement and abide by all the terms and conditions of that Agreement. 
( )Notify the Court, in writing, of any change of address. 
( )Obtain alcohol evaluation 
( )Refuse no evidentiary test for the presence of drugs or alcohol 
( )Other 
)Driver's License Suspension ________ _ 
)Restitution to be paid in the sum of 'f' _____ to _______________ _ 
Restitution to be paid in monthly installments of 
$ Imonth beginning and to be paid in futl on or before end of defendant's probationary 
period. Restitution to be paid to the Nez Perce County Clerk of the Court, P.O. Box 896, LeWiston, 10 83501, or at the 
window on the second floor of the Nez Perce County Courthouse in the form of a money order and/or cashier checks. 
( )OTHER: 
o ontact Order remain in effect wI ~ . 
DATED --'--------,~_,(;;C__+f,t DEFENDANT'S SIGNATURE ~' 1l t: 
DEJ>eNSE ATTORNEY 1c------;<+----:1£.-.....s-...;:~~=-- PROSECUTOR ~ ---r::fj IJl (jl;~ 
( ) APPROVED () ( ) ~.~ ~ 
DATED '?;IJfK/RiAL MOTION, ORDER ANfj~pJt!i~~f1SNttDGE ----=:z'5~~"" ::::::::::"l-====44-::\'1"Cf"'""" 
,. '"' 0 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 











CASE NO. CRI1-00419 
OPINION AND ORDER 
ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO 
DISMISS AND/OR SUPPRESS 
AND/OR IN LIMINE 
This matter is before the Court on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and/or Suppress and/or 
in Limine. The Court heard oral arguments on this matter on May 6, 2011. Briefing was 
completed by the parties on June 17,2011. Plaintiff State ofIdaho was represented by Nez 
Perce County deputy prosecutor Justin 1. Coleman. Defendant George J. Besaw was represented 
by attorney Charles M. Stroschein. The Court, having read the motion, affidavits, and briefs 
filed by the parties, having heard the testimony presented and the oral arguments of counsel, and 
being fully advised in the matter, hereby renders its decision. 
State v. Besaw 
Opinion & Order on Motion to Dismiss/Suppress 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
In the early morning hours of January 16,2011, Idaho State Patrol Trooper Jeffory 
Talbott was on patrol duty and traveling on 21 st Street in Lewiston, Idaho, when he observed a 
vehicle fail to signal and fail to maintain its lane oftrave1. 1 Trooper Talbott initiated a stop of 
the vehicle and made contact with the driver, who had pulled into a parking lot. The driver was 
subsequently identified by his driver's license as George Besaw. As the trooper talked to Besaw, 
he could smell the odor of an alcoholic beverage coming from the vehicle and observed Besaw's 
eyes were bloodshot. After running a driver's check, Trooper Talbott asked Besaw to perform 
field sobriety evaluations. Besaw agreed and got out of his vehicle. Trooper Talbott checked 
Besaw's eyes for horizontal gaze nystagmus and had Besaw perform a one-leg stand evaluation 
and a walk-and-turn evaluation. 
Based on his observations, Trooper Talbott formed the opinion that Besaw was under the 
influence of alcohol. The trooper then placed Besaw under arrest and, after handcuffing him, 
placed him in the back of his patrol vehicle. Trooper Talbott then left the back patrol car door 
open, stood next to Besaw and, leaning against the vehicle, turned facing Besaw so that he could 
read him the advisory form and observe him for IS-minutes before having him provide breath 
samples for testing. As Trooper Talbott was observing Besaw, he programmed the Lifeloc-FC20 
breath testing instrument. During the IS-minute observation period, Trooper Talbott was 
contacted by a Lewiston City Police officer and a brief conversation ensued. Trooper Talbott's 
I The facts as articulated by the Court were gleaned from the May 6, 2011, hearing transcript, the video and other 
evidence admitted at hearing, and the officer's probable cause documents filed in the case. 
2 
Slate v. Besaw 
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attention was also briefly directed toward a passenger in Besaw's vehicle and to an individual 
who arrived to transport one of Besaw's passengers. 
After the IS-minute observation period, Trooper Talbott had Besaw submit three (3) 
breath samples into the Lifeloc-FC20 instrument. The instrument tested Besaw's blood alcohol 
content and reported results of 0.219 and 0.201, with a third breath sample testing as insufficient. 
Trooper Talbott then informed Besaw he was under arrest for driving under the influence of 
alcohol. The trooper then transported Besaw to the Nez Perce County jail. 
On February 4, 2011, counsel for Besaw filed a Notice Pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rules 
of Evidence Rule 803(24) that included a number of attachments. On February 15,2011, 
Besaw's counsel filed a Motion to Dismiss and/or Suppress and/or in Limine. A hearing on the 
Motion was scheduled for May 6, 2011. On the day of the hearing, defense counsel filed a 
second Notice Pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rules of Evidence Rule 803(24) and an affidavit of 
counsel. Both filings included a number of attachments. At the end of the hearing, during which 
Trooper Talbott was called as a witness and a number of evidentiary items were admitted, the 
Court established a post-hearing briefing schedule. The parties timely filed their post-hearing 
briefs with defense counsel again attaching a large number of documents to his filings. 
ANALYSIS 
The analysis the Court must make in this matter includes not only allegations of specific 
error on the part of Trooper Talbott during his contact with Defendant Besaw, but also 
generalized allegations of malfeasance on the part of the forensic department of the Idaho State 
Police. The Court is cognizant of the importance of the issues presented and, having carefully 
reviewed the voluminous material presented by the Defendant, will attempt to articulate its 
3 
State v. Besaw 
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analysis and rulings in an organized manner, so as to address all relevant issues raised by the 
Defendant. 
(A) FIELD SOBRIETY TESTS 
Defendant Besaw asks the Court to find the field sobriety tests inadmissible, arguing the 
accuracy ofthe tests is questionable based on: (1) how the tests were administered; (2) the 
environment at the time of perf on nance, and (3) because the science purporting to establish a 
link between poor test performance and alcohol intoxication has been questioned. The 
Defendant cites the Court to case law from outside jurisdictions and secondary sources where the 
reliability offield sobriety tests has been questioned. The Defendant further argues that 
admissibility of field sobriety tests has never been analyzed under Idaho Rule of Evidence 702 
and, until such an analysis is made, law enforcement officers should not be allowed to testify 
regarding field sobriety tests for the purpose of proving a driver was impaired due to the 
influence of alcohol. 
Under Idaho Code § 18-8004, it is a criminal offense for a person to operate a motor 
vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. The offense may be established under either of two 
alternative theories of proof: (1) by evidence of impairment of ability to drive due to the 
influence of alcohol; or (2) by forensic testing of the driver's breath, blood or urine showing a 
blood alcohol content of 0.08 or greater. State v. Edmondson, 125 Idaho 132,134,867 P.2d 
1006 (Ct.App.1994). Idaho's appellate courts have consistently held field sobriety tests 
admissible as evidence of impairment, so long as an officer's testimony is limited to the 
observations of the officer during the testing and to any opinion formed by the officer based on 
4 
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his training, experience and observations.2 An officer may not, however, testify that 
performance of the tests, or more precisely an inability to perform the tests, is evidence of a 
specific level of intoxication.3 
Idaho's courts recognize the basic battery offield sobriety tests as including the HGN, 
the walk-and-turn, and the one leg stand.4 Of the tests commonly utilized by police in DUI 
investigations, only the HGN is scientific in nature. In detennining its admissibility, Idaho's 
Supreme Court has analyzed HGN evidence under the Frye test and has noted the applicability 
of evidence Rule 702 to the admissibility analysis. See State v. Garrett, 119 Idaho 878, 811 P.2d 
488 (1991); State v. Gleason, 123 Idaho 62, 844 P.2d 691 (1992). Nevertheless, Defendant 
contends Idaho's courts have failed to test the reliability offield sobriety testing under I.R.E.702, 
in particular HGN testing. 
Idaho Rule of Evidence 702 reads, "If scientific, technical, or other specialized 
knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a 
witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify 
thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise." The Rule requires a witness to qualify as an 
expert before testifying about scientific evidence. It does not establish the standard by which the 
science is scrutinized for reliability. "The inquiry under I.R.E. 702 is whether the expert will 
testify to scientific knowledge that will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to 
determine a fact in issue, 'not whether the infonnation upon which the expert's opinion is based 
2 Whether the field sobriety tests evidence impainnent is a factual detennination made by the jury. However, an 
officer may testifY to his training regarding the tests along with his observations and opinions fonned during the 
driver's perfonnance of the tests. 
3 Field sobriety tests are, nevertheless, admissible as evidence of probable cause for an arrest when, as in the instant 
matter, an officer has obtained forensic testing indicating a blood alcohol level of 0.08 or greater. State v. Garrett, 
119ldabo 878, 881, 811 P.2d 488 (1991). 
4 Police officers may also request a driver perfonn additional tests to detennine physical and cognitive ability, such 
as alphabet recitation, counting tests, finger-to-nose, etc. State v. Garrett, 119 Idaho 878, 879, 811 P .2d 488 (1991). 
5 
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is commonly agreed upon. '" State v. Perry, 139 Idaho 520, 522, 81 P.3d 1230 (2003), quoting 
State v. Merwin, 131 Idaho 642, 646, 962 P.2d 1026, 1030 (1998). 
The fact that the conclusion from a scientific study is not universally accepted 
does not preclude use of that study by experts in forming their opinions. The 
question under the evidence rule is simply whether the expert's knowledge will 
assist the trier of fact; not whether the information upon which the expert's 
opinion is based is commonly agreed upon. Even under the holding in Daubert, 
the focus of the court's inquiry is "on the principles and methodology, not on the 
conclusions that they generate." 
State v. Merwin, 131 Idaho 642, 646, 962 P.2d 1026, 1030 (1998), quoting Daubert at 595, 113 
S.Ct. at 2797. 
After extensive analysis, the Idaho Supreme Court held in Garrett that HGN testing is 
reliable, generally accepted in the scientific community, and admissible in DUI prosecutions for 
the limited purpose of drawing certain inferences.s Garrett at 882. While other jurisdictions 
may question the admissibility, reliability and science behind field sobriety testing, the holding 
in Garrett remains the law in Idaho and is binding upon this Court. Therefore, until Idaho's 
appellate courts steer Idaho law in a new direction, a police officer may testify to his or her 
observations during the administration of field sobriety tests and may testify to any opinion he 
may form based on his observations and training, provided a proper foundation is first laid 
showing the officer is trained in conducting field sobriety testing and that the tests were correctly 
administered. A defendant may, thereafter, challenge the weight of the evidence. 
In the instant matter, Trooper Talbott testified that he received training in DUI detection 
and investigation from a field training officer in 2005, received additional training while 
5 Once the issue of reliability was answered by Idaho's Supreme Court in Garrett, it became unnecessary for Idaho's 
trial courts to re-analyze the reliability question with every DUI case. However, in regards to HGN testing, 
"Garrett allows the use of HGN test evidence only in conjunction with evidence from other field sobriety tests, and 
pem1its the arresting officer to testify only that nystagmus may be an indicator of intoxication, not that it is 
conclusive evidence. Garrett limits the scope ofthe admissibility ofHGN-related evidence, forbidding its use to 
establish or infer any particular correlative BAC level, because nystagmus does stem from causes other than the 
ingestion of alcohol." State v. Gleason, 123 Idaho 62, 66, 844 P.2d 691 (1992). 
6 
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attending P.O.S.T., and in 2010 attended a sixteen (16) hour advanced roadside impairment 
detection enforcement class. Trooper Talbott further testified to receiving specific training as to 
the standards for administering the HGN test, walk and tum test, and one leg stand test. 
Therefore, based on the evidence presented, the Court finds the officer is sufficiently trained in 
administering the tests, the tests in the instant matter were properly administered, the officer's 
specialized knowledge regarding field sobriety tests and alcohol impairment will likely assist the 
trier of fact to understand the evidence and, therefore, the officer may testify regarding the field 
sobriety test under a Rule 702 analysis. 
Finally, in challenging the admissibility of the field sobriety tests the Defendant contends 
the tests were administered in an environment not conducive to good performance, i.e. that it was 
raining and the ground was not level. However, the Defendant has presented the Court with no 
legal suppOli for his theory that, because we live in the northwest where the seasons change and 
because vehicles are a means of mobile transport subject to the weather conditions, that a 
driver's ability to perform field sobriety tests is of no value unless conducted on a perfectly flat 
and lined paved surface during a bright and sunny day. 
Field sobriety tests allow a police officer to make a determination regarding a driver's 
intoxication, or lack thereof, and are of value for purposes of determining the probability that a 
driver is intoxicated. Idaho's cOUlis have consistently recognized field sobriety tests as 
important investigative tools for officers for detennining whether probable cause for an arrest 
exists and for evaluating a driver's level of impairment. "The state's interest in stopping drunk 
driving is 'compelling,' because protecting citizens from life-threatening danger is a 'paramount 
concern'''. State v. Ferreira, 133 Idaho 474, 480,988 P.2d 700 (Ct.App.1999). "[W]e hold that 
field sobriety tests are the least intrusive means reasonably available to verify or dispel the 
7 
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officer's suspicion in a short period of time that a driver is in violation of I.e. § 18-8004." !d. at 
483. There simply is no legal requirement that field sobriety tests be conducted only in a perfect 
environment, nor would such a requirement be reasonable given the roadside nature of a DUI 
investigation. As was stated by the Ferreira Court, "Field sobriety tests are, by their very 
definition, done in the 'field' typically on the side of a public thoroughfare and are ordinarily 
perfonned contemporaneously with a traffic stop." Ferreira at 133 Idaho 480. 
(B) FIFTEEN MINUTE OBSERVATION PERIOD 
The Defendant contends the mandatory fifteen (15) minute observation period required 
prior to breath testing was flawed, as the officer was distracted by various individuals and by 
traffic on the road adjacent to the parking lot where the Defendant was stopped. In the instant 
matter, the arresting officer handcuffed Defendant Besaw and placed him in the back seat of his 
patrol vehicle. Then, leaving the back door open, the officer stood approximately two to three 
feet away from the Defendant, facing him at all times so that he could observe him for fifteen 
(15) minutes before administering breath testing. The officer testified he did not take his focus 
off of the Defendant and did not move away even though he was briefly distracted by a Lewiston 
police officer, again by a passenger in the Defendant's vehicle, and finally by an individual 
arriving to pick up another passenger. The event, as testified to by the officer, was captured on 
the officer's patrol video camera and was reviewed by the Court. 
In State v. Remsburg, 126 Idaho 338,882 P.2d 993 (Ct.App.1994), the Court held that a 
brief diversion of an officer's attention does not negate the fifteen (15) minute observation 
period. The Remsburg Court held that the standard "does not require that the observer never take 
his eyes off the subject, only that the subject be observed closely." Remsburg at 341. More 
8 
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recently in State v. DeFranco, 143 Idaho 335,144 P.3d 40 (Ct.App.2006), the Court reiterated its 
holding in Remsburg, stating: 
Two prior decisions of this Court are instructive. The first is Remsburg, where 
the issue was whether the subject was 'closely observed' as required by the 
training manual for the Intoximeter 3000. During the last seven minutes 
preceding the tests, the officer had programmed the Intoximeter and read the 
DUI advisory form to the defendant. The defendant argued that she was not 
closely observed because the officer's sight was, during the above events, 
directed elsewhere. This Court disagreed. Key to the decision was the fact that 
the officer was standing or sitting next to the defendant at all times. This Court 
declined to adopt a rule that an officer is required to "stare fixedly" at the subject 
for the entirety of the relevant time period in order for the subject to be closely 
observed. ld. at 340, 882 P.2d at 995. Instead, we held that in light of the 
purposes of the requirement, "observation" could include not only visual 
observation but use of other senses as well. Because the officer was continually 
in a position to use all of his senses, not just sight, to detennine that the 
defendant did not belch, burp or vomit during the observation period, we 
concluded that the defendant had been closely observed in compliance with the 
training manual instructions. 
State v. DeFranco, 143 Idaho 335, 337, 144 P.3d 40 (Ct.App.2006). 
The DeFranco Court then contrasted the facts in Remsburg with the facts in State v. 
Carson, 133 Idaho 451, 988 P.2d 225 (Ct.App.1999), where the Court found the defendant was 
not sufficiently observed as the officer's primary focus was on driving his vehicle, making him 
unable to utilize visual observation or his other senses, which were impeded by the officer's 
hearing impainnent and the various noises created by a moving vehicle. The facts in the instant 
matter are more analogous with those in Remsburg and distinguishable from those in Carson and 
DeFranco, where the Court found the officer was rummaging through the trunk of his patrol car 
during the observation period and "was not always in a physical position to use either his sight 
or, altematively, his senses of smell and hearing, to accomplish the purpose of the monitoring 
period." DeFranco at 338. 
9 
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In the instant matter, the officer was within two to three feet of Defendant Besaw, was 
facing him at all times, putting himself in a physical position that allowed him to utilize not only 
his sight but all his senses to accomplish the purpose ofthe monitoring period, which is to 
detennine if a defendant belches, burps or vomits. Therefore, the Court finds the fi fteen (15) 
minute observation period was properly conducted, as the officer's attention was not impeded to 
such a degree that his various senses were diverted from the Defendant. 
(C) DRIVER'S LICENSE SUSPENSION NOTICE 
Defendant Besaw presents argument asserting the officer in the instant matter failed to 
correctly give him notice as to the consequences to his commercial driver's license should he 
refuse or fail blood alcohol testing. Though the relevance of his assertion is unclear, the Court 
assumes Defendant's position is that failed or inadequate notice should result in his breath test 
results being inadmissible in the criminal charge. 
Idaho Code §§ IS-S002 and IS-S002A require a driver to be substantially informed that 
refusal to perform testing for alcohol or other intoxicating substances, or failing such testing, will 
result in a suspension of his or her driver's license. The two statutes, commonly referred to as 
Idaho's implied consent statutes, provide that any person who operates or is in physical control 
of a motor vehicle in Idaho has by such acts impliedly consented to testing to determine 
concentrations of alcohol or other intoxicating substances, when such testing is administered by a 
law enforcement officer who has reasonable grounds to believe a driver is committing the 
criminal offense ofDUl pursuant to I.C. § 18-8004. The implied consent statutes ofLC. §§ lS-
8002 and lS-S002A authorize a civil license suspension of one's driver's license upon refusal to 
perform, or upon failing, testing for alcohol or other intoxicating substances. The same notice 
iO 
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requirement, however, is not found in the code sections that comprise Idaho's criminal DUI 
statutes. 6 
The notice of suspension is a statutory requirement relative to an administrative civil 
suspension ofa driver's license, but has no bearing or import on the criminal prosecution of the 
offense of DUI. 
Thus, under Section 18-8002, "anyone who accepts the privilege of operating a 
motor vehicle upon Idaho's highways has consented in advance to submit to a 
BAC test.. .. " In re McNeely, 119 Idaho at 187,804 P.2d at 916. See also In re 
Goerig, 121 Idaho 26, 29, 822 P.2d 545, 548 (Ct.App.1992). It follows that 
where reasonable grounds for the request exists, and the test is conducted in a 
reasonable manner, a motorist has no legal right to refuse an alcohol 
concentration test. Even if the officer did not notify the defendant of the 
consequences of the refusal as required by I.e. § 18-8002(3), the results of 
the evidentiary test will be admissible in a criminal prosecution. Woolery, 
supra; Burris, 125 Idaho at 291,869 P.2d at 1386. 
State v. Harmon, 131 Idaho 80, 85, 952 P.2d 402 (Ct.App.l998)[ emphasis added]. 
The Court finds it unnecessary to make a determination of whether the notice provided 
in the instant matter was sufficient, as the notice requirement found in I.e. §§ 18-8002 and 18-
8002A has no relevance to the prosecution of the criminal offense ofDUI, the notice requirement 
being a prerequisite only to the civil driver's license suspension under Idaho's implied consent 
statute. 
CD) PERFORMANCE VERIFICA nON S AND THE LIFELOC-FC20 
In the instant matter, Trooper Talbott conducted forensic breath testing to deterrninethe 
Defendant's blood alcohol content utilizing a portable breath testing instrument known as the 
6 Idaho Code §§ 18-8004, 18-8004A, 18-8004C, 18-8005, and 18-8006. 
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Lifeloc-FC20. The instrument has been authorized for use by the Idaho State Police
7 
and 
standard operating procedures (SOP)8 established for its use pursuant to I.C. § lS-S004( 4).9 
Trooper Talbott was certified as a breath testing specialist on the Lifeloc-FC20 on August 27, 
2010, his certification not expiring until October 31,2012. 10 The results of Defendant's breath 
tests using the Lifeloc-FC20 were 0.219 and 0.206. Defendant contends Trooper Talbott failed 
to follow the SOP requirements for perfonnance verification, making the breath test results 
inadmissible. 
The accuracy of breath testing instruments is to be checked regularly by conducting 
accuracy verifications utilizing a simulator and a perfonnance verification solution. The 
standards to be followed for perfonnance verifications are located at section 5.1 in the current 
SOP booklet.!! Performance verification ofthe Lifeloc-FC20 instrument may be perfonned 
using either a O.SO solution or a 0.20 solution and must be run within 24 hours before or after an 
evidentiary test. However, contrary to the arguments asserted by the Defendant, the standards 
make clear that a performance verification utilizing the 0.20 solution should not be run routinely 
to satisfy the 24 hour requirement, but is instead only required once per calendar month with the 
results to be logged on the Instrument Operations Log.!2 The solution is to be replaced with 
fresh solution after approximately 25 verifications or upon expiration of the solution, whichever 
occurs first. Section 5.1.9 ofthe SOP then states, "The official time and date ofthe performance 
7 IDAPA 11.03.01.014 
R Defendant's Exhibit #3. 
9 I.e. § 18-8004(4) reads in relevant part: "Analysis of blood, urine or breath for the purpose of determining the 
alcohol concentration shall be perfom1ed by a laboratory operated by the Idaho state police or by a laboratory 
approved by the Idaho state police under the provisions of approval and certification standards to be set by that 
department, or by any other method approved by the Idaho state police." [emphasis added]. 
10 Defendant's Exhibit #1. 
II Defendant's Exhibit #3. 
12 Section S.lA, page 10 of Defendant's Exhibit #3. The requirement that a 0.20 perfom1ance verification be run 
and logged "once per calendar month" meets the requirements for charges brought pursuant to I.e. § 18-8004C. See 
also Defendant's Exhibit #6, the Simulator Solution Log. 
12 
State v. Besaw 
Opinion & Order on Motion to Dismiss/Suppress 
verification is the time and date recorded on the printout, or the time and date recorded in the log, 
whichever corresponds to the perfonnance verification reference in section 5.1.3 or 5.1.4.1." 
Defendant contends there is conflicting evidence as to when a 0.20 perfonnance 
verification was perfonned on the Lifeloc-FC20 breath testing instrument utilized by Trooper 
Talbott to test Defendant Besaw's blood alcohol content. Defendant Besaw contends the 
printout produced immediately following his breath testing indicates the last 0.20 perfonnance 
verification of the instrument occurred on August 26,2009, and that there is no evidence ofa 
more recent 0.20 perfonnance verification. 13 The Court disagrees. 
The August 2009 event listed on the instrument printout is not the date of a performance 
verification but rather, it is the date and time of the last calibration of the instrument. 14 The 
Idaho Lifeloc-FC20 Reference Manual, found in the record as Defendant's Exhibit #2, states 
clearly that calibration of the instrument is done solely by the Idaho State Police laboratories and 
is password-protected. IS Only the most recent performance verification will appear on the 
instrument print-out, which will more often be a 0.08 performance verification rather than a 0.20 
verification, in compliance with Standard Operating Procedures. Records of performance 
verifications utilizing a 0.20 solution are found on the Instrument Operations Log, in compliance 
with section 5.1.9 of the SOP, and will only appear on the print-out if it was the most recent 
verification perfonned. 
The Instrument Operations Log relevant in the instant matter is found in the record as 
Defendant's Exhibit #4 and evidences a 0.20 perfonnance verification was conducted on the 
Lifeloc-FC20 at issue on January 4,2011, just twelve (12) days prior to Defendant's testing, and 
13 Defendant's Exhibit #5. 
14 See page 27 of the Idaho Lifeloc-FC20 Reference Manual (Defendant's Exhibit #2) and Defendant's Exhibit #5. 
15 Page 24 of the Idaho Lifeloc-FC20 Reference Manual. 
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a 0.08 performance verification was conducted less than two (2) hours after Defendant's 
evidentiary testing was completed. 16 Therefore, the Court finds the Standard Operating 
Procedures were followed, as the appropriate performance verifications were timely conducted 
on the Lifeloc-FC20 instrument at issue and the verifications were properly logged as required 
by the SOP manual. 
(E) THE RECENT VERSION OF THE STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES 
The Defendant in his motion challenges the credibility of the procedures utilized by the 
Idaho State Police Forensics Department during its most recent update of the Idaho Standard 
Operating Procedure Breath Operating Testing booklet. The Defendant further contends the 
language utilized in many portions of the updated SOP 'water down' the standards until they are 
barely recognizable as standards. The Defendant is unclear in his Motion as to how his 
challenge is relevant to the specific pending charge against him. Nevertheless, the Court will 
address Defendant's challenge to the degree his issues are discemable and relevant. 
Pursuant to Idaho Code § 18-8004(4) J7, the legislature has charged the Idaho State 
Police with the duty of promulgating standards for the administration of breath alcohol testing. 
Masterson v. Idaho Department o/Transportation, 150 Idaho 126,244 P.3d 625 (Ct.App.2010). 
In order to meet its statutory responsibility, the Idaho State Police have issued IDAPA 
regulations covering the requirements for the performance of breath testing and have issued 
16 See also Defendant'S Exhibit #6, Simulator Solution Log. 
17 I.e. § 18-8004(4) reads, "For purposes of this chapter, an evidentiary test for alcohol concentration shall be based 
upon a fonnula of grams of alcohol per one hundred (100) cubic centimeters of blood, per two hundred ten (210) 
liters of breath or sixty-seven (67) milliliters of urine. Analysis of blood, urine or breath for the purpose of 
determining the alcohol concentration shall be perfom1ed by a laboratory operated by the Idaho state police or by a 
laboratory approved by the Idaho state police under the provisions of approval and certification standards to be set 
by that department, or by any other method approved by the Idaho state police. Notwithstanding any other provision 
of law or rule of court, the results of any test for alcohol concentration and records relating to calibration, approval, 
certification or quality control perfom1ed by a laboratory operated or approved by the Idaho state police or by any 
other method approved by the Idaho state police shall be admissible in any proceeding in this state without the 
necessity of producing a witness to establish the reliability of the testing procedure for examination." 
14 
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Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) establishing the procedures for maintenance and operation 
of breath testing instruments authorized for use by the Idaho State Police (ISP). 
While courts are often called upon to interpret the regulations and SOP's issued by ISP, 
the Court finds no authority which allows courts to dictate the process by which ISP establishes 
its regulations and SOP's, or to dictate the language to be utilized in the writing ofISP's 
regulations and SOP's. Despite copious arguments by the Defendant as to why he is personally 
offended by the process and language chosen by ISP in updating its SOP, the Defendant fails to 
cite the Court to any authority that gives the Court the power to dictate the process and language 
to be used by ISP in fulfilling its legislative mandate. 
Finally, the Defendant contends that because the most recent version of the SOP was 
issued after Trooper Talbott last recertified as a breath testing specialist, he lacked sufficient 
training on the current standards. The Court is not persuaded, as the arguments proffered by the 
Defendant are circular and in conflict. On one hand, the Defendant contends the most current 
version of SOP's has been so watered down by discretionary language that there are essentially 
no standards. The Defendant then argues that because Trooper Talbott had not received training 
using the newest version of the SOP's, he was not sufficiently trained to meet the requirements 
of a celiified breath testing specialist. If the Court were to accept the Defendant's first premise, 
that the SOP's are so watered down that there are in essence no standards, then it would naturally 
flow that Trooper Talbott was if anything, overly trained as he was operating using much more 
stringent standards than were required. The Defendant simply cannot have it both ways. In the 
instant matter, the State has presented evidence showing Trooper Talbott was certified and 
sufficiently trained as a breath testing specialist on the day he administered breath testing to the 
Defendant and therefore, the required standards were met. 
15 
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" .... 
ORDER 
For the reasons stated in the above Opinion of the Court, Defendant's Motion to Dismiss 
and/or to Suppress and/or in Limine is hereby DENIED. 
DATED thiS.:1il- day of July, 201 [;.----,L--.=. 
Certificate of Mailing 
I hereby certify that on this ~ day of July, 2011, a true copy of the foregoing was 
delivered to the following: 
__ U. S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 




Attomey at Law 
P.O. Box 285 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
State v. Besaw 
Opinion & Order on Motion to Dismiss/Suppress 
__ U. S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
~ley Messenger Service 
__ Hand Delivery 
Facsimile 
Justin Coleman 
County Prosecutor's Office 
P.O. Box 1267 
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Justin Coleman present on behalf of the State 
Charles Stroschein present representing George 1. Besaw, Jr. who IS 
present 
State and Defense are ready to proceed 
Court addresses jurors 
Clerk calls the roll of jurors 
Present: Jodi Rae Beardsley, Charles Woodrow Blakeley, Gary Lee 
Bohnsack, Darci Jean Braun, Ashley N. Billings Burman, Theresa Louise 
Currin, Andena Jewel Hibbard, Suzan Kerrie Johnson, Gary William 
Jones, William Arvid Lahti, Kimberlee Ann Lavin, Sharon Joy Lewis, 
Michael A. Madrid, Phillip John Moser, Haylee Davmielle Moses, Sandra 
Sue Peer, Christian Paul E . Reel, Kenneth Allen Roughton, Terri Lynn 
Sterling, Patricia Squires Surgeon, Belinda Lee Turner and Harleigh Mark 
Williams 
State and Defense have no challenges to the panel. 
Clerk administers the voir dire oath 
Clerk selects at random the names of 14 jurors 
Selected: #1 Andena Jewel Hibbard, #2 Patricia Squires Surgeon, #3 
Charles Woodrow Blakeley, #4 William Arvid Lal1ti, #5 Theresa Louise 
Currin, #6 Ashley N. Billings-Burman, #7 Kimberlee Ann Lavin, #8 
Christian Paul E. Reel, #9 Jodi Rae Beardsley, #10 Belinda Lee Turner, 
# 11 Sharon Joy Lewis, #12 Harleigh Mark Williams, #13 Sandra Sue Peer 
and #14 Michael A. Madrid 
Court makes initial comments regarding jury service. 
Court introduces himself, clerk and bailiff 
Court introduces Mr. Coleman - Attorney for the State 
Coleman introduces himself and states who works in his office 
Court introduces Mr. Stroschein 
Stroschein introduces himself and states who works in his office 
Voir Dire Examination: 
COURT MINUTES 
i~ 2 3 
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. ... .. .. ... , .... ... . 
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Juror #8 Christian Reel states that he knows the Defendant and it would 
prevent him from acting with impartiality 
Stroschein does not object to l\1r. Reel being excused 
Clerk draws Haylee DaVvnielle Moses to replace juror #8 Mr. Reel who is 
excused 
Court questions Ms. Moses 
Juror #11 Sharon Lewis states that she does not remember things and is 
not good at taking notes 
Stroschein has no objection to Ms. Lewis being excused 
Court excuses Ms. Lewis 
Clerk draws Terri Lynn Sterling to replace juror #11 Ms. Lewis 
Court addresses Ms. Sterling 
Questions by Counsel: 
State questions the jury 
Jurors Rachel Ann Kennedy and Patrick Warren Hohnstein arrive during 
the State's questioning of the jury (Michael Anthony Barros does not 
appear for jury duty today.) 
State passes jury for cause 
Stroschein questions the jury 
Stroschein passes jury for cause 
Juror # 14 addresses Stroschein and Stroschein continues questioning 
Jurors 
Stroschein confIrms that he passes the jury for cause 
No challenges for cause 
Court is off the record 
Court states the 6 remaining names: 
#1 Harleigh Mark Williams, #2 Belinda Lee Turner, #3 Charles Woodrow 
Blakeley, #4 William Arvid Lahti, #5 Sandra Sue Peer and #6 Ashley N 
Billings Burman 
All jurors not selected are excused by the Court 
Jury exits 
Court is in recess 
Court is back on the record and the jury enters 
Explanation of Procedures 
Preliminary Instructions 
Clerk reads the complaint 
Clerk ends 
States opening statements 
Stroschein objects - opening statement must be factual and not argument; 
Court overrules the objection 
Stroschein - opening statements 
Clerk swears in the trial jurors 
State calls Trooper Je(forv Talbott (ISP); Sworn in by clerk 
State - direct exam 
Stroschein objects - best evidence is the video; Court overrules objection 
Stroschein objects -leading; Comi overrules objection 


































Stroschein objects - Jack of foundation; Court overrules objection 
Stroschein objects - best evidence is the video; Court allows witness to 
demonstrate 
Stroschein objects - hearsay; Court sustains objection 
State's Exhibit 1 is shown to Stroschein and given to witness 
State moves for admission of State's Exhibit 1; Stroschein asks question in 
aid of objection; Stroschein has no objection; Court admits State's 
Exhibit 1 
Stroschein objects - best evidence; Court overrules objection 
Stroschein objects - foundation and hearsay; Court overrules objection 
Stroschein objects - hearsay and best evidence; Court overrules objection 
State's exhibit 2 is shown to Stroschein and given to witness 
State moves for admission of State's Exhibit 2; Stroschein has no 
objection; Court admits State's Exhibit 2 
State requests recess to set up the video for the jury to view it 
Court admonishes the jury 
Jury exits 
Court is in recess 
Court is back on the record and the jury enters 
State plays the video of the traffic stop (State's Exhibit 2) for the jury 
Video is completed 
Court admonishes jury before court takes a lunch recess 
Jury exits 
Court is in recess 
Court is back on the record. Jury instruction conference held on the lunch 
hour. Jury instructions are being repaired. 
State and Defense have no objection to the jury instructions 
Jury enters 
State ends direct exam 
Trooper Jeffory Talbott is back on the witness stand and is reminded that 
he is still under oath 
Stroschein - cross exam of Jeffory Talbott 
State objects - argumentative; Court sustains objection 
State objects - asked and answered; Court overrules objection 
Defendant's Exhibit A handed to ",ritness 
State objects - relevance; Court overrules 
Defendant's Exhibit B handed to \vitness 
Defendant' s Exhibit C handed to witness 
Stroschein moves for admission of Defendant's Exhibit A, B and C; State 
objects to Defendant's Exhibit A because it is not relevant but has no 
objection to B and C 
Court sustains the State's objection to State's Exhibit A and admits States 
Exhibit B andC 
State objects - speculation; Court allows answer 
State - what Stroschein is asking may not be relevant; Court will allow 
witness to demonstrate the one leg stand for 30 seconds 
COURT MINUTES 3 





































State objects - asked and answered; Court sustains objection 
Stroschein continues cross exam 
Stroschein ends cross exam 
State - redirect of Trooper Talbott 
State ends redirect; Stroschein has no recross; Witness steps down 
State rests 
Stroschein has no witnesses 
Court admonishes jury; Jury exits 
Court takes a short recess 
Court is back on the record; Jury enters 
Court reads jury instructions 
Stroschein requests to approach; Stroschein and State approach the bench 
Court continues to read the jury instructions 
State - closing argument 
State ends closing argument 
Stroschein - closing argument (part of State's Exhibit 2 is played for 
Stroscheins' closing argument) 
Stroschein ends closing argument 
State - rebuttal 
Stroschein objects - evidence no in record; Court overrules objection 
State ends rebuttal 
Clerk administers the bailiff s oath 
Jury exits to deliberate 
Stroschein objects to inconsistency in instructions #5 and #6 
Court notes objection and overrules 
Recess 
Court is back on the record for a vYTitten question from the jury 
Instruction #17 pertains to the question 
Stroschein states that the jury should be told to "yes and instructed to read 
jury instruction #17". 
State responds 
Court writes back to the jury instructing them to review instruction #17 
Recess 
Court is back on the record and the jury has reached a verdict 
Jury enters 
Presiding juror presents Court with the verdict 
Clerk reads the verdict of guilty for the DUI and the alcohol level of 
.20 or over 
Jury states that this is the verdict of all 
Jury is polled. Each juror states the finding 
Jury is excused 
Court sets sentencing for 10-25-2011 at 1 :30 p.m. and instructs l'v1r. Besaw 
to obtain an alcohol evaluation prior to that date. 
Recess 

















CHARLES M. STROSCHEIN 
CLARK and FEENEY, LLP 
Attorneys for Defendant 
1229 Main Street 
P. O. Drawer 285 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
Telephone: (208)743-9516 
Idaho State Bar No. 3058 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
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17 Herewith submitted are DEFENDANT'S REQlJESTED JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
18 numbered consecutively ONE through NINE. 
19 DA TED this 4- day of September, 2011. 







DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED JURy 
INSTRUCTIONS 
B \ ____ ~--__ ~~~~=-____ --__ __ 
r es chein, a member of the firm 
Attorneys for Defendant 
- 1 
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CLARK AND FEENEY, LLP 



























I hereby certify on the 7th day 
of September, 2011, a true copy 
of the foregoing instrument 
was: Mailed 
x Faxed 
Hand delivered to: 
Justin J. Coleman 
Deputy Prosecutor 
Nez Perce County Prosecutor's Office 
P.O. Box 1267 
Lewiston,ID 83501 
DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED JURy 
INSTRUCTIONS -2 
LAW OFFICES OF 
CLARK AND FEENEY, LLP 
LEWISTON, IDAHO 63501 
INSTRUCTION NO. _1_ 
You are instructed that if evidence in this case as to any of the material allegations of the 
Complaint is susceptible of two constructions or interpretations, each of which appears to you to be 
reasonable, and one of which points to the guilt of Mr. Besaw and the other to his innocence, it is 
your duty under the law, to adopt that interpretation which will admit of Mr. Besaw's innocence, and 
reject that which points to his guilt. 
CALJIC (4th ed.) 52.02. 
State v. Price, 93 Idaho 615, 616-617, 469 P.2d 544 (1970). 







DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
INSTRUCTION NO. -L 
A complaint is but a formal method of accusing a citizen of a crime. It is not evidence of any 
kind against the accused. 
There are two types of evidence from which a jury may properly find a citizen guilty of a crime, 
one is direct evidence such as the testimony of an eye witness. The other is circumstantial evidence, 
the proof of a chain of circumstances pointing to the commission of the offense. 
As a general rule, the law makes no distinction between direct and circumstantial evidence, but 
simply requires that, before convicting a citizen, the jury must be satisfied of the citizen's guilt 








DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED JURY INSTRUCTIONS 430 
INSTRUCTION NO.l 
A witness may be impeached by showing that he or she has been previously convicted of a felony, 
or by C1vidence which is contradictory to that given by him or her or by evidence that his general 
reputation for truth, honesty, or integrity is bad, or by evidence that he or she has made at other times 
statements inconsistent with his or her present testimony. 
To "impeach" means to produce proof that the witness is not worthy of belief, or to put in 
question his or her truthfulness. Impeachment of a witness in the way mentioned does not 
necessarily mean that the witness's testimony is completely deprived of value, or that its value is 
destroyed in any degree. The effect, if any, of impeachment upon the credibility of the witness is for 






DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED WRY INSTRUCTIONS 
INSTRUCTION NO. _4_ 
It is not a crime to consume alcohol and then drive in the state of Idaho. 







DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
INSTRUCTION NO. _5_ 
A citizen in a criminal trial has a constitutional right not to be compelled to testify. The decision 
whether to testify is left to the citizen, acting with the advice and assistance of the citizen's lawyer. 
You must not draw any inference of guilt from the fact that the citizen does not testify, nor should 





Covered ---------------------Other ______________________ _ 
JUDGE 
DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
INSTRUCTION NO. _6_ 
The testimony of a police officer is not entitled to any greater weight than that of any other 
witness. 
United States v. Bush, 375 F.2d 602,605, N. 6 (D.C. Cir. 1967). 
United States v. Reid, 410 F.2d 1227, 1228. 







DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED JURy INSTRUCTIONS 
INSTRUCTION NO.l 
George Besaw comes into court protected, as every citizen of the State is, by the presumption of 
the law that he is innocent of any crime, and particularly that he is innocent of the crime charged 
against him in this Complaint. That he has been suspected and charged with perpetration of a crime 
does not tend to any degree to show his guilt or remove from him the presumption of innocence, 
which the law throws about him. That he has had a complaint filed against him is not evidence of 
his guilt. It is a mere accusation and the jury should not permit themselves, to any extent, to be 






DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
INSTRUCTION NO. _8_ 
It is not essential to a conviction in this case that the testimony of the arresting officer be 
corroborated by other evidence, provided that from all the evidence you are convinced beyond a 
reasonable doubt ofthe citizen's guilt. However, a charge such as that made against the citizen in 
this case is one which, generally speaking, is easily made, and once made, difficult to disprove even 
if the citizen is innocent. From the nature of the case such as this, the arresting officer and the 
citizen usually are the only witnesses. Therefore, I charge you that the law requires you to examine 
the testimony of the arresting officer who was the witness in the case with caution. 
In giving "this" instruction I do not mean to imply an opinion of my o"\vn as to the credibility of 
any witness. 
The fact that the charge here made is one difficult to disprove should not deter you from rendering 
a verdict of guilty if you are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the citizen is guilty as 
charged. 







DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
INSTRUCTION NO. L 
You should consider whether the field sobriety tests were reliable. Whether the person who 
administered the field sobriety tests followed scientifically acceptable procedures, when the tests 
were given. Whether the physical and medical condition ofMr. Besaw, when the tests were given, 
did not cause the test results to be unreliable. Whether scientifically acceptable procedures or 
procedures adapted by the National Highway Transportation Safety Administration were followed 
in the instruction, performance, and evaluation of the field sobriety tests. 
State v. Gleason, 123 Idaho 62 (1992). 
State v. Garrett, 119 Idaho 878 (1991). 
State v. Parkinson, 128 Idaho 29, 909 P.2d 647 (Ct. App. 1996). 
Given ----------------------Refused. ______________ _ 




DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
IN THE DISTRICT C01JRT OF THE SECO:N-U J1JDICLAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN Mv FOR THE COuNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 











Case No. CR 20 Ii -419 
v"ERDICT 
---------------------------) 
We, the Ju..ry, duly sworn, empanelled to try the above-entitled cause, for our verdict say 
that we find the Defendant, George I. Besaw, II., 
DRIVlNG lJ:NvER THE INFLUENCE OF ALCOHOL, Idaho Code Section 18-8004 
NOT GUILTY 
GlJILTY of Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol. 
If you indicated above that the defendant was "GUILTY", please answer the following 
question: 
Q1JESTION: Did you fInd beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant, George J. 
Besaw, JI., was cLriving with an alcohol concentration of .20 or more as sho\VIl by an analysis of 
his breath? 
No L Yes 





(..;....'=-::.. ~~!::'.~- , :" 
VERDICT 38 
AMENDED 
The defendant was advised of all rights and potential penalties, in compliance with the provisions of LC.R. 11 and LM.C.R.5(f). 
DEFENDANT: , S e./) Is represented by counsel ( ) Waived right to counsel () Waived rig =jury nEfF 
(><I Understands nature of the charge, right of confrontation, and consequences of plea /~ -~ 8 -r1 
C/) Waived right against incrimination () Waived all defenses ( ) Acknowledge~jea is ~un~ 
-N 
f£ERT ENTERS: 
~udgment after plea of guilty V:) Judgment after trial - guilty 
( ) Withheld judgment on conditions listed below 
THE DEFENDAl~T IS ORDERED TO PAY THE FOLLOWING: . 
c'i.0........ i ' (")" I~. 
~ine"--- (iZ) Costs $', '60, h xLc 
( ) Reimbursement for public defender services 
( ) To be paid Pay 
( ) Restitution 




begin: ______ _ 
_____ per month 
(~Jail m Efl months Credit ___________ days/months 
( ) Report to jail _________________________________ _ 
( ) Work Release ____ ~ ______________________________ _ 
( )ill-homeLuu,HH'JL~··o ________________________________ _ 
( ) Complete hours of community service _____ , and pay workers compensation insurance in the amount 
of 
HAVE DRIVING PRIv'lLEGES (~ended for e day~ont§Jommencing ________ _ 
Reinstatement of driving privileges must be accomplished before you can drive - apply to: 
Driver's Services, Post Office Box 7129, Boise, ID 83707-1129. 
( ) Temporary driving privileges granted upon application. 
PRO:BATION ORDERED/CONDITlONS: Length '"y Y Termination date to Izs-4f I~ 
ex> ,170~,nonths of jail time is suspended and lor ~ $ 25C:) of the fme is suspendect'and will ~ot have 
~ I or paid if the defendant complies with the terms of probation. 
* Meet with Probation Officer within 48 hours. 




























CHARLES M. STROSCHEIN 
CLARK and FEENEY, LLP 
Attorneys for Defendant 
1229 Main Street 
P.O. Drawer 285 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
Telephone: (208)743-9516 
Idaho State Bar No. 3058 
FILED 
uJj)!I!l4lhJ/~ / 
I.. : .~_ 
IN THE DISTRlCT COURT OF THE SECOl\TD JUDICIAL DISTRlCT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) Case No. CR 2011-0000419 
Plaintiff, ) 
) ORDER FOR STAY OF CDL 
vs. ) LICENSE SUSPENSION 
) 
GEORGEJ. BESAW, JR. ) 
) 
Defendant. ) 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that any license suspension of the Class A driver's 
license of George J. Besaw, JR., is stayed pending the appeal ofthe issues in this case. Mr. 
Besaw has a Class A or commercial driver's license, and there are issues that are pending 
in this case that are similar to the issues that are set out in Mr. Besaw's Judicial Review of 
his Administrative License Suspension and his CDL suspension that are both being heard 
in the District Court, Case Numbers CV11-00641 and CV 2011-00364. 
THEREFORE, it is in the interest of justice that the license suspension associated 
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with the DUI conviction be stayed pending the outcome ofthe appeal ofthe issues in this 
case. The Idaho Transportation Department is directed to stay the license suspension of 
Mr. Besaw's Class A license. This stay will tenninate in 6 months unless counsel brings 
forward Motion to Extend the Stay. This requirement will allow the Court to keep track 
of the appeal. The sentence regarding the j ail time, fines, and court costs are also stayed. 
"'"""' DATED this ~ay of October, 2011. 
CERTIFICAT ICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the o~ day of October, 2011, I caused to be served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, and addressed 
to the following: 
Justin 1. Coleman 
Deputy Prosecutor 
Nez Perce County Prosecutor's Office 
P.O. Box 1267 
Lewiston, ID 8350 1 
Idaho Transportation Department 
Driver Services Section 
POBox 7129 
Boise ID 83707 
Facsimile: (208) 332-7810 
Charles M. Stroschein 
Clark and Feeney, LLP 
Attorneys at Law 
P.O. Box 285 
Lewiston ID, 83501 
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CHARLES M. STROSCHEIN 
CLARK and FEENEY, LLP 
Attorneys for Defendant 
1229 Main Street 
P. O. Drawer 285 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
Telephone: (208)743-9516 
Idaho State Bar No. 3058 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 











Case No. CR 2011-0000419 
ORDER FOR STAY OF CDL 
LICENSE SUSPENSION 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that any license suspension of the Class A driver's 
license of George J. Besaw, JR., is stayed pending the appeal of the issues in this case. Mr. 
Besaw has a Class A or commercial driver's license, and there are issues that are pending 
on this appeal that are similar to the issues that are set out in Mr. Besaw's Judicial Review 
of his Administrative License Suspension and his CDL suspension that are both being 
heard in the District Court, Case Numbers CV11-00641 and CV 2011-00364. 
THEREFORE, it is in the interest of justice that the license suspension associated 
ORDER TO STAY ON CDL 
LICENSE SUSPENSION 
LAW OFFICES OF 
CLARK AND FEENEY, LLP 



























with the DDI conviction be stayed pending the outcome of the appeal of the issues in this 
case. The Idaho Transportation Department is directed to stay the license suspension of 
Mr. Besaw's Class A license. 
'-7"~ 
DATED this c::-:::> day of October, 2011. 
I hereby certify on the~ 
day of October, 2011, a true copy 
of the fore~oing instrument 
was: V Mailed 
Faxed 
:=iZ Hand delivered 
Overnight mail to: 
Justin 1. Coleman 
Deputy Prosecutor 
Nez Perce County Prosecutor's Office 
P,O. Box 1267 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Idaho Transportation Department 
Driver Services Section 
POBox 7129 
Boise ID 83707 
Facsimile: (208) 332-7810 
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Charles M. Stroschein 
Clark and Feeney, LLP 
Attorneys at Law 
P.O. Box 285 
Lewiston ID, 83501 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEC01'-.lJ) JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STA TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
CR-2011-0000419 
State ofIdaho vs. George Joseph Besaw Jr 
Hearing type: Sentencing 
Hearing date: 10/25/2011 
Time: 1 :37 pm 
Judge: Jay P. Gaskill 
Courtroom: 3 
Court reporter: None 
Minutes Clerk: Evans 
Tape Number: courtroom3 
Defense Attorney: CharJes Stroschein 
Prosecutor: Justin Coleman 
Court Services: Kyle Peterson 
013740 
BE IT KNOWN THAT THE FOLLOWING PROCEEDINGS WERE HAD, TO WIT: Has Eva!. 
Most of the sentence is stayed pending the outcome of the appeal. The only part of the sentence that is not stayed is the 
probation. The probation is for 1 year and began today. 
Defendant present for sentenClll2. [X] with Counsel 0 without Counsel 
Notification of Penalties reviewed and signed by Defendant [X] YES o NO 
[XJ JudQIDent after trial- Quilty Excessive Dill 0 Withheld JudQIDent entered 
Court Orders: Fine: $ 1000.00 Court Costs: $ 182.50 Suspended: $ 250.00 
P.D. Reimbursement: $ NA Total: $ To Pay: To Be Determined after appeal 
License Suspension: 12 mo Commence on date: To Be Determined after appeal 
Jail: 180 d Suspended: 170 d Report Date: To Be Determmed after appeal. The stay on the 
CDL is for 60 days and then a review should be requested bv Stroschein so the Court can stay informed. 
Community Service imposed - NA hours Complete by date: NA 
$ NA Community Service Fee imposed Due by date: NA 
PROBATION ORDERED/CONDITIONS: Length 1 year Termination date 10-25-2012 
(l2J) 170 l2J days 0 months of jail time is suspended and / or (l2J ) $ 250.00 ofthe fine is suspended and 
will not have to be served and 1 or paid if the defendant complies with the terms of probation. 
• Meet with Probation Officer within 48 hours. 
• Sign Probation Agreement and abide by all terms and conditions of probation. 
• Notify the Court, in writing, of any change of address 
(l2J ) Other Complete anv and all treatment counsellin2. or follow up at PO's discretion 
(l2J ) Other No alcohol. drugs or bars 






























CHARLES M. STROSCHEIN 
CLARK and FEEt'n~Y, LLP 
Attorneys for Defendant 
1229 Main Street 
P. O. Drawer 285 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
Telephone: (208)743-9516 
Idaho State Bar No. 3058 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF t-.TEZ PERCE 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) Case No. CR 2011-0000419 
Plaintiff, ) 
) NOTICE OF APPEAL 
vs. ) 
) 
GEORGE J. BESAW, JR. ) 
) 
Defendant. ) 
TO: THE STATE OF IDAHO, the above-named Respondent, and to Justin 
Coleman, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney for Nez Perce County, and to the Clerk of the 
above-entitled court: 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that: 
1. The above named Appellant, George J. Besaw, Jr., appeals to the District 
Court from that certain Opinion and Order of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and/or 
Suppress and/or In Limine entered in the above entitled action on the 28th day of July, 
2011, the Honorable Jay Gaskill presiding, the Judgement of Conviction was entered on 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
/; (i '0': 
1 ""l 
LAW OFFICES OF 
CLARK AND FEENEY, LLP 
LEWISTON, IDAHO 83501 
1 October 25, 2011. 
2 2. That the party has a right to appeal to the District Court from the 
3 
magistrate's decision to deny the issues raised at the pre-trial hearing in this case. 
4 
5 
3. A preliminary statement of the issues on appeal which the Appellant then 
6 intends to assert in the appeal; provided, any such list of issues on appeal shall not prevent 
7 the Appellant from asserting other issues on appeal. 
8 
A) Whether the court abused its discretion by not suppressing the breath test. 
9 
10 B) Whether the court abused its discretion by not suppressing the field sobriety 
11 test or limiting the use of field sobriety tests by the State. 
12 
C) Whether the court abused its discretion in its failure to find a lack of 
13 
14 
standards in breath testing as required by the Idaho Code § 18-8004(4). 
15 4. No order has been entered sealing all or any portion of the record. 
16 5. The standard reporter's transcript has already been prepared ofthe hearing. 
17 
6. I certify: 
18 
19 
(a) That the transcript fonn the Motion Hearing held on May 6, 2011, has 
2 0 already been prepared. 
21 (b) That the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's record is not applicable 
22 
in this appeal as it is from the magistrate to District Court. 
23 
24 (c) That the appellate filing fee has been paid. 
25 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 2 
26 
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(d) That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant 
to LA.R., Rule 20. 
DATED this \~-\-day of November, 2011. 
CL~ and?,FEENEY, r{LW I' 
(
j IliA /\V 
By u4 VL(. z)fjJ~ 
v 
Charles M. Stroschein, a member of 
the firm. Attorneys for Defendant. 
I hereby certify on the \9# 
day of November, 2011, a true copy 
of the foregoing instrument 
was: L Mailed 
Faxed 
Hand delivered 
Overnight mail to: 
Justin J. Co leman 
Deputy Prosecutor 
Nez Perce County Prosecutor's Office 
P.O. Box 1267 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
Linda Carlton 
Certified Court Reporter 
425 Warner Avenue 
Lewiston ID 83501 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUD CIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
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CASE NO. CR 11-00419 
ORDER SCHEDULING BRIEFS 
AND ARGUMENT 




A transcript of the proceeding in the Magistrates' Division has been filed with this 
Court. 
THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 
1) Appellant shall file their brief on or before January 9, 2012 
2) Respondent shall file their brief on or before February 6, 2012. 
3) Any Reply Brief shall be filed on or before February 28, 2012. 
4) Appellate argument shall take place on March 8, 2012, commencing at the hour of 
10:00 a.m. 
DATED this ~ay o~pcfc:r'/118ci:) 201/ 
ORDER SCHEDULING BRIEFS 
AND ARGUMENT 1 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true copy of the foregoing ORDER SCHEDULING BRIEFS AND 
ARGUMENT was 
/ hand delivered via court basket, or 
__ mailed, postage prepaid, by the undersigned at Lewiston, Idaho, this L day of December 
2011, to: 
Charles Stroschein 
PO Box 285 
Lewiston,ID 83501 
Justin Coleman 
PO Box 1267 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
PATTY O. WEEKS, CLERK 
By ~J!1iL 
o~ 
ORDER SCHEDULING BRIEFS 
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DE LiTY II 
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Idaho, in and for the County of Nez Perce. 
THE HONORABLE JAY GASKILL 
CHARLES M. STROSCHEIN 
Clark and Feeney 
1229 Main Street 
P. O. Drawer 285 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501 
(208) 743-9516 




Nez Perce County Prosecutor's 
Office 
P.O. Box 1267 
Lewiston, Idaho 83501. 
(208) 799-3073 
Attorney for Respondent 
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1 III. 
2 
Statement of the Case 
3 
4 
This is an appeal from the decision of the magistrate court regarding several pre-
5 trial motion issues. 
6 IV. 
7 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceeding 
8 
9 On January 16,2011, George Besaw, Jr., was driving in Nez Perce County with 
10 a Class A Idaho driver's license. The arresting officer, ISP Trooper Jeffrey Talbott, 
11 
indicated that a white 1995 colored Ford F 150 failed to maintain it's line and failed to 
12 
13 
signal southbound on 2pt Street at approximately 16th Avenue in Lewiston, Nez Perce 
14 County, State of Idaho. The arresting officer recorded his contact with the vehicle and 
15 the occupants. The Court can note the weather conditions from the video. Exhibit 7. It 
16 
was cold, rainy and wet. 
17 
18 
The officer could smell the strong odor of an alcoholic beverage coming from the 
19 vehicle and noticed the driver's eyes were bloodshot. The driver identified himself as 
20 George J. Besaw, Jr. After running a record's check, the driver was requested to exit the 
21 
vehicle to perform the standard sobriety evaluations. 
22 
23 Trooper Talbott was first certified as a breath testing specialist and operator on the 
24 Lifeloc device in October of2008. T. at p. 31. He was re-certified in August of2010. 
25 
26 APPELLANT'S BRIEF 1 
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1 T. at p. 31, Exhibit 1. He testified at the time of the hearing that after his training in 
2 
August of 2010, new versions of SOPs were issued. The current version was issued in 
3 
4 
November of 2010. He did not receive any training on the SOP that was issued in 
5 November of 201 O. T. at pp. 34, 39. The trooper indicated he had no involvement in 
6 writing the SOP or other manuals generated by the ISP Forensic Services. T. at p. 3S. 
7 
During the course of the hearing, the trooper was asked questions regarding the 
8 
9 conditions of the area where the field sobriety tests were conducted, the slope of the 
10 parking lot where they were conducted, and the weather conditions. T. at pp. 26-28, lOS. 
11 
The trooper conducted the horizontal gaze nystagnus walk and tum and one leg 
12 
stand in adverse weather conditions. Exhibit 7. Mr. Besaw was arrested after the field 
13 
14 sobriety test were completed. He was placed in the back of the trooper's car, handcuffed 
15 with his hands behind him with his feet in front of him. The trooper read to him the 
16 
Notice of Suspension. The trooper did not read the language that is in the bottom pOltion 
17 
18 
of the middle section of the advisory, the language states as follows, "THIS 
19 SUSPENSION FOR FAILURE OR REFUSAL OF THE EVIDENTIARY TESTeS) IS 
20 SEPARATE FROM ANY OTHER SUSPENSION ORDERED BY THE COURT." T. 
21 
at p. 90. 
22 
23 The trooper read the advisory to Mr. Besaw but did not give him a copy of said 
24 form at the scene. T. at pp. 89-90. The trooper did not video the back seat of the contact 
25 
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1 with Mr. Besaw until after the breath testing had been completed. T. at p. 86, Exhibit 7. 
2 
The trooper indicated he was positioned outside the vehicle standing and bent over some 
3 
4 
of the time. T. at pp. 93-99. The trooper was asked questions about J\1r. Besaw and his 
5 CDL license and what he had advised Mr. Besaw regarding the license suspension for a 
6 Class A license. T. at p. 91. 
7 
The video shows that the trooper did not read all of the language that is contained 
8 
9 
in the middle section of the advisory. 
10 During the IS-minute observation period, while the trooper was standing outside 
11 
his vehicle with Mr. Besaw handcuffed with his hands behind him and feet forward, the 
12 
13 
trooper had to deal with the window wipers going, the noise of21 st Street, the interruption 
14 of Lewiston police officers on two different occasions and his discussion with those 
15 police officers regarding the new advisory form and directing them to retrieve the new 
16 
advisory fonn from the front seat of his vehicle. Exhibit 7, T. at pp. 93-99. The trooper 
17 
18 
had to deal with one of the passengers getting out ofthe vehicle and coming towards the 
19 trooper's vehicle. T. at pp. 97-98. The trooper had to deal with the wife of the other 
20 passenger coming forward to the vehicle after exiting her car which she drove to the 
21 
China Inn parking lot. Exhibit 7, T. at pp. 98-99. The trooper made eye contact with the 
22 
23 Lewiston police officers, and he could not guarantee that he was bent over the whole 15-
24 minute wait. T. at pp. 86-87, 93-94. The trooper indicated that he had to yell at the 
25 
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passenger to stay at the vehicle. Exhibit 7. 
During the course of the observation period, the trooper would have been dealing 
with the rain, the traffic noise, the window wiper sounds, the Lewiston police officers, 
dispatch, his radio playing, the passenger approaching the vehicle, the wife of the 
passenger approaching the vehicle, having eye contact with the individuals that 
approached him, and speaking with them while Mr. Besaw was sitting in the back of the 
trooper's vehicle without the interior video recorder recording the actions of the breath 
test and advisory. The breath test result was a .219, insufficient, .20 l. Exhibit 5. 
The printout also notes the following, "Last calibrated CAL standard .206 time 
9:55 date 8/26/2009. Last check CAL standard .08 result .073 time 4:43 date 1/6/2011." 
Exhibit 5. 
The November, 2011, SOP requires a .20 performance verification for breath tests 
over .20. Exhibit 3. SOP, section 5.l.3 states, 
"A performance verification of the Alca sensor and Lifeloc FC20 
instruments using a .08 or a .20 performance verification must be 
performed within twenty four hours, before or after a evidentiary test to be 
approved for evidentiary use. Multiple breath alcohol tests may be covered 
by a single performance verification. Reference 5.1.4.1 for clarification on 
the use of the .20 solution in this capacity." 
Section 5.1.4 states, 
"A .20 performance verification should be run and results logged 
once every calendar month and replaced with the fresh solution 
approximately every twenty five verification or until it reaches its 
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expiration date, which ever comes first. 
NOTE: The .20 performance verification was implemented for the 
sole purpose of supporting the instrument results of a 18-8004 C 
charge. Failure to timely perform a .20 performance verification 
will not invalidate tests performed that yield results at other levels 
or in charges other than 18-8004 C." 
Section 5.1.4.1 states, "The .20 perfOlIDance verification satisfies the requirement 
for perfonnance verification within twenty four hours, before or after an evidentiary test 
at any level. The .20 performance verification solution should be not used routinely for 
this purpose." The SOP does not have language that allows for a .08 solution to be run 
at "any level" like the .20 solution. 
The instrument log sheet for the unit used on Mr. Besaw notes that a performance 
verification was done at 4:27 a.m. on January 16,2011, using the .08 solution with test 
results of .073/.073, lot number 10802, bottle 0353. Exhibit 4. 
Mr. Besaw was arrested and charged with a DUI. 
E-mail exchanges regarding the changes in the SOP were admitted into evidence 
and were attached to the closing argument with bate stamped numbers for ease of 
reference. Those bate stamped numbers are referred to in this brief on appeal. 
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1 v. 
2 
Issues Presented on Appeal 
3 
4 
l. Whether the court abused its discretion by not suppressing the breath test. 
5 lea). There was a failure to comply with the standard operating procedure 
6 requirement of a 0.20 solution performance verification within twenty four 
7 
(24) hours ofMr. Besaw's breath samples. 
8 
9 l(b). There was not a proper fifteen (15) minute observation period conducted. 
10 2. Whether the court abused its discretion by not suppressing the field sobriety test 
11 
or limiting the use of field sobriety tests by the State. 
12 
3. Whether the court abused its discretion in its failure to find a lack of standards in 
13 
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THE TROOPER FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE STANDARD 
OPERA TING PROCEDURE REQUIREMENT OF A 0.20 SOLUTION 
PERFORMANCE VERIFICATION 
Mr. Besaw was arrested by Trooper Talbott on January 16, 2001. Mr. Besaw blew 
a 0.219, insufficient and a 0.201 breath test. Exhibit 5. The performance verification 
check was run with a O.S solution, lot number 10S02, bottle 0353. Exhibit 4. Idaho Code 
(I. C.) § lS-S004( 4) requires that breath testing be run pursuant to standards developed by 
the ISP. The Court can also note the ID AP A rules that require standards be put into place. 
IDAPA 11.03.01.014.03. 
The Lifeloc reference manual specifically indicates that it is not a standard. 
Exhibit 2 at p. 4 of 34. The only standards that are currently in place is the SOP. Exhibit 
3. The Court can note that there are certain definitions found in the Lifeloc reference 
manual. Calibration is defined as: "In the field this menu is used to run performance 
verification checks, also known as wet checks or calibration checks. Actual re-calibration 
of the instrument is done by the ISP labs and is password-protected". At p. 9 of 34 of 
Exhibit 2. There is a definition of performance verification which states: "Your agency 
may require that only BTS handle the performance verification checks. Don't 
attempt performance verification checks unless you have been trained in the proper 
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1 procedure." (emphasis added) At p. 24 of34 of Exhibit 2. The Court will find none of 
2 
this in the SOP. 
3 
4 
The printout from Mr. Besaw's breath test has additional information. Exhibit 5. 
5 After the breath test sequence, there is an indication oflast calibrated "cal standard" .206 
6 and the date was August 26, 2009. R. at p. 3. The Lifeloc manual, has a similar printout 
7 
8 
that states similar language regarding last calibrated and last check. At p. 27 of 34 of 
9 Exhibit 2. 
10 The Court can read the manual and note what the machine is supposed to register 
11 
regarding calibration and what was done in this particular circumstance. Exhibit 2. There 
12 
13 
is no indication of another 0.20 solution check after August 26,2009. 
14 Please review what is set out in the Lifeloc manual at page 31 of 34, Exhibit 2. 
15 The printout (Exhibit 5) is inconsistent with the SOP (Exhibit 3). There is no verification 
16 
from the Lifeloc itself that there was ever a 0.20 solution check after August 26,2009. 
17 
18 However compare with the log sheet that notes a .20 solution check at the beginning of 
19 the month. Exhibit 4. There is no explanation to why the Lifeloc did not register the .20 
20 
solution change noted on the log sheet. 
21 
22 
Based on the definition of calibration found in the manual, page 9 of 34, the 
23 monthly performance verification check is suspect. Exhibit 2. 
24 The SOP is currently the only ISPFS standard. Exhibit 3. It does not have any 
25 
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performance verification or simulator check. Exhibit 3, SOP, at p. 2 of21. 
The Court can note there is a different procedure that is set out for minors in 
possession or consumption. Exhibit 3, SOP page 19 of21. Paragraph 8.1 has a totally 
different set-up and does not make a distinction between the breath instruments compared 
to paragraph 6.2. Exhibit 3 at p. 15 of 21. The Court has to wonder why there is a 
difference and why there is a distinction between the process that is found at 8.1 versus 
the process that is found in section 6.2. The Court can look at paragraph 8.3 to confirm 
the fact that there is a difference in the operation requirements 1. No explanation is given. 
There is no explanation, there is no standard. There are many questions that are left 
unanswered regarding this breath testing device, the breath test, calibrations, and 
performance verification that took place. 
Paragraph 8.3 of the SOP states: "Procedure: A complete breath alcohol test includes two (2) valid breath samples taken from 
the subject and preceded by an air blank. The duplicate breath samples do not need to be consecutive samples. The individual 
breath samples should be 2 minutes or more apart, to allow for the dissipation of potential mouth alcohol contamination. NOTE: 
A deficient or insufficient sample does not automatically invalidate a test sample." 
Paragraph 6.2 of the SOP states: "A complete breath alcohol test includes two (2) valid breath samples taken during the testing 
sequence and preceded by air blanks. The duplicate breath samples should be approximately 2 minutes apart, or more, for the 
ASIII's and the FC20's to allow for the dissipation of potential mouth alcohol contamination. NOTE: A deficient or insufficient 
sample does not automatically invalidate a test sanlpJe." (emphasis original) 
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There was not a 0.20 solution verification check within 24 hours of Mr. Besaw's 
tese. Exhibit 4. The SOP that was in place at the time has a requirement that there be a 
0.20 performance verification within 24 hours. Exhibit 3. 5.1A of the SOP (Exhibit 3) 
specifically notes that the 0.20 performance verification was implemented for the sole 
purpose of supporting the instruments results for an 18-8004C charge, in other words, a 
blow over .20. Failure to timely perform a 0.20 performance verification will not 
invalidate tests performed that yield results at other levels or in charges other then 18-
8004C. (emphasis added). Exhibit 3. There is no such rule for a 0.80 solution for an 
excessive breath test. It is clear that for a 0.20 blow, there has to be a 0.20 
performance verification within 24 hours of the test. There was not and the SOP 
2 
Paragraph 5.1 and its subparts ofthe SOP states: "5. J Alco-Sensor and Lifeloc FC20-Portable Breath Testing Instrument 
Performance Verification 
5. 1.1 The Alco-Sensor and Lifeloc portable breath testing instrument performance verification is run using approximately 0.08 
and/or 0.20 performance verification solutions provided by and/or approved by ISPFS. 
5.1.2 The performance verification using the 0.08 and 0.20 performance verification solutions consist of two samples. 
5.1.3 A performance verification ofthe Alco-Sensor and Lifeloc FC20 instruments using a 0.08 or 0.20 performance verification 
solution must be performed within 24 hours, before or after an evidentiary test to be approved for evidentiary use. Multiple breath 
alcohol tests may be covered by a single performance verification. Reference 5.1.4.1 for clarification on the use ofthe 0.20 
solution in this capacity. 
5.1.3.1 A 0.08 performance verification solution should be replaced with fresh solution approximately every 25 verification or 
every calendar month, whichever comes first. 
5.1.4 A 0.20 performance verification should be run and results logged once per calendar month and replaced with fresh solution 
approximately every 25 verifications or until it reaches its expiration date, whichever comes first. NOTE: The 0.20 performance 
verification was implemented for the sole purpose of supporting the instruments' results for an 18-8004C charge. Failure to 
timely perform a 0.20 performance verification will not invalidate tests performed that yield results at other levels or in charges 
otherthan 18-8004C. 
5.1.4.1 The 0.20 performance verification satisfies the requirement for performance verification within 24 hours, before or after 
an evidentiary test at any level. The 0.20 performance verification solution should not be used routinely for this 
purpose. "( emphasis original excepting the word "approximately") 
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was not complied with. As a result, there is not a valid breath test. SOP rule 5.1.4.1 
states: 
"The 0.20 perfonnance verification satisfies the requirement for 
performance verification within 24 hours, before or after an 
evidentiary test at any level." 
Exhibit 3 at p. 10 of 21. 
The court must apply the rule oflenity found in State v. Mills, 128 1d. 416, 913 
P.2d. 1196 (Ct. App. 1996). The whole reason for such testing is to determine the 
accuracy of the instrument at a 0.40 breath test, a 0.80 breath test, and a 0.20 breath test, 
which are all statutory limits developed by the legislature. State's Exhibit A. The rule 
oflenity must be applied requiring a .20 performance verification within 24 hours. The 
Mills court held in interpreting statutes, rules and regulations the following, 
At. p. 429. 
"Under the rule oflenity, criminal statutes must be strictly construed 
in favor of the accused. (cites omitted) The same principle of 
construction that apply to statutes apply to rules and regulations 
promulgated by administrative agencies." (Cites omitted) 
The breath tests results should have been stricken. The Standard Operating 
Procedure (SOP) for a Lifeloc FC20 Portable Breath Machine has a specific standard for 
performance verification. The performance verification must be run within 24 hours of 
a breath test, either before or after evidentiary breath testing to be approved for evidentiary 
use. 
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1 In this particular circumstance, pursuant to the log sheet, the arresting officer ran 
2 
a perfonnance verification on the Lifeloc using the .08 solution. Exhibit 4. Mr. Besaw's 
3 
4 
breath test was noted as .219, insufficient and .201. Exhibit 5. Pursuant to the SOP a .20 
5 solution verification solution must be performed within 24 hours. 
6 The appelant had an excessive breath test result and so the failure ofthe operator 
7 
to comply with the standards set out by Idaho State Police Forensic Services and Idaho 
8 
9 Code § 18-8004(4) and Idaho Code § 18-8002A(7)(d) required the magistrate to strike 
10 the breath test. He did not do so. 
11 
It should also be noted that § 5.1.4.1 of the SOP specifically allows the .20 
12 
13 
solution to be run for verification for a..ny breath test result even though it is not 
14 recommended. However, there is no indication that .08 performance verification can be 
15 run for a 0.20 or above breath result. Use of the .08 solution in this case is in violation 
16 
of SOP for a .20 or above breath result. It is clear that arresting officer/operator/breath 
17 
18 testing specialist failed in the requirements of this breath test and performance 
19 verification. 
20 B. 
21 WAS A 15 MINUTE OBSERVATION PERIOD PROPERLY CONDUCTED? 
22 There has to be a 15 minute observation period prior to breath testing. See State 
23 
v. Stump. 146 Idaho 857 (Ct. App. 2009). The Stump case is interesting because it points 
24 
25 to the specific standard of observation required. See also Wheeler v. Idaho Transportation 
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In Stump, the driver was transported to the Teton County Sheriff s office to test 
his breath alcohol using an Intoxilyzer 5000. The arresting officer was in the same room 
with Mr.Stump. The Court noted that there was no evidence in the record of any 
circumstances or conditions inside the room which might have interfered with or impaired 
the arresting officer's senses. Officer Hurt also advised Mr. Stump to tell him ifhe had 
belched or regurgitated during the 15 minute wait. 
In appelant's case, the arresting officer did not tell Mr. Besaw that he needed to 
advise the officer ifhe actually belched, burped, or the like. The Court can review a new 
decision trom the Court of Appeals. Wilkinson v. lTD, WL 5582537 (Id. Appellate, 
November 17, 2011). The Court in footnote 4 discussed the issue of being instructed not 
to belch: 
"Although the officer did not do so in this case, it would enhance 
law enforcement procedures to simply ask the suspect if she 
belched, burped, vomited, or did anything else during the waiting 
period that might skew the test results. Previous cases have taken 
note of whether or not the officer addressed such type of question 
to a subject. See e.g. Stump, 146 Idaho at 861,203 P.3d at 1260; 
Carson, 133 Idaho at 452,988 P.2d at 226." 
Westlaw Opinion Number page 4. 
In the Wilkinson case, the question of observation was before the Court of 
Appeals. The Court of Appeals ruled against the driver. However, the Wilkinson test 
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1 took place in a concrete room designed for breath testing. There were three video 
2 
cameras capturing the events as they occurred. The hearing officer viewed these 
3 
4 
recordings before making his decision. In addition, there was another female officer in 
5 the room standing directly behind Wilkinson during the period of time Officer Davis had 
6 his back turned to Wilkinson. Wilkinson under scores the problems that are found in Mr. 
7 
Besaw's case regarding the observation period. Trooper Talbott did not ask Mr. Besaw 
8 
9 ifhe burped, belched, or the like. The trooper did not videotape the events as was found 
10 in the Wilkinson case. The court does not need a Homer Simpson burp on the audio to 
11 
question the observation period. The trooper could have video taped the testing sequence 
12 
but chose not to. 
13 
14 In Mr. Besaw's case, he was sitting in the back seat of the police car with the door 
15 open and the officer standing outside. The Court noted in State v. DeFranco, 143 Idaho. 
16 
335,338, 144 P.3d. 40, 43 (Ct. App. 2006) that the 15 minute monitoring period is not 
17 
18 
an odorous burden and will be met if the officer stays in close physical proximity to the 
19 test subject so the officer's senses of sight, smell, and hearing can be employed. 
20 In State v. Carson, 133 Idaho 451, (Ct. App. 1999), the Court was faced with a 15 
21 
22 
minute wait that occurred in a law enforcement vehicle while the driver was being 
23 transported to the Washington County Sheriffs Office to use the Intoxilyzer 5000. In that 
24 case, Mr. Carson was asked ifhe had belched or vomited or burped, etc. during the drive. 
25 
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1 The arresting officer said he intermittently observed Mr. Carson in the rearview mirror 
2 
and listened for any indication ofbe1ching or regurgitation. The arresting officer testified 
3 
4 
that because of the late hour he encountered no traffic on the road and his police radio 
5 was quiet throughout the trip. The officer then acknowledged during cross examination 
6 that is was raining and that the windshield wipers were operating. The Court found that 
7 
the arresting officer's attention was not devoted to Mr. Carlson and that evidence 
8 
9 presented at the motion hearing and common sense, tells us that an officer's ability to use 
10 his hearing as a substitute for visual observation was impeded by noise with the 
11 
automobile engine, tires on the road, rain and windshield wipers. 
12 
13 
In State v. DeFranco, supra, a similar situation to Mr. Besaw's case is presented. 
14 The instrument used was the AlcoSensor III. In DeFranco, the officer left the patrol car's 
15 rear door open and entered through the front passenger door, called dispatch momentarily 
16 
and removed his A1coSensor equipment that had been on the front seat. He then walked 
17 
18 
to the rear of the vehicle, opened the trunk and looked through a file box to find a 





The Court noted that, as in Carson, the officer was not always in a physical 
23 position to either use his sight or alternatively his senses of smell or hearing to 
24 accomplish the purpose of the monitoring period. 
25 
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Trooper Talbott's attention was distracted from Mr. Besaw. During the 15 minute 
wait, Trooper Talbott's attention and senses were not on Mr. Besaw. 21st Street was 
quite a busy road during the period of time Mr. Besaw sat in the back of the Trooper's 
vehicle. 
supra: 
It is interesting to note the final comments by the Court of Appeals in DeFranco. 
"If an officer deviates from that practice, without beginning the 
fifteen minute period anew, which is always an alternative in cases 
of uncertainty, the officer risks that the breath test results will be 
rendered inadmissible. Such is the result here." 
At p. 338. 
The trooper did not have a valid 15 minute observation period. He was distracted 
by outside influences. This is not a situation in which Mr. Besaw and the officer were 
enclosed in a ten foot room. Mr. Besaw was sitting in the back of an ISP vehicle, in a 
parking lot, next to one of the busiest streets in Lewiston. 
The arresting law enforcement officer's senses were distracted by outside 
influences. During the 15 minute wait, Trooper Talbott was distracted by Lewiston police 
officers. There is a specific reference to him telling them to leave him alone for the next 
four (4) minutes. Exhibit 7. Instead of them leaving him alone, they continued to talk to 
him and he continued to talk to them. He directed them to get the advisory forms which 
were in his vehicle. This is not a situation in which all of this is happening in an enclosed 
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1 room like the Intoxilyzer 5000 EN at the Nez Perce County Jail. Mr. Besaw was sitting 
2 
in the vehicle, the door was open, Trooper Talbott was standing outside talking to at least 
3 
4 
one Lewiston police officer regarding the advisory fonn. 
5 During the observation period and breath testing sequence, one of the passengers 
6 got out of the vehicle and approached the law enforcement vehicle. At that time, Trooper 
7 
8 
Talbott's attention was directed to the passenger, due in part to officer safety since he was 
9 there by himself. His attention was directed away from Mr. Besaw and towards the 
10 passenger. His sight and hearing were directed towards someone other then Mr. Besaw. 
11 
N one of the case law cited herein requires that the Driver prove that he burped. The 
12 
13 
Driver only has to prove that the 15 minute observation period was not followed. The 
14 case law is very clear. 
15 On top of all of these distractions, in the middle ofthe breath testing sequence, the 
16 
Trooper's attention was again directed away from Mr. Besaw and to the wife of one of 
17 
18 the other passengers who had arrived, exited her vehicle, and approached the police 
19 vehicle. 
20 
There were three separate distracting incidents during the observation period 
21 
22 
involving interference with other people. The appellate courts do not have much patience 
23 with observation periods that are outside or in a vehicle. 
24 In State v. Carson, supra, the observation period was in the vehicle and the Court 
25 
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1 found that the observation period was not valid. In Carson, there were no other 
2 
distracting police officers, there were no distractions of passengers or passenger's wives. 
3 
4 
Carson and officer were in an enclosed car with window wipers, engine noise and tires 
5 on the road. In Mr. Besaw's case, there is the radio traffic from dispatch during the 15 




9 There is no evidence in this case, like in Carson, that some other senses replaced 
10 the senses of sight or hearing. There is no indication that a person standing outside a 
11 
vehicle, with someone sitting inside a vehicle, could smell anything such as a burp or the 
12 
13 
like. Again, note the weather and the likelihood of using the sense of smell. Obviously, 
14 the senses of touch and taste do not apply. The three senses that were applicable in this 
15 case were distracted or not realistically available during the observation period. 
16 
The Court has to wonder why with the Intoxilyzer 5000 EN, approximately 5 or 
17 
18 
10 minutes away from the location of the stop, was not used. The Trooper used the 
19 portable Lifeloc instead of the Intoxilyzer 5000 EN which is in an enclosed room at the 
20 jail, with no distractions and the like. 
21 
The Court can look at a series of decisions from Latah County regarding judicial 
22 
23 reviews of the ALS hearings issued by Judge Stegner. In Campbell v. State lTD, Latah 
24 County Case Number CV 10-401, the Court had to make a decision regarding a breath 
25 
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1 test in the field using the Lifeloc device. Attached and marked Exhibit "A" is the Court's 
2 
decision. The Court can also review Dennison v. State lTD, Latah County Case Number 
3 
4 
CV 10-1363. The Dennison case also involves a breath test at the scene and is similar in 
5 circumstance to Mr. Besaw's state. Attached and marked Exhibit "B" is the Court's 
6 decision. In both cases, Judge Stegner found the 15 minute wait lacking. 
7 
The trooper describes the 15 minute wait as the period of time when !'vir. Besaw 
8 
9 was in his vehicle, not while he was outside the vehicle, not while he was performing field 
10 sobriety tests or at any other time. T. at pp. 30-37. The State may argue that l'v1r. Besaw 
11 
simply wants the court to replace it's judgment for the judgment ofthe magistrate. One 
12 
13 
would have to assume that is what the State argued in the other cases dealing with the 15 
14 minutes wait such as: State v. Stump, 14 Id. 857 (Ct. App. 2009), State v. Carson, 133 Id. 
15 451 (Ct. App. 1999), State v. DeFranco, 143 Id. 335, 144 P.3d 40 (Ct. App. 2006), and the 
16 
Latah County decisions attached to this brief. 
17 
18 
The State may argue that the SOP has changed since the cases cited above were 
19 decided. However, has the equipment changed? Have the manufacturers 
20 recommendations changed? Has the science changed? Has Henry's law, the scientific 
21 
foundation for breath testing, changed? The only thing that has changed is ISP Forensic 
22 
23 Services' decision to make "standards" discretionary. The e-mails that are part of this 
24 record show why there is a change. However, there can be no change regarding the 
25 
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necessary in order to provide accurate results." Exhibit 3, SOP. 
The current SOP requests "at least 15 minutes of observation" Exhibit 3. The 
Court has to wonder whether "should" really is discretionary when the SOP states as 
follows: "Any material which absorbs/adsorbs or traps alcohol should be removed from 
the month prior to the start of the 15 minute waiting period." (emphasis added) Exhibit 3. 
If Mr. Besaw had an apple in his mouth or a chew soaked with alcohol or a lemon or 12 
marbles, does the officer have discretion to allow that material to remain in the mouth 
during the wait period and during the blow. What about the following: 
"During the monitoring period the subject/individual should not be 
allowed to smoke, drink, eat or belch/burp/vomitlregurgitate." 
Exhibit 3, SOP. 
Again, if :Mr. Besaw was smoking, drinking, eating, burping, vomiting and 
regurgitating, could the breath samples be valid because the word "should" is used in the 
SOP? Prior examples ofthe procedure of the 15 minute wait are as follows: 
"Prior to evidential breath alcohol testing, the subject must be 
monitored for fifteen (15) minutes. During this time the subj ect may 
not smoke, drink, or chew gum, candy, food, or any tobacco product. 
A material which absorbs/adsorbs or traps alcohol should be 
removed from the mouth prior to the start of the fifteen minute 
waiting period." 
SOP 1112006 Paragraph 3.l. See Wheeler at p. 768. 
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1 It is clear that this language including the "may not" and the "should" are all 
2 
mandatory requirements. Ifthey are not, then someone could smoke and drink during the 
3 
4 
15 minute wait, and it would not have an effect on the breath test. 
5 The State may argue that there was no indication of alcohol because of the .02 
6 correlation. In Section 6.1 of the SOP, Exhibit 3, and it's subsections, there is no 
7 
indication of the significance of the 0.02 correlation regarding the 15 minute wait. The 
8 
9 State simply wants the Court to take its word on the application of the 0.02 correlation. 
10 Mr. Besaw does not have to show anything other than the 15 minute observation 
11 
period was not followed. 
12 
13 
In this case, there was a insufficient sample between the two breath samples given. 
14 Exhibit 5. The Wilkinson. supra, court indicated, being in an enclosed room with mUltiple 
15 cameras trained on the subject lends support to the position that there was not any burping, 
16 




decided not to record Mr. Besaw during the 15 minute wait. He could have, but he 
19 decided not too. He decided to start recording after Mr. Besaw's breath testing sequence 
20 
was completed. His credibility is at issue like the officers noted in the following two 
21 
22 
cases, In the Interests of Doe, 130 Id. 811, 815,948 P.2d 166,170 (Ct. App. 1997), State 
23 v. Dominguez, 137 Id. 681, 52 P.3d 325, (Ct. App. 2002). 
24 The two breath samples were quite a distance apart, .219/.20 l. The fact that the 
25 
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1 samples had such a wide variance supports mouth alcohol in Mr. Besaw's first breath 
2 
sample. The log sheet notes other breath samples which do not have the range found in 
3 
4 
Mr. Besaw's case. Exhibit 4. (logsheet) The testing done on January 6,2011, .205/.202 
5 and .072/.073, shows a separation of 0.003, 0.001, and no separation for the testing on 
6 January 8, 2011, as both breath samples were 0.068. The testing of Boswell on January 
7 
. 16,2011, notes a 0.049 and a 0.046. One would have to believe that something like 
8 
9 mouth alcohol caused the wide margin between the .219 and the .201 samples. There is 
10 a two minute wait after each breath sample so the next valid breath sample would have 
11 
been four minutes later. Exhibit 4. 
12 
13 
The audio of the contact with Mr. Besaw speaks for itself. The trooper was 
14 distracted from his observations of Mr. Besaw with the window wipers, with the rain, with 
15 the traffic noise, with the other law enforcement officers, with the radio in his vehicle 
16 
playing, with the dispatch radio, with the passenger coming out of the car, and with the 
17 
18 wife ofthe other passenger coming and approaching his vehicle. Mr. Besaw was eating 
19 a hamburger while he was driving. Exhibit 7. The Court can note the food that came 
20 
flying out of Mr. Besaw's mouth during the time he was in the parking lot. How many 
21 
22 
fact patterns has the court seen in which someone was eating a hamburger just minutes 
23 before the breath test, and that food was in the person's mouth just prior to the observation 
24 period starting? In the cases cited above, there is no testimony from the drivers about 
25 
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1 burping, vomiting, regurgitating or the like and still the courts found a violation of the 15 
2 




5 The magistrate's conclusion is not supported by the record3 . The courts have 
6 routinely reversed decisions regarding 15 minutes waits associated with vehicles. The 
7 
magistrate abused his discretion. The Court should remand with an instruction to suppress 
8 
9 
the breath test. 
10 II. 
11 
THE FIELD SOBRIETY TEST SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUPPRESSED 
12 The court has the ability to review the video tape regarding the field sobriety test. 
13 Exhibit 7. Attached as Exhibit "c" are pages from the NHTSA Manual 2006 which the 
14 
Court can take judicial notice of. On the horizontal gaze nystagnus, the officer's 
15 
16 testimony was that Mr. Besaw's pupils did not appear to be the same size. T. at pp. 100-










Administration Manual notes "If the eyes do not track together, or if the pupils are 
noticeably unequal in size, the chance of medical disorder or injuries the nystagnus is 
present". T. at pp. 132-133. In this case, the pupil size was obviously noticeable because 
the arresting officer put that in his police report, which he testified to at the time of the 
3 
The magistrate stated: "In the instant matter, the officer was within two to three feet of Defendant Besaw, was facing him at all 
times, putting him in a physical position that allowed him to utilize not only his sight but all his senses to accomplish the purpose 
of the monitoring period, which is to determine if a defendant belches, burps or vomits." Opinion at p. 10. 
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hearing. T. at p. 133. Therefore, allowing the horizontal gaze nystagnus in as evidence 
would be improper. The scientific aura behind the testing would prejudice Mr Besaw. 
Themagistrate stated, "A defendant may, therefore, challenge the weight of the evidence." 
Opinion at p. 6. With regard to the "walk and tum" the court can note the slope that was 
present. The surface was not reasonably dry, wasn't level and it was certainly slippery 
based on the amount of water that was present. The same can be said for the "one-leg 
stand". The officer had no prior experience with Mr. Besaw and would not know what 
his ability was to perform these field tests in normal conditions. It was raining on that 
January night in 2011. The court can also note the difference in what the trooper was 
wearing and what Mr. Besaw was wearing. 
The magistrate committed error by allowing the State to use the field sobriety tests 
on the grounds of foundation, relevance, and that their probative value was substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. In one study, over 98% of roadside HGN 
tests were determined to be not properly conducted. See "End-Position Nystagmus as 
Indicator of Ethanol Intoxication", Science & Justice Journal 20014. 
See United States vs. Hom, 185 F Supp 2d 530 (D.Md. 2002) and State vs. Lasworth 42 
P.3d 844 (N.M. App., 2001). The appropriate test for measuring the reliability of 
4 Please note the many attachments to the written closing argument regarding the field sobriety testings failures. 
United States VS. HOITI, 185 F Supp 2d 530 (D.Md. 2002), Exhibit B of closing argument. 
State VS. Lasworth 42 PJd 844 (N.M. App., 2001), Exhibit C of closing argument. 
Schultz VS. State of Maryland, 665 A.2d 60, 77 (1995) and a study by Spurgeon Cole, Exhibit D of closing argument. 
The Affidavit of Harold P. Brull in the case of United States VS. Horn, Exhibit E of closing argument. 
The Affidavit of Joel P Wiesen, Ph.D., Exhibit F of closing argument. 
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evidence is Rule 702 ofthe Idaho Rules of Evidence. See State vs. Gleason, 123 Idaho 
62, 65, 844 P.2d 691 (1992). In that case, the Idaho Supreme Court questioned the 
precedential value ofStatevs. Garrett, 119 Idaho 878, 811 P.2d488 (1991). The Gleason 
Court affinned that at most the arresting officer could testifY that a nystagmus may only 
be an indicator of intoxication, not that it is conclusive evidence. Moreover, such 
evidence cannot be used "to establish or infer any particular correlative BAC level 
because nystagmus does stem from other causes other than the ingestion of alcohol." See 
Idaho Rules of Evidence, Rule 104. The Court of Appeals decision, State vs. Parkinson, 
128 Idaho 29, 909 P.2d 647 (Ct. App.1996), cites Gleason to say that the admission of 
expert testimony regarding scientific evidence is governed by Rule 702, but goes on to 
"articulate the inquiry envisioned by Rule 702" discussing Daubert vs. Merrell Dow 
Phannaceuticals. Inc., 502 U.S. 579, 113 S. Ct. 2786, 125 L. Ed.2d 469 (1993), for 
guidance. 128 Idaho, at p. 34. Such inquiry requires, 
a preliminary assessment of whether the reasoning or methodology 
underlying the testimony is scientifically valid and of whether that 
reasoning or methodology properly can be applied to the facts and 
Issues. 
(quoting Daubert) (emphasis added) 
The Trial Court must make a preliminary assessment, factors to be evaluated include: 
\Vhether the theory or technic in question can be tested, whether it has 
been SUbjected to peer review and publication, its known or potential 
error rate, the existence and maintenance of standards governing its use, 
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and whether it has attracted widespread acceptance within a relevant 
scientific community. ( quoting Dauber) 
128 Idaho, at p. 34. 
The Court then synthesized, "other courts sand commentators" in listing these 
additional factors: 
1) The presence of safeguards and the technique, 
2) Analogy to other scientific techniques whose results are admissible, 
3) The nature and breath of inferences drawn, 
4) The extent to which the basic data are verifiable by the court and jury, 
5) Availability of other experts to test and evaluate the technique, 
6) The probative significance ofthe evidence and the circumstances of the case. 
(Cites omitted) Id. 
However, the limitation in Parkinson, "just scientific expertise" has been done 
away with the decision in U. S. Supreme Court case, Kumbo Tire vs. Carmichael, 119 
S.Ct. 1169 (1999). In that case, the Supreme Court answered the question posed by Justice 
Rehnquist's dissent in Daubert vs. Merrell regarding scientific evidence. Answering 
affirmatively, in a fairly resounding decision, Justice Breyer authored the near unanimous 
decision. The Court decided "how Daubeli applies to the testimony of engineers and other 
experts who are not scientists." Id., at p. 1171. Answering this question, resolved a circuit 
split, where several circuits, notably the Third, Fifth, and Eighth had indicated that 
Daubert applied to all expert testimony while the Second, Ninth, Tenth and Eleventh 
Circuits held that Daubert applies only to the admission of "scientific" expert testimony. 
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The Court concluded that Daubert's strictures apply not just to "scientific" evidence, but 
to all forms of proposed expert testimony. Kumbo 119 S.Ct., at 1171, 1175. 
The Court, in stressing the importance of the gatekeeping function of a trial judge, 
noted that its objective was to: 
"ensure the reliability and relevancy of expert testimony, to make 
certain that an expert, whether basing testimony upon professional 
studies or personal experience, employs in the courtroom the same level 
of intellectual rigor that characterizes the practice of an expert in the 
relevant field." 
Id., at p. 1176. 
In order to ensure this level of reliability, Daubert's teaching and tests must be 
applied to all expertise, whether it be scientific or "technical" or "other specialized" 
knowledge. Kumbo, at p. 1174. These requirements must exist because all experts, not 
just scientific ones, unlike ordinary witnesses are given this wide latitude to offer opinions 
- including those not base upon firsthand observations or knowledge. Kumbo, at p. 1174. 
While the Idaho Supreme Court has used a Rule 702 case-by-case test of reliability 
for admission of expert testimony, the Court of Appeals has used Daubert, 509 U.S. 579 
(1993) and similar factors, which include: 
a) Whether the theory or technique in question can be tested; 
b) Wnether it has been subjected to peer review and publication; 
c) Its known or potential error rate; 
d) The existence and maintenance of standards governing its use; and 
e) Whether it has attracted widespread acceptance within a relevant 
scientific community. 
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1 The Idaho Court of Appeals uses the following criteria that a trial court might 
2 
consider when analyzing scientific evidence: 
3 
4 
a) The presence of safeguards in the techniques; 
b) Analogy to other scientific techniques whose results are admissible; 
5 c) The nature and breadth of inference drawn; 
6 
d) The extent to which the basic data are verifiable by the court and jury; 
e) Availability of other experts to test and evaluate the technique; and 
7 f) The probative significance of the evidence in the circumstances of the case. 
8 State vs. Konechny, 3 P.3d 535, 134 Idaho 410 (App. Ct. 2000); Kumbo Tire vs. 
9 




12 The field sobriety tests administered in Mr. Besaw's case do not meet the 
13 requirements of Daubert, Kumbo or Rule 702, nor can the arresting officer lay a sufficient 
14 
foundation to admit such evidence. Further, Mr. Besaw has no way to confront or 
15 
16 challenge the officer's observations ofthese presumed psychological or psychophysical 
17 reaction of eyes, therefore, such evidence should not be allowed. Why not perfonn this 
18 
test with a video camera available? 
19 
20 
In using the case law set out herein, the Court must detelmine that the field 
21 sobriety tests result lack reliability and do not follow the requirements of the Rule 702 
22 standards. The factors, as noted, cannot be met by the State in this case. The State called 
23 
no expert to provide a foundation pursuant to IRE 702. The Court can also note cases 
24 
25 from Kansas and Ohio. In State vs. \Vitte. 836 p.2d 110 (Kansas 1992), the Kansas Court 
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criticized states like Idaho for accepting field sobriety tests based on State vs. Superior 
Court 718 P. 2d 171 (Arizona). The Kansas Court noted: 
"The Idaho Supreme Court also followed the Arizona opinion. The 
Idaho Court noted that no evidence or publication had been presented 
that refuted the Arizona opinion." State vs. Garrett, 119 Idaho 878, 
881,811 P.2d 488 (1991). 
At pp. 1118 and 1119. 
The Kansas Supreme Court went on to criticize the Arizona Court by outlining 
several contrary scientific studies that dealt with the horizontal gaze nystagmus test. The 
Kansas Supreme Court concluded: 
At p. 1121. 
"If the Arizona Supreme Court had had the evide~ce before it, it may 
not have held that the HGN evidence satisfies the Frye admissibility 
requirements. The reliability of the HGN test is not currently a settled 
position in the scientific community." 
The Court may be better able to understand Mr. Besaw's position by looking at 
Judge Lansing's dissenting opinion in State vs. Mazzuca, 132 Idaho 868, 979 P.2d 1226 
(Ct.App. 1999). This case dealt with the Intoxilyzer 5000 and the foundation for the 
evidence allowing the breath result in. Judge Lansing stated: 
"To bolster its holding that this foundation suffices, the majority 
opinion relies upon several cases from other jurisdictions where the 
expert testimony was more complete. In my view, this reliance is 
misplaced, for expert testimony given in other cases cannot substitute 
for an evidentiary foundation properly presented before the 
magistrate. " 
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Judge Lansing then went on to criticize the State vs. Garrett, supra, decision. She 
"Since then, the Idaho Supreme Court has made it crystal clear that the 
Frye test is not to be utilized as the standard for admission of scientific 
or technical evidence. See State vs. Faught, 127 Idaho 873, 876,908 
P .2d 556 (1995). Rather, the proper standard is stated in LR.E. 702." 
Atp.872. 
Judge Lansing concluded her dissenting opinion by stating: 
At p. 872. 
"Thus, the admissibility of the Intoxilyzer 5000 test at issue here turns 
upon the sufficiency of the foundational testimony presented to the 
magistrate in this case, not information contained in decisions from 
other courts. " (emphasis original) 
Moreover, the Court must note that nothing in Daubert, Kumbo, Parkinson, and 
Rule 702 require the Court to admit opinion testimony that is connected to existing data 
only by the ipse dixit of an expert. Kumbo, at 1179. 
In State vs. Homan, 732 N.E.2d 952,89 Ohio St. 3d 421 (Ohio 2000), the Ohio 
Supreme Court stated in discussing the field sobriety test: "The small margins of error 
that characterized field sobriety tests make strict compliance critical." At p. 956. Judge 
Gaskill ignored this point in his decision. The Court continued: "The HGN test is not 
the only field sobriety test that required special care in its administration." At p. 956. The 
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standardized field sobriety testing procedures is neither unrealistic nor humanly 
impossible in the great majority of vehicle stops in which the policy choose to administer 
the test." At p. 957. 
The Court can also look at State vs. Eytchison, 136 Idaho 210,30 P.3d 988 (Idaho 
App.,2001). The Court of Appeals in commenting on the use of an expert indicated: 
At. p. 990. 
"The admissibility of expert testimony is governed by Idaho Rule of 
Evidence 702." 
The Trial Court in Mr. Besaw's case was required to conduct a Rule 702 
Parkinson, Kumbo, hearing to determine whether or not in this particular case field 
sobriety tests are settled science, as required in Rule 702 and Idaho Criminal Rule 12(b). 
The magistrate filed to do so. The Court of Appeals in the Evtchison case commented on 
the change of the Federal Rule 702 regarding expert testimony. See p. 990, footnotes 1 
and 2. See also changes to Idaho Criminal Rule 16(b)(7). 
State vs. Witte, 836 P.2d 110 (Kansas 1992) and State vs. Homan, 732 N.E.2d 952, 
89 Ohio St.3d 421 (Ohio 2000), support Mr. Besaw's argument that cases like State vs. 
Superior Court and the City of Fargo vs. McLaughlin, do not meet the requirements of 
Rule 702 of the Idaho Rules of Evidence. The State will not refute the criticisms raised 
by State vs. Witte, nor will the State refute the North Dakota Law Review article 
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In State vs. Garrett, (supra) the Court in a plurality opinion, determined the 
scientific reliability of the horizontal gaze nystagmus. Chief Justice Bakes concurred in 
the opinion while Justice McDevitt concurred in the results only. Justice Boyle filed a 
special concurring opinion rejecting the use of the .E.m standard and Justice Johnson 
dissented. Justice Johnson advocated a standard of independent reliability. Justice 
Johnson's dissent reflects what has been done by the Idaho and Federal Courts in recent 
cases like Parkinson and Eytchison, Daubert and Kumbo. In State vs. Garrett, the Court 
stated: 
At p. 880. 
"Because the reliability of a test based on a scientifically tested 
phenomenon should not vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, \ve 
examine what other jurisdictions have done when HG test results are 
offered as evidence in DUI cases." 
In Footnote 3, the Court states: "Such 'decisions' are persuasive only as they 
contain analysis and reasoning which recommend itself to this Court." At p. 880. The 
21 Garrett Court cited State vs. Superior Court: "We have been furnished with no 
22 publications or other authority which refutes the reasoned decision of the Arizona Court." 
23 
At p. 88l. 
24 
25 It is submitted that Mr. Garrett's counsel did not provide an adequate argument 
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regarding filed sobriety tests. Mr. Besaw should not be held accountable for the failures 
of Defendant counsel from a 1991 decision. Justice Johnson, in his dissent, lists 
succinctly the problems of the holding of the plurality when he stated: 
At p. 885. 
"If this (the testimony of the arresting officer) establishes the reliability 
for admissibility for expert opinion based on new scientific methods, 
then we must be prepared to accept the admissibility of the results of 
the polygraph examination based on the testimony of polygraph 
operators, the admissibility of DNA tests based on the testimony of 
laboratory technicians who conduct the tests, and the results of other 
forms of 'scientific' testing based on the testimony of those who 
conduct the tests. In my view, this is not the type of reliability that we 
should require before allowing testimony of the results of tests 
conducted based on new scientific methods. The foundation should be 
laid by experts who have researched the tests and are available to 
testify as to the scientific basis for the test." (emphasis added) 
The State ofIdaho has never provided said foundation with regard to field so briety 
tests. There has never been a true Rule 702 hearing as envisioned by Daubert, Kumbo, 
Parkinson, or Konechv. The Garrett and Gleason cases are bad law and should be 
overturned. 
The Idaho Supreme Court in Garrett accepted standards that, even in the best 
circumstances, (in the laboratory), have a 23% failure rate (HGN), a 32% failure rate 
(walk and tum) and a 35% failure rate (one leg stand). There is a well written article by 
Phillip B. Price and Sturgeon Cole in the April 21, 2001 magazine, The Champion 
published by the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers. See Idaho Rules 
.APPELLANT'S BRIEF 33 
LAW OFFICES OF 
CLARK AND FEENEY, LLP 



























of Evidence, Rule 104. The authors criticize the National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration field sobriety test validation. The author states: 
At p. 42. 
"There has been no attempt to establish norms for the SF ST. We have 
no idea how well a sober person can perform on the SFST. How does 
ageor gender affect performance? How does fatigue or practice affect 
performance? If an individual performs poorly at a .11 % BAC, how 
does that compare with his or her performance with a BAC of .00%7 
Before any individual's performance can be considered at 'test', that 
particular individual's baseline with no alcohol must be known and 
factored in. Without answers to these basic questions, the SFST 
remains in the same category as tarot cards." (emphasis added) 
The authors then go on to discuss the number of false arrests: 
At p. 42. 
"Ofthe sober individuals that were involved in the Colorado, Florida 
and San Diego studies, the officers falsely arrested 24%, 18% and 
29%, respectively. That is an average of23.6% false arrest rate. What 
this means is that if the SFST are used as a decision of whether to 
arrest an individual for an alcohol related offense, one out of every four 
sober people will be falsely arrested." (emphasis added) 
In the State vs. Gleason, case, no real "expert" was called. As Justice Johnson 
indicated in Garrett, the "expert" in question was the individual who conducted the test. 
In Gleason, Justice Bistline in his concurrence in result states: "The majority's bare 
statement that I.R.E. 702 is the appropriate test provides no guidance to the bench and bar 
as to how to determine scientific reliability." Justice Bistline then questions the use of 
Rule 702 by stating: 
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At p. 67. 
"Questions that come to mind include: What level of scientific 
reliability, if any, is required before evidence will assist the trier of 
fact? Wnat constitutes scientific reliability? How reliable does 
scientific evidence have to be before it is admissible? On whose scale 
do we measure the amount of reliability? \Vhat unit of measurement 
is being used?" 
There is in Gleason no Rule 702 analysis. The Rule 702 analysis, missing from 
Gleason and Garrett, is found in cases like Daubert, Kumbo, and Parkinson. In Gehring. 
supra, the Court allowed Officer Carrington to testifY about his assessment of a person's 
sobriety, based on field sobriety tests, being 95% accurate. Officer Carrington's 
testimony is in stark contrast to the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration's 
testing noted above and other current studies. (See Hom, supra.) 
The State may argue that Mr. Besaw is trying to overturn prior precedent. The use 
ofIdaho Rule of Evidence 702 is supported by Gleason. However, the use of a Rule 702 
analysis is lacking, but can be expanded as required by federal case law and the Idaho 
cases that have accepted the federal court reasoning. A Trial Court must do more under 
its gatekeeping function before any field sobriety test should be allowed before a jury. 
What scientific publications the Garrett Court refers to is unknown and not set out. 
In fact, the State will not be able to support its position by pointing to any scientific 
evidence that supports the use of the field sobriety tests let alone the horizontal gaze 
nystagmus. 
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In State vs. Ito, 978 P.2d 191 (Hawaii App. 1999) the Court determined that the 
horizontal gaze nystagmus test had a 23% error rate in detecting individuals with a BAC 
of.1 % or greater and a 35% error rate in detecting persons with a .08% BAC or greater. 
At p. 203. The Hawaiian Court cited State vs. O'Key, 899 P.2d 687 (Oregon 1995). The 
Oregon Court noted that part of the training the officers had to undergo required them to 
ask before administering the HGN test, whether the person had a head injury, \-vas ill or 
was taking medication. The officer in Hawaii had a whole series of questions that were 
required to be asked before the HGN test could be required. See page 204. No such 
questions were asked ofMr. Besaw. The Hawaiian Court noted as to whether the HGN 
test is susceptible to abuse, one of the criticisms leveled at the test is that, 
At p. 204. 
"It is wholly subjective - the police officer has no physical sample to 
take to the laboratory. Thus, the suspect is not able to have his or her 
expert examine the evidence .... [and] cannot contradict the officer's 
testimony[.] (Cite omitted), in our view, however, this concern is 
minimized as long as the HGN test results are limited solely to 
~ . 
probable cause determinations." (emphasis added) 
In Mr. Besaw's case, the State does not want the field sobriety tests limited to a 
probable cause determination, but used as evidence to prove intoxication beyond a 
reasonable doubt. The Hawaiian Court in vacating the Trial Court's determination of 
probable cause on the HGN test noted that officers are required to check themselves 
"monthly with an (8x 15 square template or cardboard with a diagonal line drawn from 
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sustained." Footnote 10 at p. 210. The Court also noted the wamings set out in the 
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration manual: 
At p. 210. 
"ONLY \¥HEN THE TESTS ARE ADMINISTERED IN THE 
PRESCRIBED STANDARDIZED MANNER; AND ONLY\VHEN 
THE STANDARDIZED CLUES ARE USED TO ASSESS THE 
SUSPECT'S PERFORMANCE; AND, ONLY WHEN THE 
STANDARDIZED CRITERIA ARE EMPLOYED TO INTERPRET 
THAT PERFORMANCE. IF ANY ONE OF THE STANDARDIZED 
FIELD SOBRIETY TEST ELEMENTS IS CHANGED, THE 
VALIDITY IS COMPROMISED." 
In the trial court's opinion regarding the field sobriety test, the Court does not even 
address the issue involving the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration standards 
or any of the cases cited in the closing argument regarding the use of the National 
Highway Traffic Safety Administration or the issues regarding failures to comply with the 
standards set out in the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration manual. None 
of the cases relied upon by the magistrate in it's decision addresses the National Highway 
Traffic Safety Administration and the standards that are set out there in. In fact, the 
magistrate used State v. Ferreira, 133 Id. 474, 988 P.2d 700 (Ct. App. 1999) to support 
his decision regarding the issues found in Mr. Besaw's case. The Ferreira case is not on 
point. The Ferreira case dealt with a constitutional challenge to the expectation of privacy 
intruded upon by field sobriety tests and that probable cause was required before such 
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tests were administered. The Ferreira case has nothing to do with the issues presented in 
this case regarding a IRE Rule 702 challenge or a challenge regarding the standards 
developed by the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration regarding field sobriety 
testing. 
In this case, the standards were not followed and the field sobriety test should be 
suppressed. The trial court simply ignored the evidence regarding the National Highway 
Traffic Safety Administration standards. 
III. 
ISPFS FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE STANDARD REQUIREMENT OF 
IDAHO CODE SECTION 18-8004(4) 
The court would be wise to look at Wheeler v. Idaho Transportation Department, 
148 Idaho 378, 223 P.3d, 761 (Ct. App. 2009). Administration regulations are subject to 
the same principles of statutory construction as statutes. See Mason v. Donnelly Club, 
135 Idaho 581, 586, 21 P.3d 903,908 (2001). The court indicated that when interpreting 
a statute or a rule, it has to be construed as a whole to get the intent of the Legislature or 
promulgating entity. The court has to use the literal words of the rule and the words 
should be given their plain, obvious and rational meaning. In Wheeler the court 
interpreted the use of the word "should". One would have to believe that with the e-mails 
that are part of Mr. Besaw's record, the Court of Appeals would have determined that the 
use of the word "should" was just a "weasel word" to get around any mandatory 
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The court would be well served by reading Judge Lansing's dissenting opinion. 
She commented on the fact that ISP had not formally promulgated administrative rules 
prescribing testing equipment or requirements for its maintenance and operation. She 
noted that the ISP announced its approved breath methods through SOPs, and manuals. 
Judge Lansing wrote that appellate courts have to treat such documents as "rules" for the 
purpose of judicial review because they constitute the only materials by which the ISP has 
acted upon the I.e. §§ 18-8002A and 18-8004(4) authorization for breath testing 
standards. Judge Lansing noted: "But a "standard" that is merely a recommendation, and 
hence optional, is no standard at all - it is merely something that the officers maintaining 
and operating the Intoxilyzer 5000 may do if they wish or may disregard." At p. 388. 
Judge Lansing indicated that if the rules weren't mandatory, then there could not be any 
sort of standard: "This result, however, is obviously not what is intended by the ISP. The 
ISP clearly did intend to promulgate standards, not just make optional, take or leave 
suggestions for how an Intoxilyzer 5000 could be maintained and operated." At p. 389. 
Boy was Judge Lansing wrong in this assessment of ISP. Judge Lansing also 
notes, in footnote no. 7, the problem with the use of the term "approximately": 
"There is no need here to go into an analysis of the propriety of using 
the term "approximately" in a rule that is supposed to be setting defined 
standards, but the problems caused by its use are as obvious as the 
problems caused by the use of "should". 
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1 At p. 390. 
2 
One would have to assume that the Court of Appeals wouldn't be very happy with 
3 
4 
ISPFS if they had access to all ofthese e-mails and the fact that the people in charge of 
5 the breath testing program in Idaho simply want to use "vagueness", "weasel words", and 
6 "wiggle room". There are no breath testing standards. Judge Lansing's dissenting opinion 
7 
will become the majority opinion once the court has access to these e-mails and the real 
8 
9 thought behind the so called "standards" used by ISPFS. The Wheeler court reviewed the 
10 mandatory provision of the SOP at the time of the Wheeler ALS. Those mandatory 
11 
provisions, like for the 15 minute wait, are now discretionary. Why!? See Exhibit 3, 
12 
13 
Section 6.1 (should instead of must) 
14 The court has to determine the credibility and competence of the arresting officer, 












office failed to properly advise Mr. Besaw ofthe requirement set out in I.C. § 18-8002A. 
Trooper Talbott specifically indicated that he did not read the bold capitalized letters at 
the bottom of the advisory section of the advisory form. He specifically failed to read the 
following: 
"THIS SUSPENSION FOR FAILURE OR REFUSAL OF THE 
EVIDENTIARY TEST(S) IS SEPARATE FROM ANY OTHER 
SUSPENSION ORDERED BY THE COURT." 
Mr. Besaw asked about the consequences of his CDL Class A license, the officer 
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indicated to Mr. Besaw that there wasn't any real difference or there wasn't a consequence 
different then the advisory. On the witness stand, Trooper Talbott indicated that he 
provided wrong information to Mr. Besaw and that there is a substantial difference in the 
consequence for someone who has a Class A license. T. at p. 91. The court can note that 
the consequence is a year's license suspension for a Class A license. Mr. Besaw had a 
Class A License at the time of the arrest 
State v. Bell, 115 Idaho 36,764 P.26 113 (Ct. App. 1988) interprets I.C. §18-
8004(4). The statute allows alcohol results, either blood, breath or urine, to be introduced 
into evidence without an expert testifYing regarding the same. The Court of Appeals 
stated: 
"The admissibility of the result of a scientific test such as the blood-
alcohol test in I.C. § 18-8004 turns normally on a foundation which 
establishes the acceptability, validity, reliability and accuracy of the test 
and test procedures. In the admission of a test result for alcohol 
concentration the Legislature has concluded that certain foundational 
elements need not be presented at trial unless such elements are 
disputed. The Legislature has acknowledged that certain tests, due to 
a history of reliability and accuracy, are presumed to be valid and 
acceptable ... The Legislature has enacted a statutory scheme which 
allows an expedient method for admitting a blood-alcohol test result 
into evidence without the need for some expert testimony ... Inherent in 
this statutory scheme, however, is an awareness by the Legislature of 
the need for uniform test procedures. An "extremely reliable" test result 
can only be the product of a test procedure which from previous use is 
known to be capable of producing an accurate result. This benefit is 
best provided by strict adherence to a uniform procedure. This was 
recognized by the Legislature and is apparent first, from the statutory 
language which provides for the test procedure to be determined by the 
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Idaho Department of Health and Welfare, and second, by the "shall" 
language mandating adherence to the standards set by that 
Department. " 
At p. 39 
The e-mails that were produced, based on freedom of information requests, 
regarding the changes to the Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) are replete with the use 
of vague language, "wiggle room", and "weasel wordss". ISP Forensic Services (ISPFS) 
has detennined that it is more interested in getting past legal challenges then setting up 
scientific standards that will follow the requirements of Bell and I. C. § 18-8004(4). Also, 
it's clear that Skylar Anderson, who is currently under investigation by ISPFS was 
instrumental in adapting the SOP and reference manuals that were in place at the time Mr. 
Besaw was tested. The court can go through the e-mails and note that the people that are 
making suggestions are not scientists. There is very little science discussed in these e-
mails that were generated regarding the changes to the SOPs. 
The court can look at the e-mail found at page 002, where Matthew Garnette notes 
that there area couple of changes he would like to make to the IDAPA rules. He states: 
"They are fairly minor, but are causing all kinds of issues in court." 
Vlhy is ISPFS worrying about court issues? They should be worried about 
scientific standards and not what makes life easier for prosecutors, ALS hearing officers 
S 
Note E-mails are bate stamped for ease of reference a11d are attached to the '.vritten closing argument. The e-mails were made 
part of the record at the hearing on May 13, 2011, 
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and police officers. 
On page 003, there is a discussion involving Skylar Anderson and the use of the 
term "approximately". On page 005, there is a discussion regarding the MIP/MIC 
procedure as simply being a best practices provision and not a standard. On page 006, 
there is an e-mail from Eric Moody to Mr. Gamette, noting that he is one of the Idaho 
TranspOliation Department (lTD) hearing officers. Renotes that two (2) attorneys during 
oral argument noted problems with the SOP that was in effect for that particular set of 
DUIs. The issue involved the 1:\\'0 (2) minutes standard between breath samples. 
ALS hearing officers have no business making these sorts of comments or 
participating in scientific standards being developed for Idaho. ISPFS laboratory officials 
are not above hiding and cheating as noted in the Brady material that is at page 104. 
On page 009 ofthe e-mails, there is a discussion about the two (2) minute window 
between breath samples. The standards should be developed based on science, not on 
what helps prosecute drivers who have been stopped for DUls. 
On page 013, there is a specific e-mail from Darren Jewkes to several employees 
of the ISPFS. Mr. Jewkes states: 
"I am not sure ifI dare ask, but are there any other parts ofthe SOP that 
you feel needs immediate attention, such as changing "will" to "may" 
or "approximately" or doing away with "monthly" etc. (Jeremy here 
is your chance:)." 
It is interesting to note that in this e-mail, Darren Jewkes actually uses the ":)" 
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On page 015, Jeremy Johnson uses the words: " .... I am just suggesting putting in 
some wiggle room language ... " and "cases are being tossed"( emphasis added). Where 
is the science in using "wiggle room" language. The ISP concern seems to be that cases 
are being tossed. Whether cases get tossed really isn't relevant to a discussion as to the 
scientific standards for breath testing. 
There are also discussions regarding the use ofthe 0.2 solution and the need for 
linearity. The only one who seems to be concerned about standards is David Laycock. On 
page 016, he notes: "I just don't think this is the time to cut back on quality standards." 
He goes into a discussion about compliance with SOP. In fact, Jeremy Johnson notes: 
"It is good scientific practice to check linearity because that lends 
credence to accuracy ofthe numbers that the instrument generates." 
At p. 018. 
Of course, then the e-mails note the ability to just put all sorts oflanguage in that 
protects the operators by having someone come in and testify around any problems. At 
p.019. 
There is also a discussion by Jeremy Johnston noting that a mandatory word like 
"must" would be replaced with a discretionary word like "should". Again, where is the 
science? \\That would Judge Lansing say about this? 
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On page 020 of the e-mails, Jeremy Johnston uses the term "wiggle room" 
regarding the 0.20 language. On page 021 the term "wiggle room" is used again 
regarding the simulator. 
Jared Olson, who is the Traffic Safety Resource Prosecutor for the Idaho 
Prosecuting Attorneys Association, seems to be instrumental in making changes. Why a 
non-scientist prosecutor is involved in any process involving generating standards must 
be considered suspect. 
Anne Nord indicates that the SOP is "an operator SOP". At p. 036. 
There is also a discussion involving Skylar Anderson and the use of the word 
"approximately". He notes that he thinks the word "approximately" creates ambiguity in 
the method and creates room for debate regarding when a perfonnance verification is 
valid. He notes: 
"In this forensic lab, we all have strict deadlines regarding when we can 
use a solution and I thinkBTSs are responsible enough to be held to a 
strict standard." 
Atp.036. 
This language seems pretty laughable considering the investigation that Mr. 
Anderson is under, but the words that he uses are to the point, "wiggle room" words are 
used to create ambiguity in the method and creates debate. 
On page 040, Anne Nord, states: 
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"I want to thank both of you for all the work you have put in on these. 
I hope we start seeing the payoff soon and some of these issues we 
have been having with court interpretations will go away." 
Why is ISPFS worrying about court decisions instead of simply making scientific 
standards? It is obvious that ISPFS is not interested in science. ISPFS is interested in 
convicting DUI drivers. 
Christine Starr, who is a prosecutor, has also had input into the development of the 
standards. Her scientific background is not known. Most likely, she has none since she 
is prosecutor. Jeremy Johnston notes: 
"I think we should limit it to police officers and attorneys. Defense 
might try to use something in the e-mail to their advantage if they find 
about it before the officers and prosecutors." 
Atp.051. 
At page 054, there is a discussion with Jeremy Johnston noting that he doesn't 
want the guidelines to read as mandatory because he knows some BTSs use the nuclear 
approach and change solutions ifthey get an initial failed series oftests. So again, how 
can the current SOP be mandatory. Standards are not guidelines. The holding in State v. 
Bell, eCt. App. 1988), supra, does not support the current SOP as a standard. The current 
SOP is written so that nothing is mandatory. 
On page 055, Jared Olson, asks questions about the term "calendar month" and the 
use of the word "should" and noted that the procedure is a suggestion. Jeremy Johnston 
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being approximately two (2) minutes apart. See page 063. On August 24,2010, Jesse 
Avery asks a question: 
At p. 064. 
"According to 5.1.2 of the Sop's there should be an air blank between 
the 2 verification checks on a lifeloc. The lifeloc does not perform an 
air blank when doing a wet check. Is there something else we need to 
be doing?" 
Matthew Garnette notes on August 24, 2010: 
At p. 066. 
"I just talked to Jared and he is going to have a few more prosecutors 
read the SOP over and he may have a few more comments." 
Again, why is ISPFS asking prosecutors for input regarding scientific standards. 
On August 25 th 2010, Jared Olsen says: 
"As a disclaimer; I recognize that there is absolutely no way the SOPs 
can be constructed in a way that will not result in attacks in court." 
At p. 068. 
With regard to the August 25 th e-mail, Jeremy Johnson responds from page 068 
through page' 072. The court can note the discussion regarding the 0.8 solution, the 0.2 
solution, the tenn "calendar month" and Jeremy Johnson's concern about Clark & Feeney 
coming up with a "legit argument" for the term "routinely". Jeremy Johnston also notes 
on page 070: "I removed the "open door suggestions" and just left if[ sic] vague." Jeremy 
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At p. 071. 
"I thought that I had added enough weasel words to allow for different 
jurisdictions to use their own policies and beliefs to decide." (emphasis 
added). 
On page 072 there is a discussion about that word "should" in that it is not being 
mandatory; it simply allows for best practices as opposed to an actual standard. 
1SP "scientist" Jeremy Johnson in an e-mail dated August 26, 2010, states: "Do 
these pants make my butt look fat?" At. page 075. The scientific scholarship that is 
found in these e-mails is simply mind-numbing. The level of childish comments is 
inappropriate. 
Jared Olsen writes about the real science behind the changes to SOPs: 
At p. 079. 
"It would be good to get comments from some of the BTS's, 
prosecutors in different jurisdictions and probably most importantly 
your own AGs who could forward it on to the appellate division who 
could offer some excellent insight. I recognize this is not a requirement 
of ISPFS and I just want to reaftlrm my appreciation that you would 
allow me to comment at all. I see only benefits by us working together. 
So thanks again, and please let me know if you have questions or if I 
can be of further assistance." 
Again, why involve prosecutors, attorney generals, and the appellate division of 
the attorney generals' office in the development of legal standards. 1SPFS has not 
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1 developed any scientific standards, it's simply developing "weasel words". 
2 
The court should make a determination that the "standards" in place on January 16, 
3 
4 
2011, do not meet the requirements ofI.C. § 18-8004(4) and the holding in State v. Bell 
5 (supra). The court has a challenge in front of it. Is the court going to comply with the 




9 The breath testing specialist and operator in this particular case indicated that he 
10 had not been trained or certified on the SOP that was put into effect on November 1, 
11 
2010. Therefore, he could not meet the standards set out in Masterson v. Department of 
12 
13 
Transportation, 150 Idaho 126,244 P.3d 625 (Ct. App. 2010). 
14 CONCLUSION 
15 The trial court failed to apply the case law regarding the need for standards in 
16 
breath testing pursuant to I.e. § 18-8004(4). The trial court failed to act as a gatekeeper 
17 
18 regarding the field sobriety tests. Not every problem goes to the weight, therefore, the 
19 filed sobriety test should have been suppressed. Finally, the breath test should have been 
20 
suppressed because of the failure to have a proper observation period and because of the 
21 
22 
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DATED this 2L day of January, 2012. 
. Stro chein, a member of 
the firm. Attorneys for Defendant. 
I hereby certify on the 9--
day of January, 2012, a true copy 
of the foregoing instrument 
was: L Mailed 
Faxed 
Hand delivered 
Overnight mail to: 
Justin J. Coleman 
Deputy Prosecutor 
Nez Perce County Prosecutor's Office 
P.O. Box 1267 
Lewiston, ID 83501 
CLARK and FEENEY, L~ 
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STATE OF IDAHO" ) 
TRANSPORTATION DEPARTMENT, ) 
) 
Respondent. ) , 
--------~----------~--~) 
Case No. CV-l0-401 
MEMORANDUM OPINION 
Derek Russell Campbell ("Campbell") has petitioned this Court for judicial 
review of the administrative suspension of his driver's license. which was imposed by 
the Idaho Transportation Department r'the DepartmentU ). 
BACKGROUND 
On March 17,2010, at 3:12 a.m., Idaho State Police Corporal Oint BaJ.dwin 
("Baldwin") stopped the pickup Campbell,was driving for speeding; straddJ.iD.g a l~e 
diVider, and weaving on Jacks<;Jn Street in Moscow, Idaho. The stop was recorded 




microphone located on Baldwin's perso:i:t. Another officer (whose name does not 
appear in the record) arrived to assist Baldwin. 'Noting Campbell's slurred speech, the 
smell of alcohol, and his admission to having consumed some alcohol that night, 
Baldwin had Campbell exit his pickup to verform some field sobriety tests (Fstsi '). 
(Video at 5:30.) Balp.~then checked Camphell's mouth. (Video at 5:45.) 
After administering the FSTs Baldwin walked Campbell to the passenger side 
, ' 
of the patrol car. Baldwinleft Campbell at the passenger side ~f the car, turned., and 
went around the fr6nt of the car to the opposite side to retrieve a testing device frOn:L 
inside. It took him approximately eleven seconds, during which time he slammed the 
car's door and another vehicle pass7d. (Video from 11:44 to 11:55.)- Later, after 
. Baldwin read Campbell the refusal paperwork, Campbell asked Baldwin a question, to 
which Campbell re$ponded "f D;l sorry, I could:i:t't hear you;" apparently due t~ the 
noise of a passing vehicle. (Video q,t 17:14.) 
, Later, while still next to ~p belL Baldwin got the Ufeloc FC20 (a :breath 
alcohol testing device) ready, dUring which a long series of loud beeps were heard. ' 
(Video from 18:42 to 20:59.) eru:npbell's first attempt'to submit a sample .f,ailed 
because he apparently did not blow hard enough. (Video at 22:35.) The second 
. , . 
sample registered .158. (Video at 24:57,) The third sample registered .145. (Video at 
27:26.) Carripbell was arrested for driving under the influence df alcohol in violation 





The Department suspended Campbell; s driver's license. Campbell sought 
, review' of that suspension. At his administrative license suspension r' AlS") hearing, 
. .'. 
his attorney argued that the fifteen-m:inute monitoring period had not been observed~ . 
Hearing Officer Mark Richrriond thereafter issued findings of tact and conclusions of 
law and order, sustaiIring Campbell's license suspension. In his firidings, the Hearing 
, Officer indicated that, based on Baldwin's affidavit, the breath test complied with 
. . 
Idaho law arid Idaho State Police Standard Operating Procedures. Find~gs of Fact 
. ' 
and Conclusions of Law and Order ("FFCLOTf) at 5. On appeal, Campbell argues that 
the fifteen-minute monitoring period was not observed and that there were 
insufficient breath samples to suspend hiS license. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
AccordIDgto IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-8002A(8) (2010), "[a] party aggrieved by 
the decision of the hearing officer may seekjuclicia1 review of the decision in,the 
manner proVided for judicial review of final agency action provided in chapter 52, title 
67'.~daho Code." A co:ru;t must affirm the action under review unless the agency's 
findings, iDferences, conclusions, or ciecisions (a) violate statutory or constitutional 
prOVisions; (b) excee<:i- the.agency's statutory authority; (c) are made upon unlawful 
_ procedure; (d) are not supported by-substantial evidence in the record as a wholei or 
(e) are arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 67-5279(3) 
, . 
(2004)" To succeed on review, a party challenging an ageIicy decision must 




5279(3) (~004). See IDAHO CODE ANN. § 67-5279(4) (2004); Price v. Payette County Bd. of 
County eomm'rs'r 131 Id$o 426, 429,958 P.2d 583,586 (1998). The court's review 
"must be c~nfined to the agency record.lt IDAHO CoDE ANN .. § 67-5277 (2004). IDAHO 
. . 
CoDE ANN. § 67-5279(1) (2004) sta~ that when reviewing an agency decision, a court 
1/ shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of tl}.e 
evidence on qu~stions of fact." An agenCy' s f~ctua1 determinations are binding on a 
reviewing court, even where there is conflicting evidence before the agency, so lon~ as 
the determinations are supported by substantial evidence on the record. Marshall v. 
state Dep't ofTransp., 137 Idilio 337,340,48 P.3d 666, 669 (Ct. App. 2002) (citations 
orriitted). 
ANALYSIS 
J.. Baldwin failed. to sufficiently monitor Campbell: for the required fifteen minutes. 
Breath alcohol tests must be administered accorrung to Idaho State Police 
Stand~d Operating Procedures: Breath Alcohol Testing (IfISP SOPs") in order for their 
results to enjoy a presumption of reliability. Schroeder, 147 Idaho at 478, 210 P 3d at 
586. At the time of the administrative hearing in this case, the applicable ISP SOP had 
been revised in July of 2009. 
If the necessary procedures are not strictly followed, test results will be 
. inadinissible unless the State can e;;tablish, through expert testimony I the resultsl 
reliability notwithstanding the procedural deviation. Ia.. (relying on State v. ·Chtiran, 




II (nloncompliance with:these procedures is. one of the .grounds for vacating an 
a~trative license suspension under L C. § 18-8002A(7)( d)." Mahurin v. State, 
Dep't afTrans. (In re Suspension of the Driver's Licens~ of Mahurin), 140 Idaho 656, 658:-59, 
99 P.3d 125,127-28 (Ct App. 2004). As noted·in Wheelerv. ldalw Tra.nsportation 
Department, 148 Idaho 378,_ 1 223 P.3d 761,768 (Ct. App. 2009), the mandatory 
nature of these rules is established through use of the word "must." The Department 
is given no leeway where a mandatory procedural requirement is con~erned. 
One such required procedure is the fifteen-~ute pre-test waiting period 
during which "the [test] subject must be monitored ... [and1 the subject should notbe 
allowed to smoke, drii-ik, eat or belch/burp:' ISP SOP § 3.1. Such events could 
introduce alcohol mto the subject's mouth. Carsan, 133 Idaho at 453,' 988 P.2d at 227. If 
any of those events occur, the operator must wrut another fifteen minutes, before 
testing, to allow re-absorption to occUr. State v: DeFranco, 143 Idaho 335, 337, 144: P.3d 
40,42 (et. App. 2006). During the fifteen-minute monitoring period, lithe operator 
must b~ alert for any event that might influence the accuracy of tlle breath test." ISP 
SOP § 3.1.5. 
The mandated monitoring period is "not an onerous burden" unfairly foisted 
upon law enforcement officials. Defranco, 143 Idaho at 338, 144 P.3d at 43.· The 
operator is not required to fr stare fixedly" at the subject for fifteen ti:rlnutes. Bennett v; 
. . 
State, bep't of Transp., 147 Idaho 141, 144,206 P.3d 505/508 (Ct. App. 2009) (citation 
omitted). However, the ~onitoring must "be such as could reasonably be expected to 
5 
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. accomplish the purpose of the. requirement." Carson, 133 Idaho at 453, 988 P.2d at 227. 
This requirement is ordmarily met if the operatq~ If stays in cl~ physical proximity to .. 
the test subject so that the officerl s senses of sight, smell and hearing can. be 
. . 
employed" DeFran~o, 143 Idaho at 338, 144 P.3d at 43. Use of sight alone, however, is 
not enough. Bennett, 147 Idahq at 144, 206 P.3d at 508. 
Idaho CoUlj:s have found noncompliance "With the fifteen-minute monitoring 
period in several instances. In Bennett, the court found noncompliance because the 
. . 
offi~er left the room twice during the monitonng perind. 147 Idaho at 145, 206 P.3d at 
509. In De~artCof the court found noncompliance where ~e officer 
left the patrol car's rear door ajar and then entered through the front passenger 
. door, called dispatch momentarily, and removed his breathalyzer equipment '" . 
[from the] front seat .... [and] walked around to the rear of the vehicle, 
opened the trunk and looked through a file box in the trunk ... 
143 Idaho at 336, 144 P.3d at 41. The court found nonCompliance even though the 
officer testified he could see DeFranco through the gap between the trunk and the 
vehicle and that he would have heard a bu.Tp. Id. In Carson the court found 
noncompliance where the officer wa~hed the ~bject intermittently through the 
mirror while driving hfm to the ~ti.on, the officer had a hearing aid, it was raining, 
and the wmdshield wipers were on. Carson,.133 Idaho at 453, 988 P.2d at 227 .. 
" 
In this case, Baldwin left Campbell on the passenger side of his patrol car and . 
. went arouild the front of the car to its opposite side to retrieve the testing device. This 




.-., 1 '" ") i 
approximately eleven seconds, dui:ing \'\Thich time he closed his door· and another 
.' . 
. vehicie paSsed. (Video from 11:44 to 11:55.) While Baldwin's affidavit indica~s that 
he observed the mandatory fifteen-minute waiting period, /I an affidavit alone is 
insufficient to support a finding that proper procedures were followed." Bennett, 147 
Idaho at 145,. 206 P.3d at 509. This is especially true where the video contradicts the 
affidavit 
Even if Baldwin could see Campbell throughout his eleven-second trip to the 
driver's side of the patrol car (which is not evident from the video ),it is d~ Baldwin 
could not properly employ his senses of hearing and smell while he was away. There 
is a record of passing cars making it difficult to hear. (Video at 17:1.) At the time 
Baldwin went to the other side of his car not only did anothe~ vehicle pass, but he 
. closed his car's door, which would have dro~ed ouf a belch. Requiring the operator 
to remain ~ close proximity to the suspect :in order for him to utilize his senses of 
. sight, smell, and hearing is a reasonable reqUirement. It minimizes the chance of error. 
Since the use of sight aione is not enough to properly monitor a suspect, ;e,e Bennett, 
147 Idahci at 144,206 P.3d at 508, the Hearing Officer's conclusion that Baldwin 
properly monitored Campbell is not supported by substantial evidence. . 
2. The result of the last breath sample is ~uffident to support a license 
suspension. 
The facts here. show that Baldwin attempted to take breath tE!St samples at 22:35" 




passenger side of the patrol car and went around to the opposite side to rebieve a 
testing device from inside, returning to Campbell at 1~:55 into the stop. If Bal~lwin 
" had, as required, re-started the fifteen-minute monitoring :period at that timer he could 
have started testing 26:55 .into the stop. The first two tests, administered at 22:35 and 
24:57, were not administered after a fifteen-minute monitoring period. Consequently, 
they are not valid tests. That leaves only" one test sampie, the one 'done at 27:26~ 
having been done after the fifteen-!ffinute monitoring period expired. Having only 
one valid test (absent facts not present here) is insuH;icient to suspend a driver's 
license. 
The Department argues that even if the first two testS were conducted in 
. . 
violation of the monitoring requirements, the last one was not and therefore 
constitutes a sufficiEmt basis to suspend CampbeU's driver's license. While the 
Department does not.have any appellate authority for this contention; it does cite a 
decision from another District Judge for this proposition. See, In the Matter. of the 
Drimng Privileges of Jeffrey D. Simler, No. CV07-01649 (ID Dist Ct,Nov. 21r 2007). In 
Simler, Judge Brudie concluded that" while the first breath test was adrninister~d after 
only fourteen minutes of observation and was ,therefore :inadrrrissible, the second 
breath te:5t was administered one ininute later .and thus, provided /I sufficient evidence 
in the record for Hearing Officer Moody to find the evidentiary breath test was 
properly adririnistered." Id. at 5. Suffice it to say, this Cou:t disagrees with Judge 




~; I" 3 ., , 
provided during a m;eath testing seguence.1( ISP SOP § 3.2 states that a breath test' 
.. . 
consist? of two breath samples. It reads "ra] breath alcohol test includes two (2) valid 
breath samples taken during the testing sequence and separated by air blanks." ISP 
. . 
secon~ or third adeqUl?-te sample as requested by the operator, the single test result 
may be considered valid.." The ISP SOP does not provide an):' other way by which a 
. single samp Ie can be considered v?lid.. 
The ISP SOP language unambiguo-pBly states that a breath test consists of two 
.' 
valid'samples and that one sample is not sufficient unless the lone test.is the fault of . 
the subject There is :1).0 suggestion that the lone valid test was the result of anything 
Campbell did. As a result; the Hearing Officer's conclusion that the U evidentiary test 
. . 
was performed in compliance with Idaho -law and lSP standard operating procedUre" 
is not supported by substantial evidence. 
CONCLUSION. 
The HearingOfficer's findings are not supported by substantial evidence in the 
record as a whole. Consequently, the Hearing Officer's. decision is vacated and the case 
. is remanded to the Hearing Officer. 
S' '. '. 
T?ated ~ X day of October 2010. 
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STATE OF IDAHO ) 
TRANSPORTATION DEPARTMENT, ) 
) 
Respondent. ) 
Case No. CV-2010-1363 
MEMORANDUM OPINION 
Douglas S. Denneson ("Denneson") has petitioned this Court for judicial 
review of the administrative suspension of his driver's license which was im.posed 
by the Idaho Transportation Department ("the Department"). 
BACKGROUND 
On Septem.ber 26, 2010, at approximately 10:48 a.m., Idaho State Police 
Trooper Jacob Schwecke ("Schwecke") stopped the pickup Denneson was driving 
for speeding on U.s. Highway 95. The stop occurred near milepost 358 in Latah 
County, north of Moscow. The stop was recorded visually via a recorder located in -
the front of Schwecke's patrol car and audibly via a microphone located on 
MEMORANDUM OPINION 1 
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Schwecke's person. Schwecke approached Denneson and stated he could smell 
alcohol coming from the vehicle. After Denneson admitted to having consumed 
alcohol the night before, Schwecke asked him to exit the truck to perform some 
field sobriety tests by the side of the road on Highway 95. After conducting the 
horiiontal gaze nystagmus test, Schwecke told Denneson he was going to start the 
fifteen-minute mandatory waiting period. Schwecke then checked Denneson's 
mouth. 
Schwecke next walked Denneson back to the passenger side of hiS patrol 
car, proceeding slightly ahead of Denneson and to his right. Schwecke continued 
to converse with Denneson. Schwecke then retrieved some items from inside his 
patrol car. The two then walked back to Denneson's vehicle with Denneson 
proceeding slightly ahead of Schwecke and to Schwecke's right. 
Schwecke next explained the walk and turn test to Denneson, 
demonstrating part ofit for him. Duringthe demonstration, Schwecke looked 
down at his feet and turned his back to Denneson for a total of 13 seconds. (Video 
from 12;01;18 to 12:01:31.) Schwecke was positioned a short distance away from 
Denneson during the demonstration. 
, The two walked back to the patrol car again and S chwe eke ope~ed the car 
door, retrieved the breath testing equipment, and closed the door. (Video ,at 
12:04:48.) Numerous vehicles passed throughout the fifteen-minute observation 
. period. Schwecke administered the first breath sample more than fifteen minutes 
:MEMORAI\TDl.i'M OPThITON 2 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
after he initially checked Denneson's mouth. Denneson's BAC on the first test was 
.035. On the second test 'his BAC measured .032. Because Denneson was under 
twenty-one years old at the time, he was arrested for driving under the influence 
of alcohol in violation ofLC. § 18-8004. 
The Department suspended Denneson's driver's license. Denneson sought 
review of his suspension through the administrative procedure available to him. 
At the administrative license suspension ("ALS") hearing held on December 8, 
2010, Denneson's attorney argued that the fifteen-minute monitoring period had 
not been properly observed. Following the hearing, Hearing Officer Dustin Jansen 
issued findings of fact and conchlsions oflaw, sustaining Denneson's license 
suspension. In his findings, the Hearing Officer noted that "Officer Schwecke's 
affidavit states the evidentiary test was performed in compliance with Idaho Law 
and ISP Standard Operating Procedures." Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law and Order at 4. Additionally, the Hearing Officer stated that "[a]fter review 
of the audio/video, it cannot be concluded that the observation period was not 
properly administered." Id. On appeal, Denneson argues the fifteen-minute 
monitoring period was not properly observed. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
According to I.e. § 18-8002A(8), "[a] party aggrieved by the decision ofthe 
I 
hearing officer may seek judicial re~ew of the decision in the manner provided for 
judicial review of final agency action provided in chapter 52, title 67, Idaho Code." 
3 
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A court must affirm the action under review unless the agency's findings, 
inferences, conclusions, or decisions (a) violate statutory or constitutional 
provisions; (b) exceed the agency's statutory authority; (c) are made upon unlawful 
procedure; (d) are not supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole; 
or (e) are arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. I.C. § 67-5279(3). To 
succeed on review, a party challenging an agency decision must demonstrate that 
. the agency erred in a manner specified in I.C. § 67-5279(3). See LC. § 67-5279(4); 
Price v. Payette County Ed. of County Comm'rs., 131 Idaho 426, 429,958 P.2d 583, 
586 (1998). The court's review "must be confined to the agency record." I.C. § 67-
5277. Idaho Code § 67-5279(1) states that when reviewing an agency decision, a 
court "shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of 
the evidence on questions of fact." An agency's factual determinations are binding 
on a reviewing court, even where there is conflicting evidence before the agency,so 
long as the determinations are supported by substantial evidence on the record. 
IMarshall v. State Dep't of Transp., 137 Idaho 337,340,48 P.3d 666,669 (Ct. App. 
2002) (citations omitted). 
Resolution of this issue turns on the identification and construction of the 
regulations governing the administration of the breath test. This is a question of 
law over which this Court exercises free review. State v.Remsburg, 126 Idaho 
.338, 339, 882 P.2d 993, 994 (Idaho Ct. App. 1994); see also In re Schroeder, 147 
Idaho 476, 479,210 P.3d584, 587 (Idaho Ct. App. 2009) (stating that the 
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interpretation and application of statutory law and administrative rules or 
regulations presents purely legal issues over which appellate courts have free 
review). 
ANALYSIS 
1. Schwecke failed to sufficiently monitor Denneson for the required 
fifteen minutes. 
Breath alcohol tests must be administered according to Idaho State Police 
Standard Operating Procedures: Breath Alcohol Testing ("ISP SOPs") in order for 
their results to enjoy a presumption of reliability. In re Schroeder, 147 Idaho 476, 
478,210 P.3d 584, 586; see also ISP SOP §6. The purpose behind the mandatory 
monitoring period is to make sure the operator observes the subject for any event 
that might make the results of the test inaccurate through the introduction of 
mouth alcohol. State v. Carson, 133 Idaho 451,453,988 P,2d 225, 227 (Ct. App. 
1999). 
If the necessary procedures are not strictly followed, test results will be 
inadmissible unless the State can establish, through expert testimony, the 
reliability of the results notwithstanding the procedural deviation. Id. (relying on 
State v. Charan, 132 Idaho 341, 343, 971 P.2d 1165, 1167 (Ct. App. 1999». 
Accordingly, "[n]oncompliance with these procedures is one of the grounds for 
vacating an administrative license suspension under 1. C. § 18-8002A(7) (d)." In re 
lvlahurin, 140 Idaho 656, 658--59, 99 P.3d 125, 127-28 (Ct. App. 2004). As notedin 
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fVheeler v. Idaho Transportation Department, 148 Idaho 378,386,223 P.3d 761, 
768 (Ct. App. 2009), the mandatory nature ofthese rules is established through 
use of the word "must." The Department is given no leeway where a mandatory 
procedural requirement is concerned. 
One such required procedure is the fifteen-minute pre-test waiting period 
during which "the [test] subject must be monitored ... [and) the subject Shollld not 
be allowed to smoke, drink, eat, or belchfburp." ISP SOP § 6.1. Such events could 
introduce alcohol into the subject's mouth. Carson, 133 Idaho at 453, 988 P .2d at 
227. If any of those events occur, the operator must wait another fifteen mmutes, 
before testing, to allow re-absorption to occur. State v. DeFranco, 143 Idaho 335, 
337, 144 P.3d 40,42 (Ct. App. 2006). Further, the ISP SOP provide that, "[d]uring , 
the monitoring period, the Operator must be alert for any event that might 
influence the accuracy of the breath test." ISP SOP§ 6.1.4. 
The mandated monitoring period is "not an onerous burden" unfairly foisted 
upon law enforcement officials. DeFranco, 143 Idaho at 338, 144 P.3d at 43~ The 
operator is not required to "stare fixedly" at the subject for fifteen minutes. 
Bennett v. State,' Dep't of Transp., 147 Idaho 141, 144, 206 P .3d 505, 508 (Ct. App. 
2009) (citB:tion omitted). However, the monitoring must "be such as could 
reasonably be expected to accomplish the purpose of the requirement." Carson, 
133 Idaho at 453,988 P.2d at 227. This requirement is ordinarily met lithe 
operator "stays in close physical proximity to the test subject so that the officer's 
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senses of sight, smell and hearing can be emplo.yed." DeFranco~ 143 Idaho at 338, 
144 P.3d at 43. Use of sight alone, however, is not enough. Bennett, 147 Idaho at 
144, 206 P.3d at 508. When an offic~r's sense of sight,is impaired, he must be able 
to use his senses of hearing and smell to properly observe the subject. DeFranco, 
143 Idaho at 338, 144 P.3d at 43. 
Idaho courts have found noncompliance with the fifteen-minute monitoring 
period in several instances. In Bennett, the court found noncompliance because 
the officer left the room twice during the monitoring period, 147 Idaho at 145,206 
P.3d at 509. In DeFranco, the court found noncompliance where the officer 
left the patrol car's rear door ajar and then entered through the front 
passenger door, called dispatch momentarily, and removed his breathalyzer 
equipment ... [from the] front seat .... [and] walked around to the rear of 
the vehicle, opened the trunk and looked through a file box in the trunk ... 
143 Idaho at 336, 144 P.3d at 41. There, the court found noncompliance even 
though the officer testified he could see DeFranco through the gap between the 
trunk and the vehicle and that he would have heard a burp. Id. In Carson, the 
court found noncompliance where the officer watched the subject intermittently 
through the mirror while driving him to the station. Also in Carson, the officer 
had a hearing aid, it was raining, and the windshield wipers were on. 133 Idaho 
at 453, 988 P .2d at 227: 
In contrast to Bennett, DeFranco; and Carson is State v. Remsburg, 126 
Idaho 338, 339,882 P.2d 993,994 (Ct. App. 1994). In Remsburg, the court found 
compliance where the officer sat next to the subject and progTammed the testing 
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device, waited for it to warm up, and read the required advisory to her. In 
Remsburg, although the officer failed to maintain visual contact, he appeared to 
have full use of his other senses. 
In this case, Schwecke was not always in a physical position to watch 
Denneson, or alternatively to use his sense of smell and hearing to accomplish the 
purpose of the ~onitoring period. While Schwecke's affidavit indicates he properly 
observed the mandatory fifteen-minute waiting period, "an affidavit alone is 
insufficient to support a finding that proper procedures were followed." Bennett v. 
State, Dep't of Transp., 147 Idaho at 145, 206P.3d at 509. The Court must look at 
the record as a whole. 
From the time the fifteen-minute waiting period began, to the time the 
initial breath sample was taken, over seventy vehicles passed by on U.S. Highway 
95, which is a busy two-lane road. (Video from 11:59:00 to 12:15:54.) Schwecke's 
attention was occasionally diverted from Denneson, and circumstances indicate 
Schwecke's senses of hearing and smell were also inhibited. Schwecke and 
Denneson were outside of their. cars during the entire fifteen minutes, and similar 
to the officer's actions in DeFranco, on two different occasions Schwecke leaned in 
to retrieve items out of his patrol car. (Video at 11:59:46 and 12:05:52.) Although 
Schwecke was not far from Denneson at this time, his attention. was diverted and 
his senses were impaired when reaching into the car. 
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Further, while demonstrating the walk and turn, Schwecke had his eyes to 
the ground or his back turned to Denneson for thirteen seconds. (Video from 
12:01: 17 to 12:01:30.) During the time Schwecke's vision was directed awayfrom 
Denneson, passing traffic and the outdoor setting ,further inhibited his senses of 
hearing and smell. ~4Jso, during the demonstration Schwecke was worried about 
avoiding passing traffic, further distracting him froni monitoring Denneson. 
Finally, it is difficult to conclude that Schwecke was alert to any burps during the 
administration of the Field Sobriety Tests ("FSTs") during the waiting period. To 
properly administer the FSTs, Schwecke should have been focused on Denneson's 
feet during the walk and turn and one leg stand tests. However, to properly 
administer the waiting period, Schwecke needed to observe Denneson for any 
burps or regurgitation. By trying to do two things at once, Schwecke was not 
doing what is required by the SOPs. The large source of noise and inability to 
smell any burps substantially impaired Schwecke's ability to supplement any 
visual observations with his other senses to ensure nothing occurred that would 
affect the accuracy of the test. 
The standard set forth in the ISP .sop regarding the monitoring period is 
the officer must be alert for anything that might affect the accuracy of the test. See 
ISP SOP 6.1.4. (Emphasis added.) As Carson demonstrates, an officer can be in 
close proximity to the individual, but conditions may still exist that render the 
monitoring period inadequate. It is clear that at several points during the 
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monitoring pe<riod, Sc)1wecke could not properly employ his senses of hearing, sight 
and smell. The Hearing Officer's conclusion that Schwecke properly monitored 
Denneson is therefore not supported by substantial evidence. 
CONCLUSION 
The Heari~g Officer's findings are not supported by substantial evidence in 
the record as a whole. Consequently, the ffearing Officer's decision is VACATED 
and the case is REMANDED. 
~V 










;. -.- ~~ -.". "--" -.'. ','" 
.'. ','.",> .' ••• ----- •• ~ 
o The results of this study provide a clear evidence of the validity of the 3-test 
battery. To support arrest decisions at above or below 0.08, it strongly 
suggests that the SFSTs also accurately discriminate BACs at 0.04 and 
above. 
OVERVIEW OF NrSTAGMUS 
Nystagmus 
Nystagmus is defined as an involuntary jerking of the eyes. Alcohol and certain 
other drugs cause Horizontal Gaze Nytagmus. 
Categories of Nystagmus 
There are three general categories of nystagmus: 
1. Vestibular Nystagmus is caused by movement or action to the vestibular 
system. 
A Types of vestibular nystagmus: 
o Rotational Nystagmus occurs when the person is spun around or rotated 
rapidly, causing the fluid in the inner ear to be disturbed. If it were 
possible to observe the eyes of a rotating person, they would be seen to 
jerk noticeably. 
o Post Rotational Nystagmus is closely related to rotational nystagmus: 
when the person stops spinning, the fluid in the inner ear remains 
disturbed for a period of time, and the eyes continue to jerk. 
o Caloric Nystagmus occurs when fluid motion in,the canals of the 
vestibular system is stimulated by temperature as by putting warm 
water in one ear and cold in the other. 
o Positional Alcohol Nystagmus (PAN) occurs when a foreign fluid, such 
as alcohol, that alters the specific gravity of the blood is in unequal 
concentrations in the blood and the vestibular system. 
2. Nystagmus can also result directly from neural activity: 
o Optokinetic Nystagmus occurs when the eyes fixate on an object that 
suddenly moves out of sight, or when the eyes watch sharply contrasting 
moving images. 






Examples of optokinetic nystagmus include watching strobe lights, rotating 
lights, or rapidly moving traffic in close proximity. The Horizontal Gaze 
Nystagmus test will not be influenced by optokinetic nystagmus when 
administered properly. 
Phvsiological Nystagmus is a natural nystagmus that keeps the sensory 
cells of the eye from tiring. It is the most common type of nystagmus. It 
happens to all of us, all the time. This type of nystagmus produces 
extremely minor tremors or jerks of the eyes. These tremors are generally 
too small to be seen with the naked eye. Physiological nystagmus will have 
no impact on our Standardized Field Sobriety Tests, because its tremors are 
generally invisible. 
Gaze Nystagmus occurs as the eyes move from the center position. Gaze 
nystagmus is separated into three types: 
(1) Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus occurs as the eyes move to the side. It is 
the observation of the eyes for Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus that 
provides the first and most accurate test in the Standardized Field 
Sobriety Test battery. Although this type of nystagmus is most accurate 
for determining alcohol impairment, its presence may also indicate use 
of certain other drugs. 
(2) Vertical Gaze Nystagmus is an involuntary jerking of the eyes (up and 
down) which occurs when the eyes gaze upward at maximum elevation. 
The presence of this type of nystagmus is associated with high doses of 
alcohol for that individual and certain other drugs. The drugs that cause 
Vertical Gaze Nystagmus are the same ones that cause Horizontal Gaze 
Nystagmus. 
Note: There is no drug that will cause Vertical Gaze Nystagmus that 
does not cause Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus. If Vertical Gaze 
Nystagmus is present and Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus is not, it could 
be a medical condition. 
(3) Resting Nystagmus is referred to as a jerking of the eyes as they look 
straight ahead. Its presence usually indicates a pathology or high doses 
of a Dissociative Anesthetic drug such as PCP. If detected, take 
precautions. (OFFICER SAFETY.) 
3. Nystagmus may also be caused by certain pathological disorders. They include 
brain tumors and other brain damage or some diseases of the inner ear. These 
pathological disorders occur in very few people and in even fewer drivers. 
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1\1edical Impairment 
The examinations that you can conduct to assess possible medical impairment 
include: 
o Pupil size 
o Resting Nystagmus 
o Tracking ability 
PROCEDURES 
Procedures to Assess Possible Medical Impairment 
Prior to administration of HGN, the eyes are checked for equal pupil size, resting 
nystagmus, and equal tracking (can they follow an object together). If the eyes do 
not track together, or if the pupils are noticeably unequal in size, the chance of 
medical disorders or injuries causing the nystagmus is pr~sent. 
Procedures of Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus Testing: The Three Clues 
The test you will use at roadside is "Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus" -- an involuntary 
jerking of the eyes occurring as the eyes gaze toward the side. Some jerking will be 
seen if the eyes are moved far enough to the side. 
1. The Lack of Smooth Pursuit (Clue Number One) - The eyes can be observed to 
jerk or "bounce" as they follow a smoothly moving stimulus, such as a pencil or 
penlight. The eyes of an unimpaired person will follow smoothly, i.e., a marble 
rolling across a smooth pane of glass, or windshield wipers moving across a wet 
windshield. 
2. Distinct and Sustained Nystagmus At Maximum Deviat~on (Clue Number Two) 
- Distinct and sustained nystagmus will be evident when the eye is held at 
maximum deviation for a minimum of four seconds. People exhibit slight 
jerking of the eye at maximum deviation, even when unimpaired, but this will 
not be evident or sustained for more than a few seconds. When impaired by 
alcohol, the jerking will be larger, more pronounced, sustained for more than 
four seconds, and easily observable. 
3. Onset of Nvstagmus Prior To 45 Degrees (Clue Number Three) - The point at 
which the eye is first seen jerking. If the jerking begins prior to 45 degrees it is 
evident that the person has a BAC above 0.08, as shown by recent research. 
The higher the degree of impairment, the sooner the nystagmus will be 
observable. 
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Estimating a 45-Degl'ee Angle 
It is important to know how to estimate a 45-degree angle. How far you position the 
stimulus from the suspect's nose is a critical factor in estimating a 45-degree angle. 
(i.e., If the stimulus is held 12" in front of the suspect's nose, it should be moved 12H 
to the side to reach 45 degrees. Likewise, if the stimulus is held 15" in front of the 
suspect's nose, it should be moved 15" to the side to reach 45 degrees.) 
For practice, a 45-degree template can be prepared by 
making a 15H-square cardboard and connecting its 
opposite corners with a diagonal line. 
To use this device, hold it up so that the person's nose is 
above the diagonal line. Be certain that one edge of the 
template is centered on the nose and perpendicular to 
(or, at right angles to) the face. Have the person you are 
examining follow a penlight or some other object until 
suspect is looking down the 45-degree diagonal. Note 
the position of the eye. With practice, you should be able 
to recognize this angle without using the template. 
Specific Procedures 
If the suspect is wearing eyeglasses, have them removed. 
/ 
/ 
Give the suspect the following instructions from a safe position. (FOR OFFICER 
SAFETY KEEP YOUR "WEAPON AWAY FROM THE SUSPECT): 
o "I am going to check your eyes." 
o "Keep your head still and follow this stimulus with your eyes only." 
o "Keep following the stimulus with your eyes until I tell you to stop." 
Position the stimulus approximately 12-15 inches from the suspect's nose and 
slightly above eye level. Check to see that both pupils are equal in size. If they are 
not, this may indicate a head injury. You may observe Resting Nystagmus at this 
time, then check the suspect's eyes for the ability to track together. Move the 
stimuluS smoothly across the suspect's entire field of vision. Check to see if the eyes 
track the stimulus together or one lags behind the other. If the eyes don't track 
together it could indicate a possible medical disorder, injury, or blindness. 
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Check the suspect's left eye by mO\Ting the stimulus to your 
right. Move the stimulus smoothly, at a speed that 
requires approximately two seconds to bring the suspect's 
eye as far to the side as it can go. While moving the 
stimulus, look at the suspect's eye and determine whether 
it is able to pursue smoothlv. Now, move the stimulus all 
the way to the left, back across suspect's face checking if 
the right eye pursues smoothly. Movement of the stimulus 
should take approximately two seconds out and two 
seconds back for each eye. Repeat the procedure. 
After you have checked both eyes for lack of smooth pursuit, check the eyes for 
distinct and sustained nystagmus at maximum deviation beginning with the 
suspect's left eye. Simply move the object to the suspect's left side until the eye has 
gone as far to the side as possible. Usually, no white will be showing in the corner 
of the eye at maximum deviation. Hold the eye at that position for a minimum of 
four seconds, and observe the eye for distinct and sustained nystagmus. Move the 
stimulus all the way across the suspect's face to check the right eye holding that 
position for a minimum of four seconds. Repeat the procedure. 
Note : Fatigue Nystagmus. This type of nystagmus may begin if a subject's eyes are 
held at maximum deviation for more than 30 seconds. 
Next, check for onset of nystagmus prior to 45 degrees. Start moving the stimulus 
towards the right (suspect's left eye) at a speed that would take approximately four 
seconds for the stimulus to reach the edge of the suspect's shoulder. Watch the eye 
carefully for any sign of jerking. When you see it, stop and verify that the jerking 
continues. Now, move the stimulus to the left (suspect's right eye) at a speed that 
would take approximately four seconds for the stimulus to reach the edge of the 
suspect's shoulder. Watch the eye carefully for any sign of jerking. When you see 
it, stop and verify that the jerking continues. Repeat the P12ocedure. NOTE: It is 
important to use the full four seconds when checking for onset of nystagmus. If you 
move the stimulus too fast, you may go past the point of onset or miss it altogether. 
If the suspect's eyes start jerking ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES 
before they reach 45 degrees, l. CHECK FOR EYEGLASSES 
check to see that some white of 2. VERBAL INSTRUCTIONS 
the eye is still showing on the side . 3. POSITION STIMULUS (12-15 INCHES) 
4. EQUAL PUPIL SIZE AND RESTING NYSTAGMUS 
closest to the ear. If no white of 5. TRACKING 
the eye is showing, you either 6. LACK OF SMOOTH PURSUIT 
have taken the eye too far to the 7. DIST. & SUSTAIl\TED NYSTAGMUS @ MAX. DEV. 
side (that is more than 45 8. ONSET OF NYSTAGMUS PRIOR TO 45° 
9. TOTAL THE CLUES 
degrees) or the person has 10. CHECK FOR VERTICAL GAZE NYSTAGMUS 
unusual eyes that will not deviate I!::::===================:d 
very far to the. side. 
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NOTE: Nystagmus may be due to causes other than alcohol. These other causes 
include seizure medications and some other drugs. A large disparity between the 
performance of the right and left eye may indicate a medical condition. 
Test Interpretation 
You should look for three clues of nystagmus in each eye. 
1. The eye cannot follow a moving object smoothly. 
2. Nystagmus is distinct and sustained when the eye is held at maximum 
deviation for a minimum of four seconds. 
3. The angle of onset of nystagmus is prior to 45 degrees. 
Based on the original research, if you observe four or more clues it is likely that the 
suspect's BAC is above 0.10. Using this criterion you will be able to classify about 
77% of your suspects accurately. This was determined during laboratory and field 
testing and helps you weigh the various field sobriety tests in this battery as you 
make your arrest decision. 
Vertical Gaze Nvstagmus 
The Vertical Gaze Nystagmus test is simple to administer. During the Vertical 
Gaze Nystagmus test, look for jerking as the eyes move up and are held for 
approximately four seconds at maximum elevation. 
1. Position the stimulus horizontallv, about 12-15 inches in front of the suspect's 
nose. 
2. Instruct the suspect to hold the head still, and follow the object with the eyes 
only. 
3. Raise the object until the suspect's eyes are elevated as far as possible. 
4. Hold for approximately four seconds. 
5. W?-tch closely for evidence of jerking. 
Horizontal and Vertical Gaze Nystagmus can be observed directly and does not 
require special equipment. You will need a contrasting stimulus for the suspect to 
follow with their eyes. This can be the tip of your index finger, penlight, or pen. 
The stimulus used should be held slightly above eye level, so that the eyes are wide 
open when they look directly at it. It should be held approximately 12-15 inches in 
front of the nose. Remain aware of your position in relation to the suspect at all 
times. 
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OFFICER SAFETY IS THE NUMBER ONE PRIORITY ON M'Y TRAFFIC 
STOP. 
Procedures for Walk-and-Turn Testing 
1. Instructions Stage: Initial Positioning and Verbal Instructions 
For standardization in the performance of this test, have the suspect assume 
the heel-to-toe stance by giving the following verbal instructions, accompanied 
by demonstrations: 
o "Place your left foot on the line" (real or imaginary). Demonstrate. 
o "Place your right foot on the line ahead of the left foot, with heel of right foot 
against toe of left foot." Demonstrate. 
o "Place your arms down at your sides." Demonstrate. 
o "Maintain this position until I have completed the instructions. Do not start 
to walkuntil told to do so." 
o "Do you understand the instructions so far?" (Make sure suspect indicates 
understanding. ) 
2. Demonstrations and Instructions for the \\Talking Stage 
Explain the test requirements, using the following verbal instructions, 
accompanied by demonstrations: 
o "When I tell you to start, take nine heel-to-toe steps, turn, and take nine 
heel-to-toe steps back." (Demonstrate 3 heel-to-toe steps.) 
o "When you turn, keep the front foot on the line, and turn by taking a series 
of small steps with the other foot, like this." (Demonstrate). 
o "While you are walking, keep your arms at your sides, watch your feet at all 
'times, and count your steps out loud." 
o "Once you start walking, don't stop until you have completed the test." 
o "Do you understand the instructions?" (Make sure suspect understands.) 
o "Begin, and count your first step from the heel-to-toe position as 'One.'" 
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3. Test Interpretation 
You may observe a number of different behaviors when a suspect performs this 
test. Original research demonstrated that the behaviors listed below are likely 
to be observed in someone with a BAC above 0.10. Look for the following clues 
each time this test is given: 
A. Cannot keep balance while listening to the instructions. Two tasks are 
required at the beginning of this test. The suspect must balance heel-to-toe 
on the line, and at the same time, listen carefully to the instructions. 
Typically, the person who is impaired can do only one of these things. The 
suspect may listen to the instructions, but not keep balance. Record this 
clue if the suspect does not maintain the heel-to-toe position throughout the 
instructions. (Feet must actually break apart.) Do not record this clue if 
the suspect sways or uses the arms to balance but maintains the heel-to-toe 
position. 
B. Starts before the instructions are finished. The impaired person may also 
keep balance, but not listen to the instructions. Since you specifically 
instructed the suspect not to start walking "until I tell you to begin," record 
this clue if the suspect does not wait. 
C. Stops while walking. The suspect pauses for several seconds. Do not record 
this clue if the suspect is merely walking slowly. 
D. Does not touch heel-to-toe. The suspect leaves a space of more than one-half 
inch between the heel and toe on any step. 
E. Steps off the line. The suspect steps so that one foot is entirely off the line. 
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F. Uses arms to balance. The suspect raises one or both arms more than 6 
inches from the sides in order to maintain balance. 
G. Improper turn. The suspect removes the front foot from the line while 
turning. Also record this clue if the suspect has not followed directions as 
demonstrated, i.e., spins or pivots around. 
H. Incorrect number of steps. Record this clue if the suspect takes more or 
fewer than nine steps in either direction. 
Note: If suspect can't do the test, record observed clues and document the 
reason for not completing the test, e.g. suspect's safety. 
If the suspect has difficulty with the test (for example, steps off the line) , 
continue from that point, not from the beginning. This test may lose its 
sensitivity if it is repeated several times. 
Observe the suspect from a safe distance and limit your movement which may 
distract the suspect during the test. Always consider officer safety. 
Based on original research, if the suspect exhibits two or more clues on this test 
or fails to complete it, classify the suspect's BAC as above 0.10. Using this 
criterion, you will be able to accurately classify 68% of your suspects. 
4. Test Conditions 
Walk-and-Turn test requires a designated straight line, and should be 
conducted on a reasonably dry, hard, level, nonslippery surface. There should 
be sufficient room for suspects to complete nine heel-to-toe steps. Note: Recent 
field validation studies have indicated that varying environmental conditions 
have not affected a suspect's ability to perform this test." 
The original research indicated that individuals over 65 years of age , back, leg 
or inner ear problems had difficulty performing this test. Individuals wearing 
heels more than 2 inches high should be given the opportunity to remove their 
shoes. 
5. Combined Interpretation of Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus and Walk-and-Turn 
Tests 
Based on the original research, combining four or more clues of HGN and two or 
more clues of the Walk-and-Turn, suspects can be classified as above 0.10 BAC 
80% of the time. 
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Procedures for One-Leg Stand Testing 
1. Instructions Stage: Initial Positioning and Verbal Instructions 
Initiate the test by giving the following verbal instructions, accompanied by 
demonstrations. 
o "Please stand with your feet together and your arms down at the sides, like 
this." (Demonstrate) 
o "Do not start to perform the test until I tell you to do so." 
o "Do you understand the instructions so far?" (M:ake sure suspect indicates 
understanding. ) 
2. Demonstrations and Instructions for the Balance and Counting Stage 
Explain the test requirements, using the following verbal instructions, 
accompanied by demonstrations: 
o "When I tell you to start, raise one leg, either leg, with the foot 
approximately six inches off the ground, keeping your raised foot parallel to 
the ground." (Demonstrate one leg stance.) 
o "You must keep both legs straight, arms at your side." 
o "While holding that position, count out loud in the following manner: "one 
thousand and one, one thousand and two, one thousand and three, until told 
to stop." (Demonstrate a count, as follows: "one thousand and one, one 
thousand and two, one thousand and three, etc." Officer should not look at 
his foot when conducting the demonstration - OFFICER SAFETY.) 
o "Keep your arms at your sides at all times and keep watching the raised 
foot." 
o "Do you understand?" (M:ake sure suspect indicates understanding.) 
o "Go ahead and perform the test." (Officer should always time the 30 
seconds. Test should be discontinued after 30 seconds.) 
Observe the suspect from a safe distance. If the suspect puts the foot down, give 
instructions to pick the foot up again and continue counting from the point at 
which the foot touched the ground. If the suspect counts very slowly, terminate 
the test after 30 seconds. 
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3. Test Interpretation 
You may observe a number of different behaviors when a suspect performs this 
test. The original research found the behaviors listed below are the most likely 
to be observed in someone with a BAC above 0.10. Look for the following clues 
each time the One-Leg Stand test is administered. 
A. The suspect sways while balancing. This refers to side-to-side or back-and-
forth motion while the suspect maintains the one-leg stand position. 
B. Uses arms for balance. Suspect moves arms 6 or more inches from the side 
of the body in order to keep balance. 
C. Hopping. Suspect is able to keep one foot off the ground, but resorts to 
hopping in order to maintain balance. 
D. Puts foot down. The suspect is not able to maintain the one-leg stand 
position, putting the foot down one or more times during the 30-second 
count. 
Note: If suspect can't do the test, record observed clues and document the 
reason for not completing the test, e.g. suspect's safety. 
Remember that time is critical in this test. The original research has shown a 
person with a BAC above 0.10 can maintain balance for up to 25 seconds, but 
seldom as long as 30. 
Based on original research, if an individual shows two or more clues or fails to 
complete the One-Leg Stand, there is a good chance the BAC is above 0.10. 
Using that criterion, you will accurately classify 65% of the people you test as to 
whether their BAC's are above 0.10. 
Observe the suspect from a safe distance and remain as motionless as possible 
during the test so as not to interfere. If the suspect puts the foot down, give 
instructions to pick the foot up again and continue counting from the point at 
which the foot touched the ground. If the suspect counts very slowly, terminate 
the "test after 30 seconds. 
4. Test Conditions 
One-Leg Stand requires a reasonably dry, hard, level, and non-slippery surface. 
Suspect's safety should be considered at all times. 
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The original resea.l'ch indicated that certain individuals over 65 years of age, 
back, leg or inner ear problems, or people who are overweight by 50 or more 
pounds had difficulty performing this test. Individuals wearing heels more than 
2 inches high should be given the opportunity to remove their shoes. 
5. Taking Field Notes on Suspects' Performance of Field Sobriety Tests 
For purposes of the arrest report and courtroom testimony, it is not enough to 
record the total number of clues on the three tests. The number of clues is 
important to the police officer in the field because it helps determine whether 
there is probable cause to arrest. But to secure a conviction, more descriptive 
evidence is needed. 
The officer must be able to describe how the suspect performed on the tests, and 
exactly what the suspect did. 
The standard note taking guide pro\rided in this Manual is designed to help you 
develop a clear description of the suspect's performance on the tests. 
6. Taking Field Notes on The Eve Procedures 
First, have subject remove glasses. 
Equal Pupils 0 Yes 0 No 
Equal Tracking 0 Yes 0 No 
Vertical Nystagmus 0 Yes 0 No 
The section for Medical Assessment 
appears at the bottom of the guide's 
front page. 
Other (i.e., Resting Nystagmus) ________ _ 
o Check "Yes" or "No" box for equal pupil size. 
o Check "Yes" or "No" box for equal tracking. 
r-----------------------------------~ 
In the section labeled "other", record 
any facts, crrcumstances, conditions, 
or observations that may be relevant 
to this procedures (i.e., Resting 
Nystagmus). 
The section on the Horizontal Gaze 
Nystagmus test appears on the 
bottom of the guide's front side. 
Complete the entire test for both 
eyes, writing "yes" or "no" for each 
nystagmus clue. 
HORIZONTAL.GAZE NYSTAGMUS 
o LACK OF SMOOTH PURSUIT 
o DISTINCT AND SUSTAINED 
NYSTAGMUS AT MAXIMUM 
DEVIATION 
o ONSET OF NYSTAGMUS 
PRIOR TO 45 DEGREES 
LEFT 
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o Write "yes" if the clue is present; 
o Write "no" if the clue is not present. 
In the section labeled "other," record any facts, circumstances, conditions or 
observations that may be relevant to this test. 
o Examples of additional evidence of impairment emerging during nystagmus 
test: 
suspect unable to keep head still; 
suspect swaying noticeably; 
suspect utters incriminating statements. 
o Examples of conditions that may interfere with suspect's performance of the 
Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus test: 
wind, dust, etc. irritating suspect's eyes; 
visual or other distractions impeding the test (always face suspect away 
from rotating lights, strobe lights and traffic passing in close proximity). 
7. Taking Field Notes on Walk-and-Turn Testing 
The section on the Walk-and-Turn test appears at the top of the guide's back 
side. 
WALK AND TURN 
.... -.- .. -- _ "', 
CANNOT KEEP BALANCE ,-----, 
STARTS TOO SOON - . .. 
FIRST NINE STEPS SECOND NINE STEPS 
STOPS WALKING 
MISSES HEEL -TO- TOE 
STEPS OFF LINE 
RAISES ARMS 
ACTUAL STEPS TAKEN 
IMPROPER TURN (Describe) 
CANNOT DO TEST (EXPLAIN) 
I~ O_T~:~:p~RE~:L~L~A~N~T~'S~B~ru~E~F------------------------------------~~40 
HS 178 R8/06 VIII-15 
The first two clues, "cannot keep balance" and "starts too soon" apply only 
during the instructions stage of the test. Record the number of times each of 
those clues appear. 
For example, if the suspect's feet "break apart" from the heel-to-toe stance twice 
during the instructions stage, write "2" in the box alongside the "cannot keep 
balance" clue. Similarly, if the suspect never "starts too soon," write "0" in that 
box. Note: Actual steps taken is for scoring purposes only. Wrong number of 
steps is the validated clue. 
Don't leave boxes blank. If a particular clue never shows up , write "0" in the 
corresponding box. 
Record the next five clues separately for the walk down the line, and then up 
the line. 
A. If a suspect stops walking, record it by drawing a vertical line across the toe 
of the step at which the stop occurred. Do this for the first as well as the 
second nine steps. Place the letter "S" at bottom of the vertical line to 
indicate stops walking. 
WALK AND TURN 
CANNOT KEEP BALANCE 1'---_--' 
STARTS TOO SOON 
STOPS WALKING 
MISSES HEEL -TO- TOE 
STEPS OFF LINE 
RAISES ARMS 
ACTUAL STEPS TAKEN 
FIRST NINE STEPS 
IMPROPER TURN (Describe) 
CANNOT DO TEST (EXPLAIN) 
OTHER: 
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B. If suspect fails to touch heel-to-toe, record how many times this happens. 
Draw a vertical line across the toe of the step at which the miss occurred. 
Place the letter "M" at the top of the vertical line to indicate missed heel to 
toe. 
C. If suspect steps off the line while walking, record it by drawing a line from 
the appropriate foot print at an angle in the direction in which the foot 
stepped. Do it for each nine steps. 
D. If suspect uses arms to balance, give some indication of how often or how 
long this happens. 
o Example: suspect raised arms from sides three times; place a check for 
each occurrence in appropriate box. 
o Example: suspect held arms away from sides during 3 through 7; place 
a check for each occurrence in appropriate box. 
o Example: suspect "flapped" arms continuously; make a note. 
E. Record the actual number of steps taken by suspect in each direction. 
For the next point, "improper turn," record a description of the turn. 
If you note that the suspect "cannot perform test." indicate explicitly why 
you did so. 
o Example: "off line three times;" 
o Example: "staggered six steps to right, nearly fell;" 
o Example: "fear of injury." 
At end of the test, examine each factor and determine how many clues have 
been recorded. Remember. each clue may appear several times. but still 
only constitutes one clue. 
In the section labeled "other," record any facts, circumstances, conditions or 
. observations that may be relevant to this test. 
o Examples of additional evidence of impairment during Walk-and-Turn 
test: 
suspect verbally miscounts steps; 
suspect utters incriminating statements. 
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o Examples of conditions that may interfere with suspect's performance of 
the \Valk-and-Turn test: 
wind/weather conditions; 
suspect's age, weight; 
suspect's footwear. 
8. Taking Field Notes on the Combined Interpretation of Nystagmus and Walk-
and-Turn 
By combining four or more clues ofRGN with two or more clues of the ';VAT 
test, suspects can be correctly classified as above 0.10 BAC 80% of the time. 
9. Taking Field Notes on One-Leg Stand Testing 
The section on the One-Leg Stand test appears 
midway down the page. 
By recording when things happen as well as what 
happens, you will be able to prepare a more 
descriptive arrest report. 
You will place check marks in or near the small 
boxes to indicate how many times you observed 
each of the clues. You will do this separately for 
the test on the left leg (L) or on the right leg (R). 
,--------------, In addition, if the 
suspect puts the foo-t 
L 
ONE LEG STAND 
\Hi I (i) 
\_ / \.......-; 
R 
Sways while balancing. 
Uses arms to balance. 
Hopping. 
Puts foot down. 
down during the test, 
you will record when I '-T_y_p."...:_of_F_oo_tw_e_a_r _____ -' 




o · 0 
# 0 
Sways while balancing. 
Uses arms to balance. 
Hopping. 
Puts foot down. 
I Type of Footwear 
count on new note guide). For example, when 
standing on the left leg the suspect lowered the right 
foot at a count of "one thousand and thirteen" , and 
again at "one thousand and twenty". Your diagram 
should look like the sketch to the left. You must also 
pay attention to the suspect's general appearance 
and behavior while the test is being performed. 
L--___________ -J At end of the test, examine each factor and 
determine how many distinct clues have appeared. 
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IT IS ~r:ECESSARY TO EMPHASIZE THIS VALIDATION APPLIES 
ONLY WlIEN: 
o THE TESTS ARE ADMINISTERED IN THE PRESCRIBED, 
STANDARDIZED MANNER 
o THE STANDARDIZED CLUES ARE USED TO ASSESS THE 
SUSPECT'S PERFORMANCE 
o THE STANDARDIZED CRITERIA ARE EMPLOYED TO 
INTERPRET THAT PERFORMANCE. 
IF ANY ONE OF THE STANDARDIZED FIELD SOBRIETY TEST 
ELEMENTS IS CHANGED, THE VALIDITY IS COMPROMISED. 
At end of the test, examine each factor and determine how many clues have been 
recorded. Remember, each clue may appear several times, but still only constitutes 
one clue. 
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CO MES NOW, the Appellant, by and through his undersigned attorney of record, 
and responds to the State's brief. 
I. 
FACTS 
The State does not cite to the record to support its statement of facts. 
II. 
ARGUMENT 
The Court should disregard the State's argument based upon LA.R., Rule 3 5(b)( 6). 
The maj ority of the brief is made upon of mere conclusions that are not supported by the 
record, case law, statute, rule or the like. The State's first issue is noted as follows: "The 
trial court properly found that a performance verification check was done on the Lifeloc 
FC20 unit as required by the standard operating procedures." Respondent's Brief at p. 
2 J. In this section of the State's brief, the State does not cite to the record except as to 
Defense Exhibit 5. The State does not cite to a statute or a rule, but simply tries to 
interpret a section of the SOP. Exhibit 3. The case law is clear that a party waives an 
issue if either authority or argument is lacking. The case law that is found in Idaho 
usually is applied to an Appellant, but the application of said case law can be applied to 
the State's brief. See State v. Hansen, 130 rd. 845,949 P.2d 583 (Ct. App. 1997). The 
Respondent's Brief was not numbered so Counsel simply counted the pages of the brief and 
came up with his OVvTI page number. 
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courts have routinely found that unless there is compliance with the Idaho Appellant 
Rules, then the arguments are deemed to be waived. See Dawson v. Chevovich Family 
Trust, 149 Id. 375,234 PJd 699 (2010). 
In State v. Amerson, 129 Id. 395, 325 P.2d 399 (Ct. App. 1996), the Court of 
Appeals indicated: 
"It is a well settled axiom of appellant practice that issues posed 
without citation to authority or without presentation of argument 
supported by authority, demonstrating the soundness of the principle 
argued, will not be considered." 
At. pp 409-410. 
The State's argument in Section II ignores the above noted rule and case law. The 
court should disregard the argument made by the State regarding the 0.20 performance 
verification. There is no case law cited. There is no rule cited. There is no scientific 
authority cited. 
In addition, the State fails to address the rule oflenity found in State v. Mills, 128 
Id. 416, 913 P.2d 1196 (Ct. App. 1996) and its application to the SOP. Exhibit 3. The 
Court may want to ask the State why there is any use of a 0.20 performance verification 
solution at all in section 5 of the SOP if there is no need for a 0.20 performance 
verification. 
The 0.20 performance verification is specifically used for supporting results for 
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1 an I.C. § 18-8004C charge. See SOP § 5.1.4 Note2 • Exhibit 3. Clearly Mr. Besaw's 
2 
breath test falls within the excessive range. Exhibit 4. He was convicted of an excessive 
3 
4 
charge. The 0.20 performance verification satisfies the requirements for performance 
5 verifications within twenty-four (24) hours before or after "at any level." The SOP does 
6 not say that the 0.08 can be used within twenty-four (24) hours at any level. The plain 
7 
reading of the "standard" for an excessive breath test is that a 0.20 performance 
8 
9 verification had to be run within twenty-four (24) hours of Mr. Besaw's test. There was 
10 no 0.20 performance verification run within twenty-four hours. Exhibit 4 (the log sheet). 
11 
The Court can also look at the e-mails that are part of this record that show that 
12 
13 
linearity is required for excessive breath tests. Closing argument attachments, pp 016-
14 018,068-072. Clearly, SOP Section 5.1.4.1 regarding the 0.20 performance verification 












What else could it possibly mean? The Court also has to question exactly what SOP, 
section 5.1.1 means. It states as follows: 
"The Alco-Sensor and Lifeloc FC20 portable breath testing instrument 
performance verification is run using approximately 0.08 and/or 0.20 
performance verification solutions provided by and/or approved by 
ISPFS." (emphasis added) 
SOPp.10of21. (Exhibit3) 
2 SOP 5.1.4 NOTE: The 0.20 performance verification was implemented for the sole purpose of 
supporting the instruments' results for an 18-8004C charge. Failure to timely perfOlm a 0.20 performance 
verification will not invalidated tests performed that yield results at other levels or in charges other than 18-
8004C. 
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1 What does the use ofthe word "approximately" mean in the context of this provision? 
2 
The State can not argue against the rule of lenity or common sense in the 
3 
4 
application of the science of linearity in breath testing. Cases from other parts of the 
5 country also examine the need for linearity in breath testing at different intoxication 
6 levels. See State v. Holland, 27 A.3d 1212 (App. Division N.J. 2011). 
7 
With regard to the State's section three argument, it is convoluted as to what the 
8 
9 
section actually addresses. I.e. § 18-8004(4) requires "standards". It is hard to argue that 
10 the current SOP is any sort of standard considering all of the "should"s and 
11 
"approximately"s that are set out in this current SOP. Exhibit 3. There is no science 
12 
13 
behind any of the SOP changes. Attached and marked as Exhibit "A" are ~he prior SOPs 
14 from August 20
t\ 27t\ 2010. Why have there been years of mandatory requirements 
15 regarding the 15 minute observation period and now all of a sudden, Idaho has 
16 
discretionary provisions regarding the 15 minute observation period. 
17 
18 
The State's rendition of the facts is not consistent with the record. The fact that 
19 the State does not cite to any part of the video or any part ofthe transcript is telling. The 
20 trooper did not bother to video tape Mr. Besaw until after his breath testing was 
21 
22 
completed, but this fact is not commented on by the State. See In the Interests of Doe, 
23 130 Id. 811, 815,948 P.2d 166,170 (Ct. App. 1997), State v. Dominguez, 137 Id. 681, 
24 52 P.3d 325 (Ct. App. 2002). (Credibility of officers that fail to record) 
25 
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In addition, the last sentence in this section of the State's Brief makes no sense: 
"As demonstrate above, none of these factors were present in the current case 
and Trooper Talbott was ideally positioned to ensure that the defendant did 
not burp, belch or vomit." 
Respondent's Brief at p. 73• 
Based on the video, Mr. Besaw was eating a hamburger in his vehicle. Exhibit 7. 
While he was standing outside, a large chunk of food came out of his mouth onto the 
parking lot surface. The "ideally positioned" trooper could not have prevented Mr. 
Besaw from burping, belching or vomiting. Also, there is no burden on Mr. Besaw to 
show a Homer Simpson style of burp. The burden regarding the observation period is on 
the State. State v. DeFranco, 143 Id. 335, 144 P.3d 40, eCt. App. 2006). The trooper's 
senses were distracted from Mr. Besaw. The sense of smell is not helpful in this case. 
What would a burp smell like, alcohol? Did not the trooper say Mr. Besaw smelled of 
alcohol? T. at pp. 105-106. 
With regard to the brief s final section regarding the field sobriety tests, the State, 
like the trial court, misses the point of the argument. First of all, Idaho has never had a 
LR.E., Rule 702 hearing on field sobriety tests. The Idaho case law regarding the HGN 
field sobriety test is suspect, but that is only part of the argument on this appeal. The 
Trial Court ignored the argument dealing with the requirements for proper field sobriety 
3 
Respondent's Brief was not numbered so Counsel simply counted the pages of the brief and 
came up with his own page number. 
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1 testing. Was there compliance with the requirements of the National Highway Traffic 
2 
Safety Administration manual in Besaw? The Trial Court should have suppressed the use 
3 
4 
ofthe field sobriety test because oflack of compliance with the National standard. State 
5 v. Bish, 947 N.E.2d 257 (Ct. App. Ohio, 2010) and State v. Ito, 978 P.2d 191 (Hawaii 
6 App. 1999) Again, it is telling that the State does not address any ofthe specific issues 
7 
about how the field sobriety tests were conducted on that rainy, cold January night. The 
8 
9 
State does not note the conditions at all in the facts or in the body of it' s brief. The State 
10 argues that the trooper testified that the FSTs were done within the established 
11 
procedures. The trooper did not say this, he testified that he did the tests by following his 
12 
13 
training. T. at pp. 108-109. The State did not provide proof of those established 
14 procedures. 
15 The State argues that the Idaho Supreme Court has not held that there is an 
16 
absolute need for compliance with the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration 
17 
18 
manual. Brief at p. 9. The NHTSA manual itself says there has to be an absolute 
19 compliance. See page VIII - 19 ofthe manual. Other cases throughout the country have 
20 found there has to be compliance. U.S. v. Horn, 185 F. Supp.2d 530 (D. Md. 2002) It 
21 
22 
would seem unlikely that the Idaho Supreme Court would veer away from the majority 
23 of decisions of other states on the issue of validation. In fact, the Court can review the 
24 closing argument filed by Mr. Besaw which cited additional cases dealing with issues of 
25 
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II 
1 field sobriety testing. For the Court's convenience, copies ofthose pages ofthe closing 
2 




5 The trial court failed to apply the case law regarding the need for standards in 
6 breath testing pursuant to I.C. § 18-8004(4). The trial court failed to act as a gatekeeper 
7 
regarding the field sobriety tests. Not every problem goes to the weight, therefore, the 
8 
9 
filed sobriety test should have been suppressed. Finally, the breath test should have been 
10 suppressed because of the failure to have a proper observation period and because ofthe 
11 failure to use the correct solution for preformation verification. This court should reserve 
12 
the trial court and suppress the breath test and field sobriety tests. 
13 
14 DATED thisal day of February, 2012. 
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I hereby certifY on thedl day 
of February, 2012, a true copy 
of the foregoing instrument 
was: ~ Mailed 
Faxed 
Hand delivered to: 
Justin J. Coleman 
Deputy Prosecutor 
Nez Perce County Prosecutor's Office 
P.O. Box 1267 
Lewiston, ill 83501 
REPLYBRlEF 8 
LAW OFFICES OF 
CLARK AND FEENEY, LLP 
LEWISTON, IDAHO 83501 
EXHIBIT A 








Idaho Standard Ope~~'1:'rocedure 
0° . v· Q .,~ . 
Breath~~l-Testing 
~ro ~<:> 









Idaho State Police 
FOl~nsicSerVices 
Idaho Breath Alcohol Standard Operating ProCedure 
Issuing Authority~ISPFS Quality Manager 
Revision 0 Effective 812012010 
Pagel of 17 
Glossary 
Approved Vendor: A source/provider/manufacturer of an approved premixed alcohol simulator solution shall be explicitly 
approved as a vendor of premixed alcohol simulator solutions for distribution within Idaho. 
Breath Alcohol Test: A series of separate breath samples provided during a breafu testing sequence. 
Breath Alcohol Testing Sequenc:-.e: A sequence of events as determined by the Idaho State Police Forensic Services, which 
m.a:y- be. rure.cted by either the instrument or the operator, but not both, and may consist of air blanks, perfo~ce 
verificau.on,. mtemal standard checks, and breath samples. ," 
Breath Testing Specialist (BTS): An operator who has. completed an advanced tralning class taught by an ~e of the 
Idaho State Police Forensic Services. BTS certification is valid for 26 calendar months and expires onA~&Y of the 
~~ ~ 
Certificate of Analysis: A certificate stating that the. premixed ethyl alcohol solutions used for Perf~e verification have 
been tested and approved for use by the ISPFS. 'f..... 
Certificate of Approval: A certificate stating that an individual breath alcohol testing ~ has been evaluated by the 
ISPFS and found to be suitable for forensic alcohol testing. The ce~~~ th,,~ture of an Idaho State Police 
Forensic Services Lab Manager, and the effective date of the instrument afG,'Xv .... 0'" 
ChangeQver Class: A training class for currently certified· persoun . #they are taught theory, operation, and 
. proper testing procedure for a new make or model of instrument adop their agency. Breath Testing Specialists 
attend BTS training that qualifies them to perfomi BTS duties to ~trmnent. 
~videntiary Test: .A b~ath tes: perfOI1lled on a.Stibj~U:U~tential evideuti.ary or ~egal purposes. A distinction 
IS made between eVldenuary testing and commumty ~ or ~ests perfoIIIled wlth the mstrument. 
ldah .• smt. P."'" F., • ..., s_~ ~E .. 1"" J. 0., <he Boreau ofF""""",, S_~'. <he ISPFS ~ -"""" 
to providing forensic science services to the .. j~V~ of Idaho. ISPFS is the administrative body for the 
breath alcohol testing program per IDAP ~ .. 01. ~ 
MlPIMIC An """",,",Don.-l '" do:.. # po"'~""n ~ mioo<;' _"=of okohoI. 
Operator Certification: The condition ~~g Satisfied the training requirements for administering breath alcohol tests as 
established by the ISPFS. Operator c~tion is vali<i for 26 calendar months and expires on the last day of the 26th 
=""'An ;'<IM""" -"&0.;: If§PFS ~ qwiliiiol by .......... _ """"' >1001>01_ 
.Operator Class: An~9pproved. tra.ining ciass for prospective or uncertified breath alcohol operators. Currently 
certified Breath Tes . laIists may teach opera.tor classes. 
. . 
VI!,I'H~·tion: A verification of the accuracy of the breath testing instrument utilizing a simnlator and a 
ation solution. Performance verification should he reported to three decimal places. While ISPFS uSes 
pI(,j[fQil)dance verification, manufacturers and others may use ateIIU such as "cal1bration check" or "simulator check." 
Perfo .ce Verification Solution: A premixed ethyl alcohol solution used for field performance verifications. The 
solUtion is provided by and/or approved byISPFS. 
. Recertification Class: A training class for cnn-ently certified personnel, completion of which results in unintenupted 
continuation oftheiI' Operator or BTS statns for an additional 26 months. 
Waiting P~riodlMonitoling Period/DeprivlttionPeriodlObsen'Rtion Period: 15-urinute period prior to administering a 
. breath alcOhol test, in which an officer monitors the test subjectfmdividual. 
REPLYBREIF 
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Breath Alcohol Standard Operating Procedure 
List of Revisions 
Topic 
Delete reference to ALS 
0.02/0.20 solutions 
Valid breath tests 
Aleo-Sensor calibration checks 
Intoxilyzer 5000 Calibration Checks 
EjiectiveJune,1996 
Date ofRe,1sion 
June 1, 1995 





0.003 agreement *0 
~ 0 
June 1,1996 
Operators may run cahbration ~ 0~ 
Re_'SOIntionWithin~ $ 
All 3 solutions run wi~ 24-~1>eriod 
AH3_''f!J~~r=iod .. ~~ htfief Re-rnnnm~~SO vY 
A1!*ns.~a 48-hourperiod 
~ce .. ~(lj.ee"removed 
All 3 ~srun within a 48~hour period 
~~than three calibration solntions 
& CiioluJXm VlIlnes JlQ 10jlge< called in ill BPS 
L1-0G Alco-Sensor and IntOxilyzer 5000 
July 1,1996 
September 6, 1996 
September 6, 1996 
September 6, 1996 
September 26, 1996 
September 26, 1996 
Oct 8,1996 
September 26, 1996 
October 8, 1996 
April 1, 1997 
AUgust 1, 1998 
2.2 








Name change, all refetencesniade to the 
Bureau offorensicServices were changed to 
Idaho State Police Forensic Services, 
ReCord Mariagement 
Dd~sectioIlS on relocating. repairing. recalibrating, 
arid loaning of .instruments from previous revision. 
August 1999 
August 1, 1999 
August 1, 1999 
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Sections I, 2, 3 
Ako-Sensor and Intoxilyzer 5000 calibration checks 
Deleted sections on blood and urine samples 
for alcohol determination 
Operator certification record management 
Reformat numbering 
Requirement for running 0.20 simulator solution 
Changed 3-sample to "two print cards". 
Deleted "simulator port" and "two print cards". 
Simulator temperature changed from "should" 
to "Diust". 
Clarification of 0.20 calibration checks. 
August 1. 1999 
AUgust 1, 1999 





~ <0 September 18, 2007 
. 0 
Added the Lifeloc FC20 ~ ~ February 13, 2008 
Deleted requirement that the new ~:'I{~" 
utilize the same technology if~ _is~",ntly 
certified ~ V 
Modified the accep~9for s~ator solutions to 
+/- 10%, elimina~~++II'-(} ®trovision. Added 
"Established ~~0llue e different 
from those ~ o~e ttle label" 
Added~ F~brationchecks 
In~ 500~bration is now section 2.3 
~~. ~cally allow use of the 0.20 
~~'_Ject testing 
~ral reformat for clarification. Combined 
'-~osensor and Lifeloc sections. Specifically, o ~hanged calibration requirement using the 0.20 
Febmary 13, 2008 
Febmary 13, 2008 
February 13, 2008 
February 13,2008 
December 1,2008 
efJ r$ference solution: from fom:: (4) checks to two (2). 
2.1.4, 2-23, 2;2.4'1~d.arification: a "calibration check" consists of a 
And 2.2.10 '-~ pair of sampleS in sequen~e and.both samples 
January 14,2609 
':S:>' must be within the acceptable range before 
~..::s proceeding with subject testing. A 0.20 solution 
, sllould be replaced every 20-25 samples. Clarified 
the correct procedure for perfooog a calibration check. 
2.1.3,2.1.4:1,2.1.9 
REPLYBREIF 
Clarification: Added "before and after" to the 0.080 and July 7,2009 
0.200. Calibrati6n checks; wifuin 24 hours ofa subject test 
·Theofficialtime and date of the cah"bration check is the 
. tithe 'and date recorded on the printout or the time and date 
,recorded in the log, whichevercon-esponds to the calibration 
check referenced in section 2:z.3 or 2.1.4.1. ., 
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History Page 
Revision # Effective date illstory 
o 8/2012010 The entire SOP was rewritten to incorporate language changes regarding 
perfonnance verifications, and to clear-up ambiguities associated with 
the 0.20 verification and the relevance to cases not involving an l~ 
&004c. charge. Scope and safety sections were added. Troubl~ting, 
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1 Quantitative Analysis for Alcohol in Breath by Approved 
2 
3 
. Breath Testing Instruments. 
Scope ~" ~ 
This method describes the Idaho State Police Forensic~ S  (ISPFS) 
procedure, for use by agencies external to ISPFS, for the. analysis i).~ath for the 
presence of volatile compounds using an approved breath tes~~ ent This 
method provides for the quantitative analysis of ethanol. . '() 
. .Follo~g all the recommendati~ns of this e~l pr~~: .will establish the 
sCIentific validity and set the unquestlone. d founda:. tl~Oal. sSlbility of the breath 
alcohol test Failure to meet all of the recomi!m tions . this procedure does not 
disqualify the breath alcohol test, but does all ~e stioning of the breath alcohol 
tests as it pertains to its foundation o~. . . ty . urt That foundation can be set, 
through testimony. by a breath testing s e . t. e or ISPFS expert in breath testing 
as to the potential ramifications of th ati~om the procedure as stated 
Q~~ 
~ ~~~ 
Safety &-0 «/V' 
. Within the ~1!::V'~reath alcohol testing, the general biohazard safety 
precaustiohs sho~e fo~. This is due to the potential infectious materials that 
may be. ejected from th~uth during the sampling of the breath. Caution should be 




4 . ~nt and Operator Certification 
A ~u To ensure that minimum standards are met, individual breath testing instruments, 
. ... ~erators, and ?reath tes~g sp~ialists (BTS) nmst beapp~oVed BD:d certified. by . the b..:s Idaho State Police ForeIlSlc ServIces (ISPFS). The ISPFS will establish and mamtain a 
."<otist of approved instruments by manufacturer brand or model designation for use in the 
state. . 
REPLYBREIF 
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4.1 Approval of Breath Testing Instruments. In order to be approved and certified 
each instrument must meet the following critelia: 
4.2 
4.3 
4.1.1 The instrument shall analyze a reference sample or analytical test standard, 
the results of which must agree within +1- 10% of the target value or such 
limits set by ISPFS. 
4.1.2 The certification procedures shall be adequate and appropriate ~<Jl ~e 
analyses of breath specimens for the determination of ~coo.ol 
concentration for law enforcement ~ 
4.1.3 Any other tests deemed necessary to correctly and adeq1lti~\1?aluate the 
instrument to give accurate results in routine breath alifilsting. 
The ISPFS may, for cause, remove a specific instnlD1~$-~ serial nnrober from 
evidential testing and suspend or withdraw certificati~eof 
Operators become certified by~mpi ~~. 0 class taught by an ISPFS 
certified Breath Testing Specialist . Q. tion is for 26 calendar months 
and expires the last day of the 26 th.,C~ cation will allow the operator to 
perfOlID all :functions required . tam a""Valid breath alcohol test. It is the 
responsi~ility of~e indi~())perat~·~~n ~eircun'ent c~fication; the 
ISPFS Will not notify op~ ~~rr cemficationlS about to exprre. 
4.3.1 RecertifiCa'4...@<Z:P-JJ;6-mor:.th.periOdiSachievedbycompletingan 
ISPFS ~re~d ~~r class pnor to the end of the 26th month. 
4.3.2 If/b>\~~ to satisfactorily complete. !he dass (including !he 
wrltt-eh cheal tests), or alloWs therr certification status to exprre, 
he/she take the operator class in order to become re-certified. 
4.3.3 J.[~ Operator certification is voided, the individual is not certified to 
. .( 0i evidentiary breath alcohol tests on the instrument in question until the 
CJO ""operator class is completed. 
.. · A..eJ 4.3.3.1 There are no grace periods or provisions for extension of operator 
. U ' - certification. 
~~~ .. 
~ ~4 Breath Testing Specialists (BTS) are Operators who have completed an 
n V advanced training class and are ISPFS-certified to perform instrument 
~·m.aintenance, and provide both initial and.recerlification training forinstrurnent 
operators. 
REPLYBREIF 
4.4.1 To obtain initial BTS certification, an individnal must be currently 
certiiied as an Operator of that particular. mstrilment BTS certification is 
then obtained by coropletinganapproved BTStraining class. 
·4.4.2 Certification is valid for 26 calendar months. 
Idaho . Breath Alcohol Standard Operating Procedure 
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4.4.3 IfBTS certification is allowed to expire, the individual reverts to certified 
Operator status for 12 calendar months for that instrument He/she may 
no longer perfonn any BTS specific duties relating to that particular 
instrument 
4.4.4 BTS certification is renewable by attending an approved BTS training 
class. '" 
4.4.5 The Idaho State Police Forensic Services may revoke BTS ce~~n for 
cause. Examples may include falsification of records, failwfly'-perform 
required pelfonnance verification, failure to successfull¥~"'a BTS re-
certification class and failure to meet standards in ctit&kicting operator 
training. (Q \ 
~ 
Adoption of a new instrument by an agency will reliI1~pdatingany BTS and 
Operators in that agency in the use Ofthe~ ~- -. 
4.5.1 A currently certified BTS A'b~.~ a certified BTS for a new 
instrument by completing ~PF~ved BTS Instrumentation class. 
4.5.2 A currently ce~@gera~y certify on a new instrument by 
completing an IS~ ap~~ Operator Instrumentation Class for the 
new instrume~<o ~ 
4.5.3 Indi~~~~ ~~y certified as Operators must complete an 
Ope~.1ass ~"'aach approved instnnnent 
Record ~feJ ~tndm. anagement. It is the responsibility of each 
individual ~~ , store· perfonnance verification records, subject records, 
maintenan ords, instrument logs, or any other records as pertaining to the 
tM.· d:~~~~e o~ breath testing instruments and to maintain a current record of 
oper~UllCation. 
~€JO It is the responsibility of ilie agency to see that the said records are stored 
. ~. and maintained a minimum of (3) years in accordance with IDAP A 




4.6.1.1 Records may besribject: to periodic review by the Idaho State 
Police Forensic Selvices. 
4.6.2 The Idaho State Poliee Forensic Services will not be respoUSlble forilie 
. storage of such recOrds not generated by ISPFS. 
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5. Performance Verification of Breath Testing Instruments 
Performance verifications aid the Breath Testing Specialist (BIS) and the Idaho State 
Police Forensic Services (ISPFS) in determining if a breath testing instrument is 
functioning correctly. Performance verifications are performed using a wet bath 
simulator performance verification solution. The solution is provided by and/or approved 
by ISPFS. The ISPFS analysis establishes the target value and acceptable range Rf the 
SOlUtions. used for the verification and includes the acceptable values on the c~' ;~ of 
Analysis for each solution. Note: The ISP established target values may 'erent 
from those shown on the bottle label . ~. 
5.1 Alco-Sensor and Lifeloc FC20 - Portable Breath u~&g Instrument 
Performance Verification 'f.... f.d 
5.1.1 The Aleo-Sensor and Lifeloc FC20 portabl~ath testing instrument 
performance verification is run ~g ap~ately 0.08 andlor 0.20 
performance verification SOluti~~V~Y and/or approved by ISPFS. 
5.1.2 Th: pex:rormanc~ verifi5e\~ ~~e O.OS and 0.2? performance 
venficanon solutions co~ oftw~ samples separated by arr blanks. o V 
5.1.3 A performance ~caf\~f the Aloo-Sensor and Lifeloc FC20 
instruments ~ a ~~ performance verification solution must be 
performed ~ ~~, before or after an evidentiary test to be 
approved ~ ev1lle'Ll6ry .• · use. ' Multiple breath alcohol tests may be 
COVf~Cfsi a s~'Performance verification. 
5. Q ~M performance verifieati.on solution should be replaced with 
~. solution approximately every 25 verifications or every 
"'" calendar month, whichever comes first. . 
5.1.4 A~o performance verification ~hould be run ,and results. logged once per 






NOTE: The 0.020 performance verification was implemented for the sole 
puIpose of supporting the instruments results for an lS-8004c charge. In 
the absence of an 18-S004c· charge, the 0.20 verifications, or lack thereot: 
shall have no relevance to the results or the evidentiary value of the 
evidentiary test. 
REPLYBREIF 
5.1.4.1 The 0.20 perfon:n.arlce verification satisfies the fequirement for 
performance verification Within 24 hours, before or after an 
evidentiary test. The 0.20 penormance verification solution should 
not be used routinely for this pmpose. 
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5.1.5 Acceptable results for a 0.080 or 0.20 performance verification is a pair of 
samples in seqnence that are both within +/- 10% of the performance 
verification solution target value. Target values and ranges of acceptable 
results are included in a certificate of analysis for each solution lot series, 
prepared by, and available from, the ISPFS. 
NOTE: Due to external factors associated with changing a 
performance verification solution (examples include: amb~t air 
in the sample chamber, temperature fluctuation) the resuii\. ~)~the 
initial performance verification may not be withj~n the i((eptable 
range. therefore the performance verification may be . ed until 
a pair of satisfactory results are ob~ed. ~owev '. esults after 
a total of tbreeruns for any solution (eqU1Va)..~~ SIX tests) are 
still unsatisfactory, contact the appropriate IS~Laboratory. The 
instrument should not be used for evi~ary testing until the 
problem is corrected and perfonn~L~rification results are 
within the acceptable r~. Th0bggested troubleshooting 
procedure should be~.oll t\.~~-l~al performance verification 
does not meet the a ce . 
'\' 
5.1.6 Temperatur. e of the s~~ must ~etween 33.5°C and 34.SoC in order 
for the performance x..t@Pfatio~Ults to be valid. 
N. OTE: Th~e' Q .. tOr m~d to. Walm for approximately 15 minutes to 
insure that .. . ~~"'i'also warm. If the lid is cold, condensation of 
alcohol vi!f Y. ~ producing low results. 
g -~ 5.1.7 Pe~ce ~cation solutions should only be used prior to the 
e~o~~ oil the label. 
5.1.8 An~!li, may run additional performance verification solution levels at 
~~:etion. 
5. Lb~e official time and. dale of the perfurmance verification is the time and 
G· date recorded on the printout, or the time and date recorded in the log, 
clJ· whi~hever corresponds to the perfonnance verification referenced in 
" - section 5.13 or 5.1.4.1. 
"U 
. ",,~.2 Intoxilyzer 5000lEN Performance Verification . .;;;,.v .. « .. 
REPLYBREIF 
Intoxilyzer 50001EN instruments must have a performance verification willi each 
evidentiary test If the performance verification is within the acceptable range for 
llie lot of solution being used, then the instrument will be approved and the 
resulting breath samples will l;>e deemed valid for evidentiary 'use. . 
5.2.1 IntoXilyzer 5000IEN performance verification is run using 0.08 and/or 
O.20perfonnance verificarlonsolutions provided by and/or approved by 
ISPFS. 
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5.2.2 During each evidentiary breath alcohol test using the Intoxilyzer SOOOIEN, 
a performance verification will be performed as directed by the instrument 
testing sequence and recorded as SIM CHK on the printout If the S1M 
CHI( is not within the acceptable range for the solution lot being used, the 
testing sequence will abort and no breath samples will be obtained. 
5.2.3 A two sample performance verification using a 0.08 perforlllance 
verification ,solution should be ron and results logged ea~h tfihe a 
solution is replaced with fresh solution. A 0.08 performance . ation 
solution should be replaced v,rith fre~h solution approximat\!yv ery 100 
samples or every calendar month, whichever comes first ~ -... \, "J 
5.2.4 A two sample performance verification using a~o performance 
verification S.'OIUtiOn should be ron and resul~S I ~ ed once per calendar 
month and replaced with fresh solution appr' ely every 25 samples. 
The saine bottle of 0.20 solution m,::,.be used several months. 
~ ~ 
NOTE: The 0.02~P. ~cation was implemented for 
, the sole purpose 0 po$n'g.."fue instruments results for a 18-
8004c charge. {n~ e abse~ of an 18-8004c charge, the 0.20 
verificatio~"'Ck th~ shall have no relevance to the results 
or the evid~ ~ftheevidentiary test 
5.2.5 Acceptab~e.:f...#! ~ ~o or 0.20 performance verification is a pair of 
samples ~~' ~at are both within +/- 10% of the performance 
v~ so tar, get value. Target values and ranges of acceptable 
re ", ' ~  ution lot series are included in a certificate of analysis, 
pr d ~d available from, the ISPFS. 
~tE: Due to external factors associated With changing a 
~ '0 performance verification solution (examples include: ambient air 
U in the sample chamber, temperature fluctuation) the results of the ct initial perfOIinance verification may' not ~e within the acceptabl.e 
C; range, therefure the performance verificauon may be repeated unul 
.t'l......0 a pair of satisfactory results are obtained however, if results after a 
""~ total of three runs for any solution (equivalent to six tests) are still 
" ~0 unsatisfactory, contaCt the appropriate ISPFS Laboratory. The 
L, "" ~' instrumen~ should not be used for eviden~ t:sting until the 
<')"V" problem IS corrected and performance verificatIon results are 
""-within tlie acceptable range. Follow the suggested troubleshooting 
procedure if the initial performance verification does not meet the 
acceptance Criteria. 
REPLYBREIF 
5.2.6 ,The official time anddaie of the performance verificatiOn is the time and 
date recorded on the printout, or 1he time and date recorded inihelog. 
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S.2~7 Performance verification solntions should only be used prior to the 
expiration date as marked on the label. 
5.2.8 Temperature of the simulator must be between 33.SoC and 34.SoC in order 
for the performance verification results to be valid. 
5.2.9 An agency may run additional performance verification solution levels at 
their discretion. "-
5.2.10 The BTS must set the correct acceptable range limits and ~~~ance 
verification solution lot number in the instrument before pr~~g with 
evidentiary testing. {' "' \. ,J 
6. Evidentiary Testing Procedure 0'-cJ. 
Proper testing proce.dure by certified operators i~~cess ~rder to provide accurate 
results that will be admissible in court rn~~ us daho measure alcohol in the 
breath, not the blood, and report results as ~ of ~ in 210 liters of breath. 
6.1 Prior to evidential breath al<mM tes~ the subject'individnal should be 
monitored for at least ~?\.~ min~~ Any material which absorbs/adsorbs 
or traps alcohol should .~0VR.~om the mouth prior to the start of the 15 
minute waiting peri~~. ~~.~~:l'bnitoring period the subject'individual should 
not be allowed to ~ ~t, or belchlburp/vomit'regurgitate. 
NOTE: ~o o~material is left in the mouth during the entirety of the 
15 mUm ~izj?l;od; any potential external alcohol contrunination will 
comeint~ .... with the subject/individual's body water andlor dissipate so 
. as notlo interf~ the results of the subsequent breath alcohol test 
6.1.1 ~ ~ath alcohol test must be administered by an operator currently 
~ 0'fl1ied in the use of the instrument used. 
fJ..uOFalse teeth, partial plates, or bridges installed or prescribed by a dentist or 
~ physician do not need to be removed t.a obtain a valid test 
~U 6.1.3 The operator may elect a blood test in place of the breath alcohol test if .§> there is a failure to complete the fifteen minUte monitoring period « sucCessfully . 
REPLYBREIF 
. 6.1.4 During the monitoring period, the operator must be alert for any event that 
might influence the accuracy of the breath alcohol test. 
6~1.4.1 The operator must be aware of the possible presence of mouth 
alcohol as indicated by the testing instrument. If mouth alcohol is 
suspeCted or indicated, the operator shoUld begin another lS-
minute waiting period before repeating the testing sequep.ce. 
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6.2 
6.1.4.2 If, during the 15-minute waiting period, the subjectfmdividual 
vomits or regurgitates material from the stomach into th.e 
subject/individual's breath pathway, the I5-minute waiting period 
must begin again. 
6.1.4.3 If there is doubt as to the events occurring during the 15 minute 
monitoring period, the officer should look at results <R the 
duplicate breath samples for evidence of potential ~c6hol 
contiunination. For clarification see section 6.2.2.2. R) 
0~ 
A ~mplete b~eath alcohol test includes two. (2) valid ~~~~les taken 
dunng the testing sequence and preceded by arr blanks. ~ duplicate breath 
samples should be approximately 2 minutes apart to allQl(.for the dissipation of 
potential mouth alcohol contamination. ~(l) ~ 
NOTE: A deficient or ~t flfiP~ does not automatically 
invalidate a test sample. ~ f()" • ~ 
6.2.1 If. the subject/indivi~ or ~es to provide a second or third 
adequate sample ~sted ~e operator, the single test result may be 
considered valid. • .... :(', .. ... 0 ~v-
6.2.1.1 ~~~ repeat the testing _ce as required by 
6.~e ~r should use a new mouthpiece for each series of tests. 
6 .. 2.2 A third ~ sample is required if the first two results differ by more than 
o.o~ 
.. ~~.l Unless mouth alcoh~l is indi~~ed or ~uspected, i~ is not .necessary o .. to repeat the 15-n:unute WaIting penod to obtam a third breath 
rL0.·C; sample. 
"" -6.2.22 The results for a duplicate breath samples should correlate within 
~V 0.02 to indicate the absence of alcohol contamination in the 
~ ~. subject/individual's breath pathway, show consistent sample 
/)"V" delivery, and indicates the absence of RFI as a contributing factor 
"'<.. to the breath results. 
REPLYBREIF 
6.2.3 The operator should log test results and retain printouts for possible use in 
coUrt The log of the results or the instrUment printouts can be used as the 
offlciallegal record for coUrt purposeS. 
6.2.4 If a subject/individual fails or refuses to provide a second or third sample 
as requested by the operator, ilie results obtained ate still considered valid 
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by the ISPFS, provided the failure to supply the requested samples was 
the fault of the subject/individual and not the operator. 
6.2.5 If the second or third samples are lacking due to instrument fuilure, the 
operator should attempt to utilize another instrument or have blood drawn. 
7. Troubleshooting Procedure '" 
Proper testing procedure by certified operators is. necessary in or.de. r to ~rovi ~urate 
results that will be admissible in court. Instruments used in Idaho measure 01 in the 
breath, not the blood, and report results as grams of alcohol in 210 liters atb.. 
7.i Performance verification: If, when performing the p~~ performance 
verification, the instrument falls outside the limits .OJ.(.. the verification, the 
troubleshooting guide should be used. *fO" 
NOTE: This is a guide f~~ub ~ting failed performance 
verifications and the proced~<G i-~ nded to streamline and isolate 
the. pote~tial cause of the. R1IQblemv ct adherence to the guidelines is 
notrequured. ~~ 
OV v· 
7.1.1 The three source/;) ernt~en performing the .periodic performance 
v.ro;canoos #,~~r setup and operator technique, 1he 
~imulator ~ ~~cation solution, and the instrument calibration 
Itself. 00 ~ c} 
7.1.2 If ~t 0Tormance verification fails, the simulator setup and 
tecQre~qu-;e~ e operator performing the verification should be evaluated. 
The s· should be evaluated to ensure that 1.·t is hooked up properly, 
use hoses, is properly warmed, is within temperature, the operator 
~JeJf. ft ecbnique is not too hard or soft, and that the operator does not stop 
~&.~g until after the sample is taken. . 
I'> yO 7.1.2.1 The performance verification should be run a second time 
. «-'<.I 7.1.22 If the performance verification passes on the second try, the 
.. ~ V instrument passes the performance verification. 
... ~ . 
rJ ...... :.:::> 7:1.3 If the second performance verification fails, then the perforrruince 
, verification solution should be evaluated. 
REPLYBREIF 
7.1.3.1 The performance verification solution shOuld be changed to a fresh 
solution. 
7.1.3.2 'The solution should be wanned for app!()x.Unately 15 minutes, or 
-until the tempeiature is within range, and the simulator lid is as 
warm as the simulator jar. 
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7.1.3.3 The performance verification may then be repeated.. 
7.1.4 If the third performance verification fails, then the only remaining source 
of error lies with the instrument itself At this point the instrument must 
be taken out of service and sent to ISPFS or an approved service provider. 
7.1.5 Upon return from service, the instrument should be evaluated by ~FS 
before being put back into service. " 
Thermometers: ~ 
7.2.1 If a bubble forms in the thermometer, the operator or·.....).,~an place the 
thermometer in a freezer to draw the mercury (or equiva1e~~""';e bulb of the 
thermometer. This should disperse the bubble. <l;-
8. MIPIMIC Procedure ~ '5::-eJ2 
Since the. testing tbr:sho!d (presence or ~~. e).~minor in posses~ionlminor in 
consumption charge IS different from ~~.:s~e and the numenc thresholds, 
!here is a· different proce.dru;e associ~with ~ese speci.al circt~tance~.. In many 
mstances, ail underage drinking ~y OOQgist of multiple subJectsrmdiVlduals that 
need to be tested and the sheern~ero~viduals does not lend itself to observing a 
15 minute waiting period f01i(.~h p(~C.'~~' The potential for "mouth alcohol" is still a 
factor and should be addr(!y."i§m ~~g sequence. 
8.1 15 minU~O tion ~d: At the officer's discretion, or as the circumstances 
dictate, ~ :\.0tx-~cedure (Section 6) may be followed in order to obtain 
a breath s Ie ~ thesubjectiindividual. Otherwise, a shOltened procedure 
can be fOllO~~ 
MIP~cqyocedure: 
~ .. O~e breath alcoh?l test must be administered by an operator currently 
ed ill the use of the mstruInent used. 
. V ~.:u . False teeth. partial plates, or bridge •. inst:ill~or prescribed by • dentist or 
. . ~phYSICtan do not need to be removed to obtam a valid test . 
.. ~ « 8.3 
REPLYBREIF 
. A complete breath alcohol test includes two (2) valid breath samples taken 
during the testing sequence and· preceded by ait blanks. The duplicate breath 
samples should be approximately 2 minUtes apart to .allow for the dissipation of 
potential mouth alcohol conumunation. 
NOTE:. A deficient or insufficient sample does not automatically 
invalidate a test sample. 
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8.3.1 If the subjectfmdividual fails or refuses to provide a second or third 
adequate sample as requested by the operator, 'the single test result may be 
considered valid. 
8.3.1.1 The operator may repeat the testing sequence as required by 
circumstances. 
8.3.1.2 The operator should Use a new mouthpiece for each series o~sts. 
8.3.2 A third breath sample is required if the first two results differ ~~ than 
0.02. $. V~ 
83.2.1 The results for a.dnplicare breath samples S~Jare wifuin 
0.02 to indicate the absence of alcohol . tion in the 
subject/individnals breath pathway, _ ~ consistent sample 
delivery, and indicates the absence of ~s a contributing factor 
to the breath results. ~ f:::-0 
8.3.3 The opera. tor should log test Ii ~~~iri printouts for possible use in 
court. The log of the resul tb.e~~-;;rt printouts can be used as the 
official legal record for purpose-!. 
a y" 
83.4 Ifa SUbjectfmdiviQfails~fuses to provide a second or third sample 
as requested ~'l ~ op~~, the results obtained are still considered valid 
by the IS~t~O?!. old: 4>fu.ee failure to supply the requested samples was 
the faul~ s~~dividual. and not the operator. 
8.3.5 If Jilt\'Q~~\.~·r~a;ird ... Samples are lacking due to instrument failure, the 
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Glossary 
Approved Vendor: A source/provider/manufacturer of an approved premixed alcohol simulator solution shall be explicitly 
approved as a vendor of premixed alcohol simulator solutions for distribution within Idaho. 
Breath Alcohol Test: A series of separate breath samples provided dnring a breath testing sequence. 
Breath Alcohol Testing Seqnence: A sequence of events as detem:rined by fue Idaho State Police Forensic Serv-ices, which 
may be directed by either the instrument or the Operator, but not both:, and may consist of air blanks, perfolJIllUlce 
verification, internal standard checks, and breath samples. , 
Breath Testing Specialist (BTS): An Operator who has completed an advanced training class taught by an ~ of the 
· Idaho State Police Forensic Services. BTS certification is valid for 26 calendar months and expires on the y of the 
~~ ~ 
Certificate of Analysis: A certificate stating that the premixed ethyl alcohol solutions used for perfo+ ~erification have 
been tested and approved fur use by the ISPFS. «:)\ 
. Certificate of Approval: A certificate stating thilt an individual breafh alcohol testing ~ been evaluated by the 
ISPFS and found to be suitable for forensic alcohol testing. The certificate bears the ~~ of an Idaho State Police 
Forensic Services Lab Manager, and the effective date of the instrument app~ 0 
Changeover Class: A. training class for curreirtly certified perso~el ~<:;:w~ are taught theory. operation, and 
proper testing procedure for a new make or model of instrument be· ted'~eir agency. Breath Testing Specialists 
attend BTS training that qua.li:J:ies theni to perform Bis duties rela the ;n!lt.,,~ent. 
. (J ~'V' 
· ~"identiary Test: .A br~ath t~ Perli. ormed .. on .a.subjec~~ for p¥al evidenti~ or ~egal pmposes. A distinction 
lS made between eVIdentiary testIng and commumty s~~ts perfurmed WIth the mstrument. 
ldah. 0 State Police Foreus. ic Services (lSPFS): F~k:nO~~e Bureau of Forensic Services, the ISPFS is.dedicated 
to providing forensic science services to the ~ ~9" ~tem of Idaho. ISPFS is the administrative body for the 
breath alcohol testing program per IDAP A 1l.Olf'lol'. -~ V 
P:J~ .. ~,,-' 
MIPIMIC: An abbreviation used to ~ min{Y0~ssession or minor in cousumption of alcohoL 
Operator Certification: The condition of ha~fied the training requirements for administering breafh alcohol tests as 
eStablished by the ISPFS. Operator ~~~ is valid fur 26 calendar months and expires on the last day of the 26th 
month. _ ~ 
· Operator: An individual Certi1ied~ISPFS as qualified by training to administer breath alcohol tests. 
Operator Class: An ISPF~ed 1raining class for prospective or uncertified breafh alcohol Operators. Currently 
certified Breafh Testing ~ts may teach Operator classes. 
. Perlorm_"'T- A verification of ... """"'. cy of the breath testing instrument ntilizing a simulator an. d a 
performance v l;Olution. Peifonnance verification should be reported to 1hree decimal places. While ISPFS uses 
. . the term perf1 verifi~on, lIIlW.ufact:urerS and others may use a term such as "cahbration check" or "simulator check." 
.. PerfO~~eIificatiOn Solution: Apremixed ethyl alcohol solution used for field performance verifications. The 
'. solution ~rovided by and/or approved by ISPFS. 
Recertification Class: A training cla:ss for aJiTentlycertUied personnel, completion of which results in uninterrupted 
Continuation of their Operator or BTS status for aD. additioua126 months. 
. . . . _. .. 
Waiting Period/Moilitoring Period/Depri,'ation Period/Observation Period: IS-minute period prior to administering a 
breath alcohol test, in which an officer nionitorS the test subj~trmdivid.ual. 
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Breath Alcohol Standard Operating Procedure 
List of Revisions 
Topic 
Delete reference to ALS 
0.0210.20 solutions 
Valid breath tests 
Aka-Sensor cahbration checks 
Date of Revision 
June 1,1995 
June 1,1995 
Intoxilyzer 5000 Calibration Checks 
Effective Jurie, 1996 
OctobA~995 
$\)996 
riY"~ 1, 1996 
0.003 agreement 0' June 1, 1996 
Operators may run calibration chec~ .~ July I, 1996 
Re-run a ",lution withln 24 h~ ~. ~0 <:::' Sept<mber 6, 1996 
All 3 solutions run ~~"1.our ~Od September 6, 1996 
AIl 3 solutions ~ a .. ~~ period September 6, 1996 
R~running~'?dtutiO'f# September 26, 1996 
All SOl~~'~; a 48-hour period September 26, 1996 
~~ tO~~OVed Oct 8,1996 
~SOl~ run within a 48-hour period September 26, 1996 
M~ three calibration solutions October 8, 1996 
~~utionvalues no longer called in to BFS Aprill,1997 
~o-~. . 
00·· Alco-Sensorand Into~yzer 5000 
~eJ. calihrationcheck 
August 1. 1998 
r. Calibration checks for the Intoxilyzer 5000 
~v 
«,~ Name change, all references made to the Buteau of Forensic Services were changed to 
Idaho State Police Forensic Services. 






Deletedsec1ions. on relocating, repairing, recahbrating, 
and 10anfug of instruments frOm previous revision. 
August 1, 1999 
August 1, 1999 
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1.2, 2.1, 2.2 
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1.6 











Sections 1, 2, 3 
Alea-Sensor and Intoxilyzer 5000 calibration checks 
Deleted sections on blood and urine samples 
for alcohol dete:rmination 
Operator certification record management 
Reformat numbering 
Requirement for running 0.20 simulator solution 
August 1, 1999 
August 1, 1999 
January 29,2001 
Angust 18, 2006 
Changed 3-sample to "two print cards". NovembeF{7' 2006 
Deleted "simulator port" and "two print cards". ~~ ~7 
Simulator temperature changed from "should" 
to "musf'. . 14,2007 
Clarification of 0.20 cahbration checks. ~ "":'september 18, 2007 
Added the Lifeloc FC20 *0<'" February 13, 2008 
Deleted requirement that the new~' ~~~~0 
utilize the same technology if the c~ February l3, 2008 
certified ~ .{$ 
Modified the accepted ran-~ simnl~solutions to 
+1-I0~, elimin.· ating~~.Ol ~ion. Added 
"Established target ~s ~ different 
from those sh~n ~~e label" 
A.d~ Lif~C20~ration checks 
IntoifO~ ~1:ion is now section 2.3 
M~. ttO ... ~callY allow use of the 0.20 
during s~testing 
Gen~fori:nat for clarification. Combined 
~ensor aild Lifeloc sections. Specifically, 
.( ~ged calibration requirement using the 0.20 
0, "reference solution from four (4) checks to two (2). 
February 13, 2008 
February 13, 2008 
February 13, 2008 
December 1, 2008 
CJ . 
2.1.4, 2.2.3, 2.2.4,2~0 .... 
And 2.2.10 ."\; ~ 
Clarification: a "calibration check" consists of a 





2.1.3, 2.1.4.i, 2.1.9 
REPLYBREIF 
must be within the acceptable range before 
proceeding with subject testing. A 0.20 solution 
shouid berepI.aced every 20-25 samples. Clarified 
the correct procedure for performing a calibration check. 
Clarification: Added "before and after" to the O.ORand July 7,2009 
0.20 cal1bration checks, within 24 hours of a subject test. 
The official time and date of the cahbratioil check is the 
tiineand date recorded. on the printout, or the time and date 
recorded in the log, whichever cOlTesponds to the calibration 
. ch¢k referenced in section 2.1.3 or2.1.4.1. 
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The entire SOP was rewritten to incorporate language changes regarding 
performance verifications, and to. dear-up ambiguities associated with 
the 0.20 verification and the relevance to cases not involving an 18-
8004C charge. Scope and safety sections were added. Troubleshooting, 
MIP/MIC sections added. ~ 
" Deletions andlor additions to sections 2. 4.3.3, 4.4.1. 4.4.3, ~.6.1.l, 5.1.2,5.1.4,5.1.4.1,5.1.5,5.2.4,5.25,6,6.2.1, 6.2.3, 6;'~V~1, 7.1.1, 
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Quantitative Analysis for Alcohol in Breath by Approved 
Breath Testing Instruments. 
Scope 
This method describes the Idaho State Police Forensic Services lJ~S) 
p.rocedure, for use by agencies external to ISPFS, for the analysis of~e : tbr the 
presence of volatile compounds using an approved breath testing ins . This 
. method provides for the quantitative analysis of ethanol. (~ 
. ~.) 
.... Following all the recommendations (}f this external procedt; ~ establish the 
scientific validity of the breath alcohol test Failure to meet all ~ the recommendations 
within this procedure does not disqualify the breath alcoh~l~~ut does allow for the 
questioning of the breath alcohol tests. as it pert:ai,e.s to its ~on of admissibility in 
court.. That foundation can be set, through te~'), h~ ... ~ath testing specialist expert 
or ISPFS expert in breath testing as to the ~.lia}-~cations of the deviation from 
the procedure as stated. ~~... 0-"-
CO ',,/ Safety 
Q~.~ Within the disciplI·~...or bre .. cohol testing, the general biohazard safety 
precautions should be fouU'",""",,- . due to the potential infectious materials that may 
be ejected from the m urinJ§...~ sampling of the breath. Cantion should be taken so 
as the expired bre t ~~d towards the officer or other unrelated bystander . 
.;s. 
Instrument 2n~~rator Certification 
TO~ en ~t minimum standards are·met, individnal breath testing instruments, 
Operators, reath testing specialists (BTS) must be approved and certified by the 
I~ S~' ce Forensic Services (ISPFS). The ISPFS will establish and maintain a 




Approval of Breath TeSting Instruments. In order to be approved and certified 
each instrument must meet the following criteria: 
4.1.1 The instrument shall analyze a reference sample or analytical test 
standard, the results of which must agree within +/ - 10% of the target 
value or such limits set by ISPFS. 
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4.1.2 The certification procedures shall be adequate and appropriate for the 
analysis of breath specimens for the determination of alcohol 
concentration for law enforcement. 
4.1.3 Any other tests deemed necessary to correctly and adequately evaluate the 
instrument to give accurate results in routine breath alcohol testing. 
The ISPFS may, for cause, remove a specific instrument by serial number from 
evidential testing and suspend or withdraw certification thereof. 
~, 
Operators become certified by completing a training class taUght~y PFS 
certified Breath Testing Specialist (BTS). Certification is for 26 cal onths 
and expires the last day of the 26th month. Certification will a?~ ~ Operator 
to perf01ID all functions required to obtain a valid breathi:~ -test It is the 
responsibility of the individual Operator to maintain their c certification; the 
ISPFS will not notify Operators that their certification is ~u expire. 
4.3.1 Recertification for another 26-month period ~ved by completing an 
ISPFS approved Operator class P~ the~~fthe 26th month. 
4.3.2 If the individual fails to sa~~ori~~~plete the class (including the 
written and practical tes~r a11~eir certification status to expire, 
he/she must retake the~a~$s in order to become recertified.. 
4.3.3 If current Operato~,"  is expired, the individual is not certified to 
run evidenti~0ath' I tests on the instrument in question until the 
Operator c~~ c~ d.. 
4.3.~~ ~~ grace periods or provisions for extension of Operator 
O~tQitn. 
Breath Tes~~ecialists (BTS) are Operators who have completed an 
advanced ~g ,class and are ISPFS-certified to perform instrument 
~' and provide both inllial ."d recertifu:arion 1nUning for instrument 
4.tP To obtain initial BTS certification, an individual must be currently 
/1.....0 certified as an Operator of that particular instrument BTS certification is 




NOTE: The prior Operator status "on that particular instrument" 
requirement is waived for new instrumentation. 
4.4.2 BTS Certification is valid for 26 calendar months. 
4.4.3 IfBTs certification is allowed to expire, the individual reverts to certified 
Operator status for 12 calendar months for that instrument. He/she may 
no longer perform any BTs specific duties relating to that particular 
instrument. 
Idaho Brea1h Alcohol Standard Operating Procedure 
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4.4.4 BTS certification is renewable by attending an approved BTS training 
class. 
4.4.5 The Idaho State Police Forensic Services may revoke BTS certification for 
cause. Examples of what may constitute grounds for revocation may 
include falsification of records, failure to perform required performance 
verificatioll; failure to successfully pass a BTS recertification class and 
failure to meet standards in conducting Operator training. 
Adoption of a new instrument by an agency will require updating any :ij~d 
Operators in that agency in the use of the new instrument. R) '" 
4.5.1 A currently certified BTS may become a certified ~'l6r a new 
instrument by completing an ISPFS approved BTS Ins~~tion class. 
4.5.2 A currently certified Operator may certify o~.f 'Ow instrument by 
completing an ISPFS approved Operator Ins~tation Class for the 
new instrument. ~ ~ 
4.5.3 Individuals not currently ~ .~ ~rators must complete an 
Operator Class for each ap~~~nt 
Record maintenance and m~e¥len~ It is the responsibility of each 
individual agency to sto~o~~ verification records, subject records, 
maintenance recordS, ~~eriritt ~: or any other records as pertaining to the 
evidentiary use ofbr~€M:es' ents and to maintain a current record of 
Operator certifica~EJ 0 
4.6.1 !~. ~ of the agency to see that the said records are stored 
:tai:q.0a minimum of (3) years in accordance with IDAPA 
11. .01.& 
4.6. ~ords may be subject to periodic audit by the Idaho State Police 
"-C::1 Forensic Services. 
4;6.&~e Idaho State Police Forensic . Services will not be responsible for the 
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5. Performance Verification of Breath Testing Instruments 
Performan~ verifications aid the Breath Testing Specialist (BTS) and the Idaho 
State Police Forensic Services (ISPFS) in detennining if a breath testing instrument is 
functioning correctly. Performance verifications are performed using a wet bath 
simulator performance verification solution. The solution is provided by and/or approved 
by ISPFS. The ISPFS analysis establishes the target value and acceptable range of tl1e 
solutions used for the verification and includes the acceptable values on the Certificate of 
Analysis for each solution. Note: The ISPFS established target values may be di"ent 
from those shown on the bottle label. ~ 
5.1 Alco-SensQr and Lifeloc FC20-Portable Breath Testinj \<il>s~ment 
Performance Verification V)\ 
5.1.1 The Aleo-Sensor and Lifeloc FC20 portable brea~~ instrument 
performance verification is ron using appro~ly 0.08 and/or 0.20 
performance verification solutions provided b;:#ir approved by ISPFS. 
5.1.2 The performance verification l~ th~~8 and 0.20 performance 
verification sohrtions cons~Y~ 
5.1.3 A performance verificati~ of ~ Alco-Sensor and. Lifeloc FC20 
instruments using a A~-PeQ:o~ce verification solution must be 
performed within~~~..betore or after an evidentiary test to be 
approved for .;~)(ti.. . Multiple breath alcohol tests may be 
covered by a~ J~ ce verification. 
~ .. 
5.1.3.1_~~8 p~ ·ce. verification solution should be replaced with 
O~. h ~on app~oximately every 25 verifications or every bale~1ith, whichever comes :first. 
5.1.4 A O-}ii~rmance verification should be run and results logged once per 
cal~ month and replaced with fresh solution approximately every 25 
OGj:jications or until it reaches its expiration date, whichever comes first 
rp<': NOTE: The 0.20 performance verification was implemented for 
<0'" the sole purpose of supporting the instruments' results for an 18-
~ .. 8004Ccharge. Failure to timely perform a 0.20 performance 
.. U verification ~ not invalidate tests performed that yield results at 
~ other levels or m charges other than 18-8004C . 
.. ~'J. 
REPLYBREIF 
5.1.401 The 0.20 performance verification satisfies the requirement for 
performance verification wifuin 24 hours, before or after an 
evidentiary test at any level. The 0.20 performance verification 
solution should not be used routinely for this pmpose. 
5.1.5 Acceptable results fot a 0.08 or 0.20 performance verification is a pair of 
samples in sequence that arebotl1 within +1- 10% of the performance 
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verification solution target value. Target values and ranges of acceptable 
results are included in a certificate of analysis for each solution lot series, 
prepared by, and available from, the ISPFS. 
NOTE: Due to external factors associated with changing a performance 
verification solution the results of the initial performance velification may 
not be within the acceptable range, therefore the performance verification 
may be repeated until a pair of satisfactory results are obtained. However, 
if results after a total of three test series for any solution (equivalent to six 
tests) are still unsatisfactory, contact the appropriate ISPFS Lal\Q~ry. 
The instmment should not be used for evidentiary t~Stin t n'til the 
problem is corrected and performance verification results . ., the 
acceptable range. The suggested troubleshooting proc should be 
followed if the initial performance verification d.ct~ ot meet the 
acceptance criteria. <0\ 
5.1.6 Temperature of the simulator must be betwee~~<C and 34.5°C in order 
for the performance verification re~ts to be ~ 
. NOTE: The simulator may n~ wJi!J ~r approximately 15 minutes 
to ensure that. the metal lid [~ w~'ff the lid is cold, condensation of 
alcohol vapor may OCC~~U~g~ results. 
5.1. 7 Performance v~Q: .SQbJMn: should only be used prior to the 
expiration dat~~tih(la~ ... 
5.1.8 An agenc~ ~J_~Onal performance verification solution levels at 
their dis~ ~u 
5.1.9 ~. cial~  and date of the performance verification is the time and 
date reco~ on the printout, or the time and date recorded in the log, 
whisPi"@j corresponds to the performance verification referenced in 
. sec~.1.3 or 5.1.4.1. 
5.2 rnto:!.fo:.'? SOOOIEN Performance Verification 
T.£;Qyzer 50001EN instruments must have a performance verification with each 
.tl.-~tiary test. If the performance verification is within the acceptable range for 
"'" the lot of solution being used, then the instrument will be approved and the 
~ V Iesulting breath samples will be deemed valid for evidentiary use . 
. ~~ . 
rJV 5.2;1 Into:rilyzer 5000lEN performance verification is run using 0.08 andlor 
~ 0.2Qperfonnance. verification solutions provided by and/or approved by 
ISPFS. .. 
REPLYBREIF 
5,2.2 During each evidentiary breath alcohol test using the IntoxilyZe! 50001EN, 
aperforman~ verification will be performed ;:is directed by the instroment 
testing sequence and recorded as SIM CHK on the printout If the SIM 
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CHK is not within the acceptable range for the solution lot being used, the 
testing sequence will abort and no breath samples will be obtailled. 
5.2.3 A two sample performance verification using a 0.08 performance 
verification solution should be run and results logged each time a 
solution is replaced with fresh solution. A 0.08 performance verification 
solution should be replaced with fresh solution approximately every 100 
samples or every calendar month, whichever comes first 
5.2.4 A 0.20 perfonnance verification should be run and results logged ~~er 
calendar month and replaced with fresh solution approximate~Very 25 
verifications or until it reaches its expiration date, whichever ~V first 
NOTE: The 0.20 performance verification was imple~ for the sole 
pmpose of supporting the instruments' results for(lh\8-8004C charge. 
Failure to timely perform a 0.20 perfonnance<.vlrlfication will not 
invalidate tests performed that yield results a,.t ~llevels or in charges 
other than 18-8004C. ~ eJ"-
5.2.5 Ac. ceptable results for a 0.08 o-gJ:;:iJ" D~ce verification is a pair of 
samples in sequence that~oth ~ -:1- 10% of the perfonnance 
verification solution targ..~ue. ~et values and ranges of acceptable 
results for each s~~CO\ldt s~s ... are included in a certificate of analysis, 
prepared by, and ~.Le .. ~~ "'rfle ISPFS. 
NOTE: Due ~~. J:Wo.~·'~tors associated with changing a perfonnance 
Verificati?~tioJ('j;BP;clts of the initial performance verifica~on ~y 
not be -wffi th~~le range, therefore the performance verificat:J.on 
ma~!'fep~~Ul a pair of satisfactory results are obtained. However, 
if s ota! of three test series for any solution (equivalent to six 
testS are unsatisfactory, contact the appropriate ISPFS Laboratory. 
The ~ent should not be used for evidentiary testing until the 
prolh$i is cou'ected and performance verification results are within the 
~table range. Follow the suggested troubleshooting procedure if the 
~  perfonnance verification does not meet the acceptance criteria. 
~,,? r:z:rv The official time and date of the performance verification is the time and 
~.. date recorqed on the printout, or the time and date recorded in the log. 
~U . 5:2:7 Per.f~ce verification solutions should only be used prior to the ..§5 expItation date as marked on the label. 
5.2.8Tempe~ of the simulator must be between 33.S0C and 34.SoC in order 
for the penoimailce verification results to be valid. 
5 ;i:9 Au agency may run additional perfonnance verification solution levels at 
their discretion. 
Idaho Breath Alcohol Standard Operating :?rocedure 
Issuing Authority,...,..ISPFS Quality Manager 




5.2.10 The BTS must set the correct acceptable range limits and performance 
verification solution lot number in the instrument before proceeding with 
evidentiary testing. 
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6. Evidentiary Testing Procedure 
Proper testing procedure by certified Operators is necessary in order to provide 
accUrate results. Instruments used in Idaho measure alcohol in the breath, not the blood., 
and report results as grams of alcohol in 210 liters of breath. 
6.1 Prior to evidentiary breath alcohol testing, the subjectlindividual should be 
monitored for at least fifteen (15) minutes. Any material which absorbs/adsorbs 
or traps alcohol should be removed from the mouth prior to the start of ti!-e 15 
minute waiting period During the monitoring period the subjectlindivi~),uld 
not be allowed to smoke, drink, eat, or belchlburp/vomitlregurgitate. ~ 
NO. TE: If a foreign objectlmaterial is left in the mouth during 1hF ~~ty of the 
.15 minute monitoring period., any potential external alcohol c~Ya&ination will 
come into equilibrium with the subjectlindividual's body wa~\paror dissipate so 
as not to interfere with the results of the subsequent breath ~~ol test 
6.1.1 The breath alcohol test must be administer~an Operator currently 
certified in the use of the instrume~ 0 
6.1.2 False teeth, partial plates, or b~ in~~~ or prescribed by a dentist or 
physician do not need to be ~ved ~tain a valid test 
6.1.3 The Operator may electrl~od te~ place of the breath alcohol test if 
there is a failureAc()'rJIDpI~e fifteen minute monitoring period 
successfully. V * ~ 
. tho ",OA.' ~ 6.1.4 During e m~nn d, the Operator must be alert for any event 
that might ~n~ curacy of the breath alcohol test 
6.1.4..~OOp¥ must be aware of the possible presence of mouth 
0' JI=~co indicated by the testing instrument If mouth alcohol is 
. s ed or indicated, the Operator should begin another 15-
~ e waiting period before repeating the testin~ sequence. . 
~~) If, during the IS-minute w. aiting period, the subject/individual o vomits or regurgitates material from the stomach into the <§ subjectlindividual's breath pathway, the IS-minute waiting period 
~efJ must begin again. 
,- 6.1.4.3 If there is doubt as to. the events occurring during the IS minute 
~ U .. momtoring period., the officer should look at results of the 
El .
•. ~. ~ .. . duplicate breath samples fot evidence of potential alcohol 
~-.....; . contamination. For clarification see section 6.2.22. 
REPLYBREIF 
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6.2 A complete breath alcohol test includes two (2) valid breath samples taken. 
during the testing sequence and preceded by air blanks. The 
duplicate breath samples should be approximately 2 minutes apart 
to allow for the dissipation of potential mouth alcohol 
contamination. 
NOTE: A deficient or insufficient sample does not automatically invalidate a test 
sample. 
6.2.1 If the subject/individual fails or refuses to provide a duplicate, a...~ate 
sample as requested by the Operator, the single test resuIN1mll be 
considered valid. ~\J 
6.2.1.1 ~. e Operator may repeat the testing seque~~ required by 
CIrcumstances. . «) \ ~ 
6.2.1.2 The Operator should use a new mOllt~e for each series of 
tests. ~ eJ2 
6.2.2 A third breath sample is req~e ~o results differ by more than 
0.02. ~ ~~ 
6.2.2.1 Unless mouth al~ ~ in~ted or suspected, it is not necessary 
to repeat ~@.~jnJl.i:Maiting period to obtain a third breath 
sample. 0 V ~~' 
6.2.2.2 Th,~tsfi9&licate breath samples should c~LTe~ate :vithin 
O.~ '0: ~~e the abse:ilce of alcohol contamInatlOn m the 
L ,JdtiJect/~dual's breath pathway, show consistent sample o "\d;livciV and indicates the absence of RFI as a contributing factor 
to ~~eath results. 
62.3 Th~atc:r should log test results and retain printouts, if any, for 
~~bt~ use ill court 
6.2'0'Qia SUbject/individual fails or refuses to provide a dupli~te, adequa~e 
. . CJ sample as requested by the Operator, the results obtained are still 
~.. considered valid by the ISPFS, provided the failure to supply the 
"\. - requested samples was tlie fault of the subject/individual and not the 
. .~U· Operator. 
~.s> 
REPLYBREIF 
6.2.5 If the second or third samples are lacking due to ins1rument failure, the 
Operator' should attempt to utilize another instrnment or have blood 
drawn. 
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7. Troubleshooting Procedure 
Proper testing procedure by certified Operators is necessary in order to provide 
accurate results. 
7.1 Performance verification: If, when performing the periodic performance 
verification, the instrument falls outside the limits of the verification, the 
troubleshooting guide should be used.. 
N?TE: .This. is. a guide for troubles~ooting performance verific:ations ou1ki~the 
verification limits and the procedure 1S recommended to streamline ~~1~ the 
potential cause of the problem. Strict adherence to the guidelines is ~~ed.. 
7.1.1 The three sources of uncertainty when perfo~ e periodic 
performance verifications are in the simulator ~ and Operator 
technique, the simulator performance verifica~ solution, and the 
instrument calibration itself ~0 
7.1.2 ~ the first performance v~rifi. ca~s out~the ve~fication ~ts, ~e 
sunulator setup and techni~e ~e. Q1l.~or performmg the verifica:lO.n 
should be eValuated..~e s 0t ~ be evaluated to ensure that It lS 
hooked up properly, . . ort li'bs€s, is properly w81med, is within 
temperature, the Op. ·lo~que is not too hard or soft, and that 
the Operator does ~ p ~g until after the s8lUple is taken. 
7.1.2.1 The P~e~rificatiOnShOuld be run a second time 
7.1.2.2 ~~perJ'3...,~ verification is within the verification limits on 
~ se~, the instrument passes the performance verification. 
7.1.3 If Q se~performan?e v~rificatio~ is outside the verification limits, 
thena~fformance venfication solution should be evaluated next 
i... &;j 1 The performance verification solution should be changed to a :fresh 
~O solution. 
o 1'>9 7.1.3.2 Th: solution should b~ w~ed for approximate~y 15 min~t~, or 
.. ~'<.I until the temperature IS Within range, and the sunulator hd IS as 




7.1.3.3 The performance verification may then be repeated.. 
7.1.4 If the thirdperfonnance verification is outside the verification limits, the 
instrument must be taken out of Service and sent to the ISPFS or an 
approved service provider. 
7.15 Upon return from service, the instrument should be recertified by ISPFS 
before being put back into seIVice. 
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7.2 Thermometers: 
REPLYBREIF 
7.2.1 If a bubble forms in the thermometer. the Operator or BTS can place the 
thermometer in a freezer to draw the mercmy (or equivalent) into the bulb 
of the thermometer. This should disperse the bubble. 
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8. IV[]P IMIC Procedure 
The previous version of tlris section has been withdrawn from publication and will 
be replaced by an updated version that is pending statutory and legal review. Please 
disregard and destroy any copies of the previous version of this section. 
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FIELD SOBRIETY TEST 
2 
3 The court has the ability to review the video tape regarding the field sobriety test. 
4 On the horizontal gazenystagnus, the officer's testimony was that Mr. Besaw's pupils did 
5 
not appear to be the same size. The testimony indicated that the National Highway Traffic 
6 
7 
Safety Administration Manual notes "If the eyes do not track together, or ifthe pupils are 
8 noticeably unequal in size, the chance of medical disorder or injuries the nystagnus is 
9 present". In this case, the pupil size was obviously noticeable because the arresting officer 
10 
put that in his police report, which he testified to at the time of the hearing. Therefore, 
11 
12 
allowing the horizontal gaze nystagnus in as evidence would be improper. Scientific aura 
13 behind the testing would prejudice that. With regard to the "walk and turn" the court can 
14 note the slope that was present. The surface was not reasonably dry, wasn't level and it 
15 
was certainly slippery based on the amount of water that was present. The same can be 
16 
17 said for the "one-leg stand". The officer had no prior experience with Mr. Besaw and 
18 would not know what his ability was to perfonn these field tests in nonnal conditions. It 
19 
was raining heavily in January 2011. During the course of the field sobriety test, the court 
20 
21 
can note everything on the video tape. The court can also note the difference in what the 
22 trooper was wearing and what Mr. Besaw was wearing. 
23 The State should be allowed to introduce evidence on the field sobriety tests on the 
24 
grounds of foundation, relevance, and that its probative value is substantially outweighed 
25 
26 
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1 by the danger of unfair prejudice. Allowing such evidence violates Mr. Besaw's 
2 confrontation rights under the Idaho and United States Constitutions. In one study, over 
3 
98% of roadside HGN tests were detennined to be not properly conducted. See "End-
4 
5 
Position Nystagmus as Indicator of Ethanol Intoxication", Science & Justice J ouma1200 1. 
6 See United States vs. Hom, 185 F Supp 2d 530 (D.Md. 2002) ( a copy of which is 
7 attached hereto as Exhibit B) and State vs. Lasworth 42 P.3d 844 (NJv1. App., 2001) (a 
8 
copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit C). The appropriate test for measuring the 
9 
10 reliability of evidence is Rule 702 of the Idaho Rules of Evidence. See State vs. Gleason, 
11 123 Idaho 62,65,844 P.2d 691 (1992). In that case, the Idaho Supreme Court questioned 
12 
the precedential value of State vs. Garrett, 119 Idaho 878, 811 P.2d 488 (1991). The 
13 
14 
Gleason Court affinned that at most the arresting officer could testify that a nystagmus 
15 may only be an indicator of intoxication, not that it is conclusive evidence. Moreover, 
16 such evidence cannot be used "to establish or infer any particular correlative BAC level 
17 
because nystagmus does stem from other causes other than the ingestion of alcohol." See 
18 
19 
Schultz vs. State of Marvland, 665 A.2d 60, 77 (1995) and a study by Spurgeon Cole, 
20 attached hereto as Exhibit D. Also see the Affidavit of Harold P. Brull in the case of 
21 United States vs. Horn, attached hereto as Exhibit E and also see the Affidavit of Joel P. 
22 
Wiesen, Ph.D., attached hereto as ExhibitF. See Idaho Rules of Evidence, Rule 104. In 
23 
24 a more recent Court of Appeals decision, State vs. Parkinson, 128 Idaho 29, 909 P.2d 647 
25 
26 
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(Ct.App.1996), the Court cites Gleason to say that the admission of expert testimony 
regarding scientific evidence is governed by Rule 702, but goes on to "articulate the 
inquiry envisioned by Rule 702" discussing Daubert vs. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 
Inc., 502 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786,125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993), for guidance. 128 Idaho, at 
p. 34. Such inquiry requires, 
a preliminary assessment of whether the reasoning or methodology 
underlying the testimony is scientifically valid and of whether that 
reasoning or methodology properly can be applied to the facts and issues. 
(quoting Daubert) (emphasis added) 
The Trial Court must make a preliminary assessment. Factors to be evaluated 
include: 
Whether the theory or technic in question can be tested, whether it has been 
subjected to peer review and publication, its known or potential error rate, 
the existence and maintenance of standards governing its use, and whether 
it has attracted widespread acceptance within a relevant scientific 
cOlmnunity. (quoting Dauber) 
128 Idaho, at p. 34 
The Court then synthesized, "other courts sand commentators" in listing these additional 
factors: 
1) The presence of safeguards and the technique, 
2) Analogy to other scientific techniques whose results are admissible, 
3) The nature and breath of inferences drawn, 
4) The extent to which the basic data are verifiable by the court and jury, 
5) Availability of other experts to test and evaluate the technique, 
6) The probative significance of the evidence and the circumstances of the case. 
(Cites omitted) Id. 
CLOSING ARGUMENT 
REPLYBREIF 
20 LAW OFFICES OF 
CLARK AND FEENEY, LLP 





























However, the limitation in Parkinson, "just scientific expertise" has been done 
away with the decision in U. S. Supreme Court case, Kumbo Tire vs. Carmichael, 119 
S. Ct. 1169 (1999). In that case, the Supreme Court answered the question posed by Justice 
Rehnquist's dissent in Daubert vs. Merrell regarding scientific evidence. Answering 
affirmatively, in a fairly resounding decision, Justice Breyer authored the near unanimous 
decision. The Court decided "how Daubert applies to the testimony of engineers and other 
experts who are not scientists." Id., at p. 1171. Answering this question, resolved a circuit 
split, where several circuits, notably the Third, Fifth, and Eighth had indicated that 
Daubert applied to all expert testimony while the Second, Ninth, Tenth and Eleventh 
Circuits held that Daubert applies only to the admission of "scientific" expert testimony. 
The Court concluded that Daubert's strictures apply not just to "scientific" evidence, but 
to all forms of proposed expert testimony. Kumbo 119 S.Ct., at 1171, 1175. 
The Court, in stressing the importance of the gatekeeping function of a trial judge, 
noted that its objective was to: 
"ensure the reliability and relevancy of expert testimony, to make certain 
that an expert, whether basing testimony upon professional studies or 
personal experience, employs in the courtroom the same level of intellectual 
rigor that characterizes the practice of an expert in the relevant field." 
Id., atp. 1176. 
In order to ensure this level of reliability, Daubert's teaching and tests must be 
applied to all expertise, whether it be scientific or "technical" or "other specialized" 
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knowledge. Kumbo, at p. 1174. These requirements must exist because all experts, not 
just scientific ones, unlike ordinary witnesses are given this wide latitude to offer opinions 
- including those not base upon firsthand observations or knowledge. Kumbo, at p. 1174. 
While the Idaho Supreme Court has used a Rule 702 case-by-case test of reliability 
for admission of expert testimony, the Court of Appeals has used Daubert, 509 U.S. 579 
(1993) and similar factors, which include: 
a) Whether the theory or technique in question can be tested; 
b) Whether it has been subjected to peer review and publication; 
c) Its known or potential error rate; 
d) The existence and maintenance of standards governing its use; and 
e) Whether it has attracted widespread acceptance within a relevant 
scientific cOlmnunity. 
The Idaho Court of Appeals uses the following criteria that a trial court might 
consider when analyzing scientific evidence: 
a) The presence of safeguards in the teclmiques; 
b) Analogy to other scientific techniques whose results are admissible; 
~) The nature and breadth of inference drawn; 
d) The extent to which the basic data are verifiable by the court and jury; 
e ) Availability of other experts to test and evaluate the technique; and 
f) The probative significance of the evidence in the circumstances of the case. 
State vs. Konechny, 3 P.3d 535, 134 Idaho 410 (App.Ct.2000); Kumbo Tire vs. 
Cannichael, 119 S.Ct. 1169 (1999); State vs. Parkinson, 909 P.2d 647, 128 Idaho 29, 
(Idaho App. 1996). 
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The field sobriety tests administered in Mr. Besaw's case do not meet the 
requirements of Daubert, Kumbo or Rule 702, nor can the arresting officer lay a sufficient 
foundation to admit such evidence. Further, Mr. Besaw has no way to confront or 
challenge the officer's observations ofthese presumed psychological or psychophysical 
reaction of eyes, therefore, such evidence should not be allowed. 
In using the case law set out above, the Court must detennine that the field sobriety 
tests result lack reliability and do not follow the requirements of the Rule 702 standards. 
The factors, as noted above, cannot be met by the State in this case. Mr. Besaw requests 
that evidence obtained against him be suppressed on the grounds that his due process and 
other constitutional rights, as protected under the Idaho State Constitution and the United 
States Constitution, were violated. The Court can also note cases from Kansas and Ohio. 
In State vs. Witte, 836 p.2d 110 (Kansas 1992), the Kansas Court criticized states like 
Idaho for accepting field sobriety tests based on State vs. Superior Court, 718 P. 2d 171 
(Arizona). The Kansas Court noted: 
"The Idaho Supreme Court also followed the Arizona opinion. The Idaho 
Court noted that no evidence or publication had been presented that refuted 
the Arizona opinion." State vs. Garrett, 119 Idaho 878, 881, 811 P.2d 488 
(1991). 
At pp. 1118 and 1119. 
The Kansas Supreme Court went on to criticize the Arizona Court by outlining 
several contrary scientific studies that dealt with the horizontal gaze nystagmus test. The 
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Kansas Supreme Court concluded: 
"If the Arizona Supreme Court had had the evidence before it, it may not 
have held that the HGN evidence satisfies the Frye admissibility 
requirements. The reliability of the HGN test is not currently a settled 
position in the scientific community." 
Atp.1121. 
The Court may be better able to understand Mr. Besaw's position by looking at 
Judge Lansing's dissenting opinion in State vs. Mazzuca, 132 Idaho 868, 979 P.2d 1226 
(Ct.App. 1999). This case dealt with the Intoxilyzer 5000 and the foundation for the 
evidence allowing the breath result in. Judge Lansing stated: 
"To bolster its holding that this foundation suffices, the majority opinion 
relies upon several cases from other jurisdictions where the expert testimony 
was more complete. In my view, this reliance is misplaced, for expert 
testimony given in other cases cannot substitute for an evidentiary 
foundation properly presented before the magistrate." 
At p. 872. 
Judge Lansing then went on to criticize the State vs. Garrett, supra, decision. She stated: 
"Since then, the Idaho Supreme Court has made it crystal clear that the Frye 
test is not to be utilized as the standard for admission of scientific or 
technical evidence. See State vs. Faught, 127 Idaho 873, 876,908 P .2d 556 
(1995). Rather, the proper standard is stated in I.R.E. 702." 
At p. 872. 
Judge Lansing concluded her dissenting opinion by stating: 
"Thus, the admissibility ofthe Intoxilyzer 5000 test at issue here turns upon 
the sufficiency ofthe foundational testimony presented to the magistrate in 
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this case, not information contained in decisions from other courts." 
(emphasis original) 
Atp.872. 
The Court's attention can also be drawn to a recent Eighth Circuit case, U. S. vs. 
Iron Cloud, 171 F.3d 587, (8 th Cir.1999). In this case, Iron Cloud requested a Daubert 
hearing on the reliability of the portable breath testing device. Said evidence being an 
Alco Sensor III. The trial judge in Mr. Iron Cloud's case took the accuracy ofthe portable 
breath test device for granted and he ignored the established procedure. It is interesting 
that several states do not allow an Alco Sensor III to be used at trial, holding that the 
preliminary breath tester may only be admissible to establish probable cause. See Boyd 
vs. City of Montgomery, 472 So.2d 694, 697 (Ala.App.1985). Patrick vs. State, 750 
S.W.2d 391, 394 (Ark. 1988), State vs. Strizich, 952 P.2d 1365, 1371 (Mont. 1997), 
Thompson vs. State Department of Lie ensing, 960 P.2d475, 477 (Wash. App. 1998). The 
govermnent argued in Iron Cloud that the District Court was correct in admitting the 
results of the portable breath testing device without a Daubert hearing because the 
technology had been in use for an extended period of time. The Court noted, however, 
"the mere fact that a test has been used for a long time does not make it reliable." At. P. 
591. The Eighth Circuit goes on to state: 
"The experts disagree orr the reliability of the intoxilyzer test. The defense 
counsel challenged the accuracy of both the PBT and the intoxilyzer test. 
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The intoxilyzer test is measured from the use of the breath, not the blood, 
so a ratio must be applied to get the results in the form of the blood alcohol 
level. The defense contended that this ratio can lead to inaccuracies. The 
government's expert conceded on cross-examination that the blood test was 
the most reliable of the three tests and that the intoxilyzer tests brought 
many variables into play." 
At p. 592. 
Moreover, the Court must note that nothing in Daubert, Kumbo, Parkinson, and 
Rule 702 require the Court to admit opinion testimony that is connected to existing data 
only by the ipse dixit of an expert. Kumbo, at 1179. 
In the case at bar, the government can not satisfY the reliability, accuracy, or 
relevancy predicates for the admission of "expert" officer opinion testimony for the 






There is not a substantial basis as to what an average intoxicated person's 
performance would be where a pretest practice session was not allowed; 
There is not a substantial factual basis as to what an average non-intoxicated 
and uncoordinated persons' performance would be where a pretest practice 
session was not allowed; 
There is not a substantial basis for believing the tests can distinguish 
between an intoxicated person's perfonnance and the nonnal metal andJor 
physical faculties, of a normally coordinated and) or normally uncoordinated 
non-intoxicated persons performance of the tests; 
There is not a substantial factual basis for believing the witness possesses 
any specialized medical/scientific training to proffer an expert opinion; 
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There is not a substantial basis for knowing what the defendant's nonnal 
mental andior physical faculties were supposed to be at the time of police 
testing in order to properly and relevantly compare his nonnal unpracticed 
performance and the perfonnance observed; 
There is not a substantial basis to believe that these tests were medically 
tested to be medically reliable and accurate; 
There is not a substantial basis to believe that these tests have been 
subj ected to meaningful peer review; 
There is not a substantial basis for believing that these tests have been 
universally accepted within the medical andior scientific community as 
being accurate and reliable indicators of a person being intoxicated to the 
exclusion of other non-intoxicated reasons for not having the same normal 
mental andior physical faculties of a perfectly average person; 
There is not a substantial basis for believing that either the methodology or 
techniques utilized by the witness can be correlated to explicitly 
distinguished between the test performance of an intoxicated person and a 
perfectly average non-intoxicated person, and then to implicitly correlate 
those performances and the performances of the defendant in this case. 
In State vs. Homan, 732 N.E.2d 952, 89 Ohio St. 3d 421 (Ohio 2000), the Ohio 
Supreme Court stated in discussing the field sobriety test: 
"The small margins of error that characterized field sobriety tests make 
strict compliance critical." 
Atp.956. 
The Court continued: 
"The HGN test is not the only field sobriety test that required special care 
in its administration." 
Atp.956. 
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The Court concluded its holding by stating: 
"In contrast we fmd that strict compliance with standardized field sobriety 
testing procedures is neither unrealistic nor humanly impossible in the great 
majority ofvehicle stops in which the policy choose to administer the test." 
Atp.957. 
The Court can also look at State vs. Evtchison, 136 Idaho 210,30 P.3d 988 (Idaho 
App.,2001). The Court of Appeals in cOlmnenting on the use of an expert indicated: 
"The admissibility of expert testimony is governed by Idaho Rule of 
Evidence 702." 
At. p. 990. 
The Trial Court in Mr. Besaw's case is required to conduct a Rule 702 Parkinson, 
Kumbo, hearing to determine whether or not in this particular case field sobriety tests are 
settled science, as required in Rule 702 and Idaho Criminal Rule 12(b). The Court of 
Appeals in the Eytchison case commented on the change of the Federal Rule 702 
regarding expert testimony. See p. 990, footnotes 1 and 2. See also changes to Idaho 
Criminal Rule 16(b )(7). 
The Federal Judicial Center has developed a Reference Manual on Scientific 
Evidence as a result of the several federal cases that have developed regarding Rule 702 
which have been cited above. The manual states in pertinent part: 
"Obj ections to expert evidence relating to admissibility, qualifications of 
a witness, or existence of a privilege should be raised and decided in 
advance of trial whenever possible." 
At. p. 53. 
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The manual cites, in a footnote, Daubert vs. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, supra: 
"Before admitting expert testimony, the trial court must make a 'preliminary 
assessment of whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the 
testimony is scientifically valid'." (emphasis added) 
At p. 53. 
The manual also states: 
"In a criminal case in which the defense challenges the prosecution's expert 
testimony, a trial court may choose to proceed differently than it would in 
a civil case, in light of factors such as the narrower scope of discovery, the 
defense's lack of resources and need for expert assistance, and the 
Government's role in developing the expertise that is now in question. AS 
in civil cases, the Court must take into account the particular facts of the 
case. 'Whatever the District Court does, a clear message that emerges from 
the Court's remarkably detailed factual analysis in Kumbo is that the 
District Court must explain its choices so that the Appellate Court now has 
an adequate basis for review." 
Atp.29. 
The manual also states: 
"Of course, even if a court has no objection to the particular methodology's 
relevance in proving causation, it may disagree with how it was applied in 
the particular case. As the Supreme Court said in Joiner, 'Nothing .... 
requires a District Court to admit opinion evidence which is connected to 
existing data only by the ipse dixit of the expert'." 
At. p. 33. 
A North Dakota Law Review (Vol. 71, No.3, 1995) article strongly criticizes the 
24 North Dakota decision in City of Fargo vs. McLaughlin, 512 N.W.2d 700, (N.D. 1994) 
25 
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1 and the use of such cases as the State vs. Superior Court, supra, regarding field sobriety 

























horizontal gaze nystagmus test, concluded: 
"The scientific foundation of the HGNT is at best weak. Although 
NHTSAs work claims to have found a correlation between BAC and HGNT 
performance, this research has not been replicated by independent 
investigators. The lack of evidence makes the continued use ofHGNT's 
grounding in scientific principles, the admittance of such evidence in the 
courtroom suit should be subject to the standards of admissibility of 
scientific evidence." 
Atp.694. 
The article indicated there has been minimal peer review and publication and that 
the lack of interest in the area and the misunderstanding of findings had lead to a lack of 
agreement within any scientific community which could be considered appropriate. The 
last sentence of the article states: 
"Therefore, the North Dakota Supreme Court erred in not requiring proof 
of scientific validity through expert testimony prior to the admittance of 
HGNT results for the purpose of showing circumstantial evidence of 
intoxication. " (emphasis added) 
Atp.696. 
The science behind the field sobriety tests used in Mr. Besaw's case must be 
analyzed by the Trial Court. 
State vs. Witte, 836 P .2d 110 (Kansas 1992) and State vs. Homan, 732 N.E.2d 952, 
89 Ohio St.3d 421 (Ohio 2000) which was cited above, support Mr. Besaw's argument 
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that cases like State vs. Superior Court and the City of Fargo vs. McLaughlin, do not meet 
the requirements of Rule 702 of the Idaho Rules of Evidence. The State will not refute 
the criticisms raised by State vs. Witte, nor will the State refute the North Dakota Law 
Review article criticizing the North Dakota Supreme Court's decision regarding the 
horizontal gaze nystagmus test. 
In State vs. Garrett, (supra) the Court in a plurality opmlOn, determined the 
scientific reliability of the horizontal gaze nystagmus. Chief Justice Bakes concurred in 
the opinion while Justice McDevitt concurred in the results only. Justice Boyle filed a 
special concurring opinion rejecting the use of the Em standard and Justice Johnson 
dissented. Justice Johnson advocated a standard of independent reliability. Justice 
Johnson's dissent reflects what has been done by the Idaho and Federal Courts in recent 
cases like Parkinson and Eyichison, Daubert and Kumbo. In State vs. Garrett, the Court 
stated: 
"Because the reliability of a test based on a scientifically tested phenomenon 
should not vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, we examine what other 
jurisdictions have done when HG test results are offered as evidence in DDI 
cases. " 
At p. 880. 
In Footnote 3, the Court states: 
"Such' decisions' are persuasive only as they contain analysis and reasoning 
which recommend itself to this Court." 
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The Garrett Court cited State vs. Superior Court: 
"We have been furnished with no publications or other authority which 
refutes the reasoned decision of the Arizona Court." 
At p. 881. 
It is submitted that Mr. Garrett's counsel did not provide an adequate argument 
regarding filed sobriety tests. Mr. Besaw should not be held accountable for the failures 
of Defendant counsel from a 1991 decision. Justice Johnson, in his dissent, lists succinctly 
the problems ofthe holding of the plurality when he stated: 
"Ifthis {the testimony ofthe arresting officer} establishes the reliability for 
admissibility for expert opinion based on new scientific methods, then we 
must be prepared to accept the admissibility ofthe results of the polygraph 
examination based on the testimony of polygraph operators, the 
admissibility of DNA tests based on the testimony oflaboratory technicians 
who conduct the tests, and the results of other fonus of' scientific' testing 
based on the testimony of those who conduct the tests. In my view, this is 
not the type of reliability that we should require before allowing testimony 
of the results of tests conducted based on new scientific methods. The 
foundation should be laid by experts who have researched the tests and are 
available to testify as to the scientific basis for the test." (emphasis added) 
At p. 885. 
The State ofIdaho has never provided said foundation with regard to field sobriety 
tests. There has never been a true Rule 702 hearing as envisioned by Daubert, Kumbo, 
Parkinson, or Konechy. The Garrett and Gleason cases are bad law and should be 
overturned. 
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The Court may also want to look at State vs. DuffY, 778 A.2d 415 (N.H. 2000). In 
that particular case, Mr. Duffy was arrested after perfonning field sobriety tests. The New 
Hampshire Supreme Court indicated: 
"The defendant also argues that the results ofthe HGN test were improperly 
admitted. Because this issue is likely to arise on remand, we will address 
it. (Cite omitted). New Hampshire Rule of Evidence 702 requires that 
opinion evidence based upon scientific principles, must meet a threshold 
level of reliability to be admissible. (Cite omitted). This Court has never 
decided if the HGN test is based on scientific principles within the meaning 
of Rule 702. The trial court did make any preliminary determination in this 
regard. Rather, with respect to the evidence, the court noted, "It is very, 
very, subjective in this Court's opinion ... .It's a question of what weight I 
give it, I guess." On remand, if the State intends to offer evidence of the 
HGN test, it should note that this court recently ordered, in a factually and 
procedurally similar case, that the Concord District Court hold a hearing 
regarding the reliability of the HGN test and whether Rule 702 requires 
preliminary fmdings prior to its admission." 
At pp. 418-419. 
In State of New Hampshirevs. Michael Dahood, New Hampshire Case No. 99-510, 
the Supreme Court remanded the issue of the HGN test to the District Court. It's Order 
stated: 
"In denying the defendant's motion to exclude the HGN testimony, the 
district court relied upon the reasoning of the supreme judicial court of 
Main in State vs. Taylor 694 A.2d 907 (Maine 1997), which took judicial 
notice of the reliability ofthe HGN test. The district court also relied upon 
the factual findings of a 1987 superior court order. The trial court did no, 
however, hold a preliminary hearing to establish the reliability of the HGN 
test." 
See Order issued by State of New Hampshire Supreme Court, June 5, 2001. 
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The Idaho Supreme Court in Garrett accepted standards that, even in the best 
circumstances, (in the laboratory), have a 23% failure rate (HGN), a 32% failure rate 
(walk and tum) and a 35% failure rate (one leg stand). There is a well written article by 
Phillip B. Price and Sturgeon Cole in the April 21, 2001 magazine, The Champion 
published by the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers. See Idaho Rules of 
Evidence, Rule 104. The authors criticize the National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration field sobriety test validation. The author states: 
"There has been no attempt to establish norms for the SFST. Vie have no 
idea how well a sober person can perfonn on the SFST. How does age or 
gender affect performance? How does fatigue or practice affect 
performance? If an individual perfonns poorly at a .11 % BAC, how does 
that compare with his or her performance with aBAC of .OO%? Before any 
individual's perfonnance can be considered at 'test', that particular 
individual's baseline with no alcohol must be known and factored in. 
Without answers to these basic questions, the SFST remains in the same 
category as tarot cards." (emphasis added) 
Atp.42. 
The authors then go on to discuss the number of false arrests: 
"Of the sober individuals that were involved in the Colorado, Florida and 
San Diego studies, the officers falsely arrested 24%, 18% and 29%, 
respectively. That is an average of23 .6% false arrest rate. What this means 
is that if the SFST are used as a decision of whether to arrest an individual 
for an alcohol related offense, one out of every four sober people will be 
falsely arrested. " (emphasis added) 
Atp.42. 
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In the State vs. Gleason, case, no real "expert" was called. As Justice Johnson 
indicated in Garrett, the "expert" in question was the individual who conducted the test. 
In Gleason, Justice Bistline in his concurrence in result states: "The majority's bare 
statement that LR.E. 702 is the appropriate test provides no guidance to the bench and bar 
as to how to determine scientific reliability." Justice Bistline then questions the use of 
Rule 702 by stating: 
"Questions that come to mind include: What level of scientific reliability, 
if any, is required before evidence will assist the trier of fact? What 
constitutes scientific reliability? How reliable does scientific evidence have 
to be before it is admissible? On whose scale do we measure the amount of 
reliability? What unit of measurement is being used?" 
Atp.67. 
There is in Gleason no Rule 702 analysis. The Rule 702 analysis, missing from 
Gleason and Garrett, is found in cases like Daubert, Kumbo, and Parkinson. In Gehring, 
supra, the Court allowed Officer Carrington to testify about his assessment of a person's 
sobriety, based on field sobriety tests, being95% accurate. Officer Carrington's testimony 
is in stark contrast to the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration's testing noted 
above and other current studies. (See Hom, supra.) 
The State may argue that:Mr. Besaw is trying to overturn prior precedent. The use 
ofIdaho Rule of Evidence 702 is supported by Gleason. However, the use ofa Rule 702 
analysis is lacking, but can be expanded as required by federal case law and the Idaho 
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cases that have accepted the federal court reasoning. A Trial Court must do more under 
its gatekeeping function before any field sobriety test should be allowed before a jury. 
What scientific publications the Garrett Court refers to is unknown and not set out. 
In fact, the State will not be able to support its position by pointing to any scientific 
evidence that supports the use of the field sobriety tests let alone the horizontal gaze 
nystagmus. 
In State vs. Torres, 976 P.2d 20 (New Mexico 1999), the Court had at issue the 
admissibility of the horizontal gaze nystagmus test. The Court applied a Daubert analysis 
and determined that: 
"The better view, however, is that the Albericio-Daubert standard is not 
limited to novel scientific theories." (Cites omitted) 
At p. 30. 
The Court detennined that the Trial Court, pursuant to the Rules of Evidence, must 
ensure that any and all scientific testimony or evidence admitted pursuant to Rule 702 was 
not only relevant but reliable. At p. 32. The Court stated: 
"Our review ofthe record indicates that the trial court did not consider any 
of the required factors for assessing the evidentiary reliability of HGN 
testing in this case, nor was there an appropriate focus on principles and 
methodology. " 
Atp. Id. 
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The New Mexico Court commented on State vs. Superior Court, the case that the 
Idaho Supreme Court used in State vs. Garrett. The New Mexico Court noted that part of 
the reason the Arizona Courts may regard additional expert testimony as unnecessary is 
that in Arizona the Courts only admit the HGN evidence for limited purposes such as 
establishing probable cause and corroborating the result of more reliable sobriety tests 
such as chemical analysis of breath, blood or urine. (See Superior Court, 718 P .2d 181-
182) At pp 31-32. Will the Trial Court allow the use of the horizontal gaze nystagmus test 
for more than probable cause purposes? In the Torres case, no chemical analysis of Mr. 
Torres' BAC was provided. The Torres Court also concluded that the officer's training 
and experience was not sufficiently probative ofthe test's evidentiary reliability. 
The Court stated: 
Id. 
"Nevertheless, we find persuasive the reasoning of other courts which have 
held that if police officers are not qualified to testify about the scientific 
basis underlying the HGN test, they are not competent to establish that the 
test satisfies the relevant admissibility standard. (Cites omitted) 
The Torres Court also determined that it was improper to look for scientific 
acceptance only from reported case law. At p. 32. Shouldn't Idaho and this Trial Court 
do the same? In the Torres case, the arresting officer testified that the National Highway 
Traffic Safety Administration accepted the HGN testing, that the test was nationally 
certified, and that the test was given routinely. Even with that evidence, the Court found 
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that his testimony was not sufficient to establish the evidentiary reliability required by 
Daubert. The COUli stated: 
"Officer Bowdich was not qualified to testify about the scientific basis of 
HON testing and although his testimony let support for a conclusion that the 
test was widely used - thus giving rise to an inference of general acceptance 
- his testimony did not explain how the test proved intoxication. He, 
therefore, did not assist the trier of fact in understanding the scientific 
validity of the test" 
Atp.33. 
The Court also determined: 
"We therefore detennine that judicial notice of the evidentiary reliability of 
HON testing would be inappropriate at this time." 
At p. 33. 
The record reflects that the arresting officer did not follow the requirements of the 
NHTSA manual. See State vs. Homan, 732 N.E.2d 952 (Ohio 2000). 
The Torres Court also addressed the issue of harmless error and found that the 
admissions of the horizontal gaze nystagmus was not harmless error. It stated: 
"Error in the admission of evidence in a criminal trial must be declared 
prejudicial and not harmless if there is a reasonable possibility that the 
evidence complained of might have contributed to the conviction." 
(emphasis added) 
"We conclude that the error in this case was not harmless, because there is 
a reasonable possibility that the admission of Officer Bowdich's HON 
testimony might have contributed to Torres' conviction." (emphasis added) 
Atp.36. 
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be a factor in establishing probable cause. At p. 499. The Wilson Court also found that 
the admission of horizontal gaze nystagmus was not harmless error. The Court stated: 
"Because we cannot say the error did not contribute to the jury's conviction 
as to the DUI charge, we must vacate the DUI conviction." 
Atp.502. 
The Court in State vs. Helms, 504 S.E.2d 293 (N.C. 1998) found that a police 
officer could not provide adequate foundation for the correlation between intoxication and 
nystagmus, and therefore his testimony was not adequate foundation for the admission of 
HGN test results. The North Carolina Court concluded that: 
"Until there is sufficient scientifically reliable evidence as to the correlation 
between intoxication and nystagmus, it is improper to permit a lay person 
to testify as to the meaning ofBGN test results." 
Atp.295. 
The North Carolina Court found that the arresting officer's testimony was that of 
a lay person. The North Caroline Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals with 
regard to the BGN test results being harmless error. The Court stated: 
"\Ve conclude that, in light of the heightened credence juries tend to give 
scientific evidence, there is a reasonable probability that had evidence of the 
BGN test results not been erroneously admitted, a different outcome would 
have been reached at trial." 
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Atp.296. See also Statevs. Garrett, atpp. 881. 
In the Montana case, Hulse vs. State Department of Justice, Motor Vehicle 
Division, 961 P.2d 75 (Montana 1998), the Court followed the rationale from the above 
cited case: 
"No testimony was presented either through Officer Kennedy or another 
expert witness describing the underlying scientific basis of the HGN test 
other than Officer Kennedy's explanation that everyone's eye will exhibit 
nystagmus at 'maximum deviation', but that '[w]ith the introduction of 
alcohol into the system, the nystagmus becomes more prevalant and it 
doesn't cease .... ' This testimony shows that Officer Kennedy was trained 
to administer the HGN test and, in fact, administered the HGN test in 
accordance with his training and, therefore, he was qualified to testify as to 
both his administration of the HGN test and his evaluation of Hulse's 
performance. However, nothing in the evidence establishes that Officer 
Kennedy had special training or education nor adequate knowledge 
qualifying him as an expert to explain the correlation between alcohol 
consumption and nystagmus, the underlying scientific basis of the HGN test. 
Accordingly, we conclude that there was insufficient foundation for the 
admission of evidence concerning the HGN test and the district Court 
abused its discretion when it summarily denied Hulse's motion in limine 
and allowed Officer Kennedy to testify as to Hulse's HGN test results." 
Atp.95. 
In State vs. Ito, 978 P.2d 191 (Hawaii App. 1999) the Court determined that the 
horizontal gaze nystagmus test had a 23 % error rate in detecting individuals with a BAC 
of.l % or greater and a 35% error rate in detecting persons with a .08% BAC or greater. 
At p. 203. The Hawaiian Court cited State vs. O'Key, 899 P.2d 687 (Oregon 1995). The 
Oregon Court noted that part of the training the officers had to undergo required them to 
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ask, before administering the HGN test, whether the person had a head injury, was ill or 
was taking medication. The officer in Hawaii had a whole series of questions that were 
required to be asked before the HGN test could be required. See page 204. No such 
questions were asked of Mr. Besaw. The Hawaiian Court noted as to whether the HGN 
test is susceptible to abuse, one of the criticisms leveled at the test is that, 
"It is wholly subjective - the police officer has no physical sample to take 
to the laboratory. Thus, the suspect is not able to have his or her expert 
examine the evidence .... [and] cannot contradict the officer's testimony[.] 
(Cite omitted), in our view, however, this concern is minimized as long as 
the HGN test results are limited solely to probable cause detenninations." 
(emphasis added) 
At p. 204. 
In Mr. Besaw's case, the State does not want the field sobriety tests limited to a 
probable cause detennination, but used as evidence to prove intoxication beyond a 
reasonable doubt. The Hawaiian Court noted that in Mississippi, the HON test was not 
admissible at trial but that the Supreme Court of Mississippi held that the HON test results 
were reliable for purposes of determining probable cause. At p. 706. The Hawaiian Court 
in vacating the Trial Court's detennination of probable cause on the HGN test noted that 
officers are required to check themselves "monthly with an [8x15 square template or 
cardboard with a diagonal line drawn from one comer to another to demark 45 degrees] 
to be sure that your accuracy has been sustained." Footnote 10 at p. 210. The Court also 
noted the warnings set out in the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration manual: 
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"ONLY WHEN THE TESTS ARE ADMIN1STERED IN THE 
PRESCRlBED STAJ\TDARDIZED M.A]\JNER; AND ONLY WHEN THE 
STANDARDIZED CLUES ARE USED TO ASSESS THE SUSPECT'S 
PERF OR-MANCE; AND, ONLY W1IEN THE STANDARDIZED 
CRITERlAARE EMPLOYED TO INTERPRET THAT PERFORMANCE. 
IF ANY ONE OF THE STANDARDIZED FIELD SOBRIETY TEST 
ELEMENTS IS CHANGED, THE VALIDITY IS C01'vfPROMISED." 
At p. 210. 
The opinion from State vs. Doriguzzi, 760 A.2d 366 (N.J. Super A.D. 2000) found 
that it is unusual for an Appellate Court to exclusively on judicial notice and that, 
"In the present case, a survey of the relevant decisions around the country 
does not provide us with the level of certainty necessary to approve HGN 
testing for future case. We also note that our ability to comprehend the 
technical writings in this field or the interpretations of them by other 
scientists is hampered by the very problem that cause our inquiry - i.e., we 
are not scientists with technical backgrounds. \Vhile it may very well be 
that the HGN testing can meet the Frve test, we believe that he case which 
decides the issue for all other cases in New Jersey should be grounded in 
sufficient expert testimony to assure defendants that the state alike that a 
conviction for driving under the influence, when based in part on HGN 
testing, is a conviction grounded in reliable scientific data. The 
consequences of a drunk driving conviction are severe and may include 
incarcerati on." 
Atp.342. 
The New Jersey Court then goes on to cite quite extensively from the Kansas 
Supreme Court in State vs. \Vitte in its criticism of the State vs. Superior Court decision 
used by Idaho to support its horizontal gaz nystagmus decision. The New Jersey Court 
then noted an Illinois decision. The New Jersey Court stated: 
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"The Kirk court stated: 
Reliance upon other court's oprnlOns can be problematic: Unless the 
question of general acceptance has been thoroughly and thoughtfully 
litigated in the previous cases .... reliance on judicial practice is a hollow 
ritual.' McCormick Section 203, at 870, n. 20." 
At p. 346. 
The Court then states: 
"Judicial notice could become a yellow brick road for judicial acceptance 
of bogus or at least unvalidated scientific theories or techniques." 
At p. 346. 
The New Jersey Court then commented on the Arizona decision by stating: 
"The expert retained by the prosecution in Blake, Dr. Burns, was the 
individual who conducted the study that lead to the National Highway 
Traffic Safety Achninistration's adoption of the HGN test. Police 
departments, in turn, have adopted the NHTSA's recommendations. In 
Blake, Dr. Burns supported the NHTSA's manual and the fact that the test 
is used by different police departments. By doing so, however, she in 
essence referred back to her own conclusions, magnifying the opportunity 
of error. We do not say that Dr. Burns' conclusions on the subject are 
flawed, only that the issue has not been fully and thoroughly litigated." 
At pp. 346-347. 
The Court in the New Jersey case was also asked to find that the HGN test results 
admitted to evidence would likely be harmless error. However, in the New Jersey case, 
there was no breathalyzer result and the HGN test result was an integral part of the 
decision in finding the defendant guilty. The Court then states: 
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"'!' e know it a recurrent theme in the decision from other jurisdictions that 
a jury may be inappropriate influenced by the apparent scientific precision 
of the HGN testing or otherwise fail to properly understand it." 
Atp.347. 
The Court determined that it was not harmless error to allow the HGN test as 
evidence and reverse the defendant's conviction. See State vs. Barcella, 135 Idaho 191, 
199 (Ct.App. 2000). 
u. S. vs. Horn, 185 F Supp 2d 530 (D.Md. 2002) is also a case of extreme 
inappropriateness and should be reviewed by the court regarding the experts call by both 
sides, the state and the driver. The Court is asked to read this case as it has a complete 
history of case reviews of the field sobriety tests throughout the Country. 
V. 
THERE IS NO 15 MINUTE WAIT 
There are a number ofIdaho cases that are on point and are discussed below. There 
has to be a 15 minute observation period prior to breath testing. See State v. Stump, 146 
Idaho 857 (Ct. App. 2009). The Stump case is interesting because it points to the specific 
standard of observation required. See also Wheeler v. Idaho Transportation Department, 
(supra). 
In Stump, the driver was transported to the Teton County Sheriff s office to test his 
breath alcohol using an Intoxilyzer 5000. The arresting officer was in the same room with 
Mr. Stump. The Court noted that there was no evidence in the record of any circumstances 
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State of Idaho vs. George Joseph Besaw Jr 
Hearing type: Appellate Argument 
Hearing date: 3/8/2012 
Time: 10:11 am 
Judge: JeffM. Brudie 
Courtroom: 1 
Court reporter: Linda Carlton 
Minutes Clerk: PAM 
Tape Number: Crtrm#1 
Defense Attorney: Charles Stroschein 
Prosecutor: Justin Coleman 
Counsel are present in the courtroom. 
Court reviews case. Case was appealed from Magistrate Court. Court has 
transcript and briefs of parties. Court doesn't usually limit argument time but Court has to 
be in Coeur d' Alene this afternoon for mediation. 
10:12:18 Mr. Stroschein presents Appellate argument. He presents argument re: Rule 
of Lenity. He presents argument re: solution used. A .2 solution should be used and it 
wasn't. A .08 solution was used. He addresses CV11-00364 (ALS case with Judge Kerrick). 
This case involved the same trooper as the Beyer case. He presents argument re: Rule of 
Linearity. He presents argument re: 15 minute wait. He is not going to play video because 
of time constraint of Court. He presents argument re: 702 challenge. The State hasn't met 
their burden. Judge Gaskill should not have allowed field sobriety test in this case. He asks 
Court to remand this case back to Magistrate Court for conviction to be undone. He 
presents argument re: e-mails. He argues that 18-8004(4) has not been met. He asks Court 






Mr. Coleman presents State's argument. 
Court questions Mr. Coleman re: verification checks. 
Mr. Coleman responds. 
Court further questions Mr. Coleman. 
Mr. Coleman responds and presents argument. He presents argument re: 
notice for license suspension. 
Court Minutes 1 March 8, 2012 
10:32:15 
10:32:26 
Court que~ Mr. Coleman. 
Mr. Coleman continues with argument. He presents argument re: Standard 




Mr. Stroschein presents rebuttal argument. He presents argument re: Rule of 
Court responds. Appeal is under advisement at this time. Court will issue a 
written rUling. 
10:38:48 Court in recess. 
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by and through his undersigned Attorney of Record, CHARLES M. STROSCHEIN, of the 
finn of Clark & Feeney, and submits the attached authority for the Court's consideration 
regarding the issue of the 15 minute observation period. The attached decision was authored 
by Judge Stegner and dated March 2, 2012. 
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______________ ~R~e~sp~o_n~d~e~n~t. _______ ) 
Case No. CV-2011-0795 
MEMORANDUl\1 DECISION 
C. Jack Platz ("Platz") has petitioned this Court for judicial review of the 
administrative suspension of his driver's license by the Idaho Transportation 
Department ("the Department"). 
I. BACKGROU~'D 
On June 26, 2011, while traveling south on State Highway 3, near milepost 
12, Platz was stopped by Idaho State Police Trooper Chad Montgomery ("the 
officer"), for traveling above the posted speed limit. AR at 4. After being stopped, 
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Platz admitted to the officer that he had consumed alcohol prior to driving. ld. at 
5. The officer then asked Platz to exit his vehicle to perform Field Sobriety Tests. 
Id; Pet. '$ Exhibit H ("video') at 19:47:25. Upon Platz exiting his pickup, the officer 
had him open his mouth and checked for any substances. ld. at 19:47:38. Next, 
the officer looked down at his watch and indicated that a fifteen-minute waiting 
period was beginning. ld. at 19:47:45. Platz then submitted to the Horizontal 
Gaze Nystagmus evaluation. ld. at 19:48:25 19:49:44. The officer then looked 
down to demonstrate the Walk and Turn evaluation to Platz. ld. at 19:51:02-
19:51: 19. Platz performed the Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus, Walk and Turn, and 
the One-leg Stand evaluations on the side ofthe highway and failed two ofthose 
evaluations. ld. at 19:48:25 19:53:17; AR at 5. 
The officer then informed Platz that he would have to submit to a breath 
alcohol test. Vu:leo at 19:54:30. At that time, a second unidentified officer arrived 
on the scene and engaged in a brief unrelated conversation with Platz. ld. at 
19:55:21. The officer then read and explained the Idaho Code Advisory Form to 
Platz while they were both standing alongside the highway in front of the officer's 
patrol car. AR at 5; video at 19:55:44 19:58:35. Platz then blew into the Lifeloc 
FC20 breath·testing instrument three times. Video at 20:02:45 - 20:07:30. Before, 
and in between blows, the second officer and Platz continued their conversation. 
ld. at 20:00:52 - 20:01:35. The Lifeloe machine measured Platz's breath alcohol 
content at .201 on his first blow, indicated an insufficient sample on the second 
blow, and measured Platz's breath alcohol content at .191 on the last blow. ld. 
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The officer then arrested Platz for Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol. Video 
at 20:08:18. 
Platz later reQ1:18sted an agency hearing to challenge the administrative 
suspension of his driver's license. AR at 10. At a telephonic hearing held July 18, 
2011, Platz's counsel argued that the officer did not wait fifteen minutes before 
having Platz submit to the breath-alcohol tests. Transcript tTr.'? at 4, lines 1-18. 
Platz's counsel later submitted supplemental argument to the Department 
alleging that because of the circumstances surrounding the fifteen-minute 
monitoring period, the officer was not always in a physical position to visually 
monitor Platz or to use his sense of smell or hearing to ensure that nothing had 
occurred to affect the validity of the test results. AR at 26·27. 
The Hearing Officer issued Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and 
Order on August 4,2011, sustaining the suspension of Platz's driver's license. AR 
at 45-53. The Hearing Officer made the following findings: 
1. The affidavit submitted by Officer Montgomery states the evidentiary 
test was performed in compliance 'with Idaho Law arid ISP Standard 
Operating Procedures. 
2. Idaho State Police Standard Operating Procedure, Rule 6.1, provides 
that . [p]rior to evidential breath alcohol testing, the 
subjectfindividual should be monitored for at least fifteen (15) minutes. 
This waiting period allows sufficient time for any mouth alcohol to 
dissipate. 
3. Counsel for Platz argues that all of the Standard Operating Procedures 
"must" be observed for the test results to be admissible. However, 
Standard Operating Procedure, Rule 6.1, sets forth recommended 
language (,should") rather than mandatory language, and therefore, 
strict compliance with the recommended language shall not bear the 
sufficient weight to suppress the evidentiary test results. 
4. 
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5. An acceptable breath alcohol test normally includes two breath samples 
separated by a difference of.02 or less, and if this conditions exists, the 
consistent and similar BRAC results of .201 and .191 confirms that no 
residual mouth alcohol was present nor was there any other foreign 
substances present which may have skewed the breath test results or 
influenced the reliability of the test. 
6. . ... Based on the record and a review of the video/audio recording of 
the investigation, it has not been definitively shown that Officer 
Montgomery did not foHow the requisite procedures regarding the 15-
minute observation period. Brief conversations by Platz with a backup 
officer did not significantly impede the ability of Officer Montgomery to 
monitor Platz at the scene. 
7. The Petitioner, Platz, did not affirmatively show by a preponderance of 
the evidence that the test was not performed in compliance with Idaho 
law and ISP Standard operating Procedures. 
8. The evidentiary test was performed in compliance with Idaho Law and 
ISP Standard Operating Procedures. 
AR at 48-49. Following that adverse decision, Platz timely filed a Petition for 
Judicial Review with this Comt. AR at 54. 
II. STANDi\RD OF REVIEW 
Pursuant to I.C. § 18-S002A, the Department must suspend the driver's 
license of any driver who has failed an evidentiary test for breath alcohol 
concentration administered by a law enforcement officer. After being notified of 
the administrative license suspension, the driver may request a hearing before a 
Hearing Officer designated by the Department. Wilkinson v. State Dep't of 
Transp., 151 Idaho 784, 264 P.3d 680, 682 (Ct. App. 2011) citing LC. § 18-
8002A(7). The driver has the burden to prove that one of the grounds for vacating 
the license suspension under L C. § 18-8002A(7) exists by a preponderance of the 
evidence. ld; I.C. § 18-8002A(7). Those grounds include, that "[t]he tests for 
alcohol concentration, drugs or other intoxicating substances administered at the 
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direction of the peace officer were not conducted in accordance ""ith the 
requirements of section 18-8004(4), Idaho Code, or the testing equipment was not 
functioning properly when the test was administered." I.C. § 18-8002A(7)(d). 
Pursuant to LC. § 18-8004(4), the Idaho State Police ("ISP") were given the 
responsibility of setting standards for alcohol testing. To carry out tbat 
responsibility, the ISP have issued procedures for the maintenance and operation 
of breath testing equipment. Wilkinson, 264 P.3d 680 at 683 citing IDAHO ADMIN. 
CODE 11.03.01.014. Noncompliance with ISP procedures is one of the grounds for 
vacating an administrative license suspension pursuant to I.C. § 18-8002A 7(d). Id. 
citing Mahurin v. State Dep't of Transp., 140 Idaho 656, 658-59, 99 P.3d 125, 127· 
28 (Ct. App. 2004). 
A court reviewing an agency decision, "shall not substitute its judgment for 
that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on questions of fact." I.C. § 67-
5279(1). A court should defer to an agency's findings of fact "unless they are 
clearly erroneous." Wilkinson, 264 P.3d at 682. An agency's factual 
determinations are not clearly erroneous so long as the determinations are 
supported by substantial evidence in the record. Marshall v. State Dep't of 
Transp., 137 Idaho 337, 340, 48 P.3d 666, 669 (Ct. App. 2002) (citations omitted); 
I.C § 67-5279(3)(d). The court's review of disputed issues offact "must be confined 
to the agency record." I.C. § 67-5277. 
A court must affirm the agency action under review unless it finds that the 
agency's findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions: (a) violate statutory or 
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constitutional provisions; (b) exceed the agency's statutory authority; (c) are made 
upon unlawful procedure; Cd) are not supported by substantial evidence in the 
record as a whole; or (e) are arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. LC. § 
67-5279(3). Marshall, 137 Idaho at 340, 48 P.3d at 669; Price v. Payette County 
Bd. of County Comm'rs., 131 Idaho 426, 429, 958 P.2d 583, 586 (1998). The party 
challenging the Hearing Officer's decision has the burden to prove "that the 
agency erred in a manner specified by I.C. § 67-5279(3) and that a substantial 
right of that party has been prejudiced." Bell v. Idaho Transp. Dep't, 151 Idaho 
659, 262 P.3d 1030, 1035 (Ct. App. 2011) (citations omitted). If the agency's 
decision is not affirmed, "it shall be set aside, in whole or in part, and remanded 
for further proceedings, as necessary." I.e. § 67-5279(3). 
III. ANALYSIS 
A. The Hearing Officer's conclusion that the officer sufficiently 
monitored Platz during the fifteen-minute waiting period was 
not supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole. 
The ISP Standard Operating Procedures ("SOPs") for breath-alcohol testing 
state, "prior to evidentiary, breath testing, the subjectlindividual should be 
monitored for at least flfteen (15) minutes." SOP § 6.1 (effective 11/01/2010). 
During the fi:ft.een-minute pre-test waiting period, the test subject "should not be 
allowed to smoke, drink, eat, or belchlburp/vomit/regurgitate." Id. The officer 
conducting the fifteen-minute pre.test waiting period "must be alert for any event 
that might influence the accuracy ofthe breath alcohol test." SOP § 6.1.4. And, if 
"the subject/individual vomits or regurgitates material from the stomach into the 
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subject/individual's breath pathway, the 15-minute waiting period must begin 
again." SOP § 6.1.4.2. If the testing officer has any doubt "as to the events 
occurring during the 15 minute monitoring period, the officer should look at the 
results of the duplicate breath samples for evidence of potential alcohol 
contamination." SOP § 6.104.3. Duplicate breath samples that correlate within .02 
indicate the absence of alcohol contamination in the test-subject's breath pathway. 
SOP § 6.2.2.2. 
The purpose behind the monitoring period is to make sure the operator 
observes the subject for any event that might make the results of the test 
inaccurate through the introduction of mouth alcohoL State v. Carson, 133 Idaho 
451,453,988 P.2d 225,227 (Ct. App. 1999). The monitoring period is "not an 
onerous burden" unfairly foisted upon law enforcement officials. State v. 
DeFranco, 143 Idaho 335, 338, 144 P.3d 40,43 (Ct. App. 2006). The operator is not 
required to "stare flXedly" at the subject for fifteen minutes. Bennett v. State, 
Dep't. of Transp., 147 Idaho 141,144,206 P.3d 505,508 (et. App. 2009) (citation 
omitted). However, the monitoring must "be such as could reasonably be expected 
to accomplish the purpose of the requirement." Carson, 133 Idaho at 453,988 P.2d 
at 227. This requirement is ordinarily met if the operator "stays in close physical 
proximity to the test subject so that the officer's senses of sight, smell and hearing 
can be employed." DeFranco, 143 Idaho at 338, 144 P.3d at 43. Use of sight alone 
is not enough. Bennett, 147 Idaho at 144, 206 P.3d at 508. Furthermore, when an 
officer's sense of sight is impaired, he must be able to use his senses of hearing and 
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smell to properly observe the subject. DeFranco, 143 Idaho at 338, 144 P.3d at 43 . 
.. 'in officer's form affidavit is insufficient to support a finding that proper 
procedures were followed "when specific credible evidence demonstrates a violation 
of proper procedures." Bennet, 147 Idabo at 145,206 P.Sd at 509. 
The officer did not sufficiently monitor Platz during the fifteen-minute 
waiting period because he was not "alert for any event that might influence the 
accuracy of the breath alcohol test," as required by SOP § 6.1.4. The officer left the 
observation area when he walked to retrieve the breatbalyzer from his car. 
During that time, neither he nor Platz was visible on the video. Video at 19:54:48 
- 19:55:20. It is impossible to tell whetber the officer was in a position to visually 
monitor Platz. In addition, the officer did several things during the observation 
period, such as demonstrating the Walk and Turn evaluation, retrieving the 
machine from his car,preparing the machine, and talking to the other officer, that 
diverted his attention from the requirement that he monitor Platz. Video at 
19:47:45 - 20:02:45. Furthermore, there were several factors during the 
monitoring period that impeded the officer's ability to augment his sense of sight 
with other senses, including: the noise from the numerous cars that passed by, the 
noise from the airplanes flying overhead, the noise from the conversations between 
the second officer and Platz, and the outdoor odors. Id . 
. Lastly, the monitoring period in this case was fraught with the following 
problems from the standpoint of monitoring the suspect: First, the officer and 
Platz were not in a room designed for breath alcohol testing that was equipped 
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with cameras. Instead, the observation took place along a busy highway with only 
one camera available to record the observation. At one point, both Platz and the 
officer are not within the camera's view. Video at 19:54:48 - 19:55:20. Second, 
there were numerous noises throughout the outdoor observation period in this case 
which could have concealed any burps or belches. In fact, at one point during the 
observation, the officer noticeably raises his voice to overcome the noise. Video at 
19:50:51. Finally, the second officer did not assist in the monitoring. The second 
officer was never in very close proximity to Platz, did not pat him down, or ask him 
if he had burped or belched. Rather, he merely engaged Platz in an unrelated 
conversation. Video at 19:55:21- 19:55:36; 20:00:52- 20:01:35. The noise from 
those conversations could have actually further impaired the officer's ability to 
hear and distracted him from his visual observations. 
In conclusion, the officer was not always in a position to employ his sense of 
sight or alternatively, his sense of hearing and smell to be alert for any factors 
that could influence the validity of the test results. By trying to do several things 
at once, the officer did not sufficiently monitor Platz to ensure that the presence of 
mouth alcohol did not affect the validity of the test results: The officer's form 
affidavit is simply not enough to overcome the objective; credible video evidence 
that showed the proper procedures were not followed in monitoring Platz. The 
Hearing Officer's conclusion that the officer sufficiently monitored Platz during 
the fifteen-minute waiting period was therefore, not supported by substantial 
evidence in the record as a whole. 
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B. The Hearing Officer held Platz to an inappropriate burden of 
proof in reaching his decision. 
At the agency level, the driver has the burden to prove by a preponderance 
of the evidence that a basis exists for vacating his license suspension under I.C. § 
lS-8002A(7). Wilkinson v. State Dep't of Transp., 151 Idaho 784, 264 P.3d 680, 682 
(Ct. App. 2011); I.C. § 18-8002A(7). One such ground is to show that the tests for 
alcohol concentration were not conducted in accordance Vi-'ith the requirements set 
forth in LC. § 18-8004 and the ISP SOPs governing breath-alcohol testing. Id. at 
6S3 relying on Le. 1S-S002A(7)(d)_ As explained above, the ISP SOPs advise that 
"prior to evidentiary, breath testing, the subject/individual should be monitored for 
at least fIfteen (15) minutes." SOP § 6.1 (effective 11/01/2010). During that period, 
the testing officer "must be alert for any event that might influence the accuracy of 
the breath alcohol test." SOP § 6.1.4. 
In this case, Platz challenged the sufficiency ofthe fifteen-minute waiting 
period at the agency level by arguing that it was not fifteen minutes in duration 
and that during the waiting period, the officer was not always in a position to 
monitor Platz to ensure that nothing had occurred to affect the validity of the test. 
Tr. at 4, lines 1-18; AR at 26-28. Platz had the burden to prove that the 
monitoring period was not conducted in compliance with Idaho Law or ISP SOPs 
by a preponderance of the evidence. See I.e. §18-"8002A(7). However, in reaching 
the conclusion that the officer conducted the monitoring period in compliance with 
those standards, the Hearing Officer found the following: 
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[b]ased on the record and a review of the video/audio recordffig of the 
investigation, it has not been definitively shown that Officer Montgomery 
did not follow the requisite procedures regarding the I5-minute observation 
period. 
AR at 49. This is a misstatement of the burden of p roof borne by Platz. Idaho 
Code § I8-BOO2A(7) requires the driver to make a showing by a preponderance of 
the evidence. The statute does not require the driver to "definitively show" that 
the requisite procedures were not followed. The Hearing Officer's conclusion 
regarding the sufficiency of the monitoring period was therefore, based upon a 
finding that did not comport with I.e. § 18-8002A(7). Accordingly, this is an 
alternative basis for tbis Court to vacate Platz's license suspension pursuant to 
I.C. § 67-5279(3)(a). 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The Hearing Officer's findings are not supported by substantial evidence in 
the record as a whole. In addition, the Hearing Officer applied the wrong burden of 
proof when he concluded that Platz had not "definitively shown that Officer 
Montgomery did not follow the requisite procedures regarding the I5-minute 
observation period." Consequently, the Hearing Officer's decision is VACATED and 
the case is REMANDED. 
Dated this 1-~ay of March 2012. 
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District Judge 
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STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
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) Case No. CR 2011-0000419 
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) ORDER FOR STAY ON CDL 
vs. ) LICENSE SUSPENSION 
) 
GEORGE J. BESAW, JR. ) 
) 
Defendant. ) 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that any license suspension of the Class A driver's 
license of George J. Besaw, JR., is stayed pending further Order of the Court. 
THEREFORE, it is in the interest of justice that the license suspension associated 
with the DT.Jl conviction be stayed pending the outcome of the appeal of the issues in this 
case. The Idaho Transportation Department is directed to stay the license suspension of 
Mr. Besaw's Class A license. 
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CASE NO. CRII-00419 
MEMORANDUM OPINION 
AND ORDER ON APPEAL 
This matter is before the Court on Defendant's appeal of the magistrate court's ruling on 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and/or Suppress and/or in Limine. The Court heard oral 
arguments on this matter on March 8, 2012. Plaintiff State ofIdaho was represented by Nez 
Perce County deputy prosecutor Justin J. Coleman. Defendant George 1. Besaw was represented 
by attorney Charles M. Stroschein. The Court, having reviewed the record in the matter, having 
read the transcript of the hearing in the magistrate court and the briefs of the parties, having 
heard the oral arguments of counsel, and being fully advised in the matter, hereby renders its 
decision. 
State v. Besaw 
Opinion & Order on Appeal 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
Defendant Besaw was stopped by Idaho State Patrol Trooper Jeffory Talbott in the early 
morning hours of January 16,2011, after Trooper Talbott observed the Defendant fail to signal 
and fail to maintain his lane of travel while traveling on 21 st Street in Lewiston, Idaho. As 
Trooper Talbott talked to Besaw, he could smell the odor of an alcoholic beverage corning from 
the vehicle and observed Besaw's eyes were bloodshot. After running a driver's check, Trooper 
Talbott asked Besaw to perform field sobriety evaluations. Besaw agreed and got out of his 
vehicle. Trooper Talbott checked Besaw's eyes for horizontal gaze nystagmus and had Besaw 
perform a one-leg stand evaluation and a walk-and-turn evaluation. 
Based on his observations, Trooper Talbott formed the opinion Besaw was under the 
influence of alcohol. The trooper placed Besaw under arrest and, after handcuffing him, placed 
him in the back of his patrol vehicle leaving the door open. Trooper Talbott leaned against his 
patrol vehicle next to Besaw and, facing the Defendant, read him the advisory form and observe 
him for IS-minutes before having him provide breath samples for testing. As Trooper Talbott 
observed Besaw, he programmed the Lifeloc-FC20 breath testing instrument. During the 15-
minute observation period, Trooper Talbott was contacted by a Lewiston City Police officer and 
a brief conversation ensued. Trooper Talbott's attention was also briefly directed toward a 
passenger in Besaw's vehicle and to an individual who arrived to transport one of Besaw's 
passengers. 
After the IS-minute observation period, Trooper Talbott had Besaw submit three (3) 
breath samples into the Lifeloc-FC20 instrument. The instrument tested Besaw's blood alcohol 
content and reported results of 0.219 and 0.201, with a third breath sample testing as insufficient. 
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Based on the results of the breath tests, Trooper Talbott informed Besaw he was under arrest for 
driving under the influence of alcohol and Besaw was transported to the Nez Perce County jail. 
On February 4, 2011, counsel for Besaw filed a Notice Pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rules 
of Evidence Rule 803(24) that included a number of attachments. On February 15,2011, 
Besaw's counsel filed a Motion to Dismiss and/or Suppress and/or in Limine. A hearing on the 
Motion was held on May 6, 2011, during which Trooper Talbott was called to testify. The 
magistrate court also had a large number of documents before it that had been submitted by the 
Defendant. After the parties were given the opportunity to submit post hearing briefs, the 
magistrate court entered its ruling on July 28,2011 denying Defendant Besaw's Motion. The 
matter then went to jury trial and, on September 8, 2011, the jury returned a verdict of guilty of 
DUI. 
On November 2,2011, Defendant Besaw filed a Notice of Appeal. The Defendant listed 
the following issues to be addressed on appeal: (1) whether the magistrate court abused its 
discretion by not suppressing the breath test results; (2) whether the magistrate court abused its 
discretion by admitting into evidence the field sobriety tests or by failing to limit the use ofthe 
tests by the State; (3) whether the magistrate court abused its discretion when it failed to find a 
lack of standards in breath testing as required by I.C. § 18-8004(4). 
STANDARD OF REVIEW ON APPEAL 
On appeal of a trial court's admission of evidence, the trial court will be reversed only 
upon a showing the court abused its discretion. State v. Zimmerman, 121 Idaho 971, 973-74, 
829 P.2d 861,863-64 (1992). Upon an assertion that the trial court abused its discretion, the 
appellate court conducts a multi-tiered inquiry to determine: (1) whether the lower court 
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correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the lower court acted \vithin the 
boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any legal standards applicable to the specific 
choices before it; and (3) whether the lower court reached its decision by an exercise of reason. 
State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600, 768 P.2d 1331, 1333 (1989). 
On appeal, the magistrate's record is examined to determine whether there was 
substantial and competent evidence to support the magistrate's findings of fact and whether the 
magistrate's conclusions oflaw correctly flowed from those findings. State v. Stump, 146 Idaho 
857,859,203 P.3d 1256 (Ct.App.2009). 
ANALYSIS 
(A) DENIAL OF MOTION TO SUPPRESS BREATH TESTS 
On appeal, Defendant contends the arresting officer failed to comply with the 
performance verification requirements for the Lifeloc-FC20 as set out in the standard operating 
procedures manual and that the officer failed to properly conduct the fifteen (15) minute 
observation period prior to conducting BAC breath testing. The magistrate court disagreed with 
the Defendant's position and denied his motion to suppress the breath test evidence. 
Idaho Code § 18-8004 provides in relevant part: 
State v. Besaw 
For purposes of this chapter, an evidentiary test for alcohol concentration shall be 
based upon a formula of grams of alcohol per one hundred (100) cubic 
centimeters of blood, per two hundred ten (210) liters of breath or sixty-seven 
(67) milliliters of urine. Analysis of blood, urine or breath for the purpose of 
determining the alcohol concentration shall be performed by a laboratory operated 
by the Idaho state police or by a laboratory approved by the Idaho state police 
under the provisions of approval and certification standards to be set by that 
department, or by any other method approved by the Idaho state police. 
Notwithstanding any other provision of law or rule of court, the results of any test 
for alcohol concentration and records relating to calibration, approval, 
certification or quality control performed by a laboratory operated or approved by 
the Idaho state police or by any other method approved by the Idaho state police 
4 
Opinion & Order on Appeal 
shall be admissible in any proceeding in this state without the necessity of 
producing a witness to establish the reliability of the testing procedure for 
examination. 
I.C. § 18-8004(4). 
Evidentiary testing of blood, urine or breath done to determine the alcohol concentration 
of a driver is admissible in a judicial proceeding without the need for expert testimony so long as 
the testing was done in compliance with any method approved by the Idaho State Police. In the 
instant matter, Defendant Besaw contends Trooper Talbott failed to comply with the standard 
operating procedures ("SOP") promUlgated by the Idaho State Police relevant to performance 
verification requirements for the Lifeloc-FC20. The Defendant contends the SOP requires a 
performance verification utilizing the 0.20 solution within 24 hours of any test with results of 
0.20 or higher. In the instant matter, Defendant Besaw's breath test results indicated he had a 
blood alcohol content ("BAC") of 0.219 and 0.206. However, the performance verification that 
was conducted within 24 hours of his testing was done utilizing a 0.08 solution. The State does 
not dispute the results of Defendant Besaw's breath tests nor does it dispute that a 0.08 solution 
was utilized for the performance verification done within 24 hours before or after Defendant 
Besaw's test. Rather, the State contends the SOP only requires a 0.20 performance verification 
once per calendar month, regardless of test results. 
The Standard Operating Procedures manual in effect at the time of Defendant Besaw's 
arrest addresses performance verifications on the Lifeloc-FC20 at section 5 of the manual and 
reads:! 
5. Performance Verification of Breath Testing Instruments 
lDefendant's Exhibit #3, admitted at the May 6, 2011 Motion Hearing held by the magistrate court. 
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State v. Besaw 
Performance verifications aid the Breath Testing Specialist (BTS) and the 
Idaho State Police Forensic Services (ISPFS) in determining if a breath testing 
instrument is functioning correctly. Performance verifications are performed 
using a wet bath simulator performance verification solution. The solution is 
provided by and/or approved by ISPFS. The ISPFS analysis establishes the 
target value and acceptable range of the solutions used for the verification and 
includes the acceptable values on the Certificate of Analysis for each solution. 
Note: The ISPFS established target values may be different from those shown 
on the bottle label. 
5.1 Alco-Sensor and Lifeloc FC20-Portable Breath Testing Instrument 
Performance Verification 
5.1.1 The Alco-Sensor and Lifeloc FC20 portable breath testing instrument 
performance verification is run using approximately 0.08 and/or 0.20 
performance verification solutions provided by and/or approved by ISPFS. 
5.1.2 The performance verification using the 0.08 and 0.20 performance 
verification solutions consist of two samples. 
5.1.3 A performance verification of the Alco-Sensor and Lifeloc FC20 
instruments using a 0.08 or 0.20 performance verification solution must be 
performed within 24 hours, before or after an evidentiary test to be 
approved for evidentiary use. Multiple breath alcohol tests may be covered 
by a single performance verification. Reference 5.1.4.1 for clarification on 
the use ofthe 0.20 solution in this capacity. 
5.1.3.1 A 0.08 performance verification solution should be replaced with 
fresh solution approximately every 25 verifications or every 
calendar month, whichever comes first. 
5.1.4 A 0.20 performance verification should be run and results logged once per 
calendar month and replaced with fresh solution approximately every 25 
verifications or until it reaches its expiration date, whichever comes first 
NOTE: The 0.20 performance verification was implemented for 
the sole purpose of supporting the instruments' results for an 18-
8004C charge. Failure to timely perform a 0.20 performance 
verification will not invalidate tests performed that yield results at 
other levels or in charges other than 18-8004C. 
5.1.4.1 The 0.20 performance verification satisfies the requirement for 
performance verification within 24 hours, before or after an 
evidentiary test at any level. The 0.20 performance verification 
solution should not be used routinely for this purpose. 
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The Lifeloc-FC20 performance verification portion of the SOP contains no language that 
supports Defendant's asserted position. The SOP recommends a performance verification using 
the 0.20 solution be performed once per calendar month and notes that the 0.20 performance 
verification was implemented to support the instruments results when a test result shows a BAC 
of 0.20 or greater in violation of I.e. § 18-8004e.2 While the SOP requires a performance 
verification be run within 24 hours of any test, it makes clear the 0.20 verification should not be 
used for this routine performance verification, i.e. the 24 hour requirement. However, when the 
0.20 verification is performed in order to meet the "per calendar month" requirement, any test 
results obtained during the 24 hours before or after the monthly 0.20 performance verification 
will meet the requirements for evidentiary use. The SOP notes that failure to timely perform a 
0.20 performance verification, i.e. to perform a 0.20 verification once per calendar month, may 
invalidate test results of 0.20 or greater, but will not invalidate test results below 0.20. Nothing 
in the notation suggests that in order for a test result of 0.20 or greater to be valid, a 0.20 
performance verification must be run within 24 hours before or after the test, as asserted by 
Defendant. 
Finally, the Defendant argued to the Court that the purpose of the performance 
verification is to verify a test result is accurate, not to verify that the testing instrument is 
functioning correctly. Defendant's argument runs contrary to the statement of purpose that 
precedes the performance verification procedures. The SOP clearly states, "Performance 
verifications aid the Breath Testing Specialist (BTS) and the Idaho State Police Forensic 
Services (ISPFS) in determining if a breath testing instrument is functioning correctly." 
2 Defendant does not dispute that a 0.20 performance verification was conducted once per calendar month during the 
time in question. 
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The court finds the SOP's are clear and unambiguous regarding the performance 
verifications to be run on the Lifeloc-FC20 breath testing instrument.3 A performance 
verification must be run 'within 24 hours before or after an evidentiary test, preferably utilizing 
the 0.08 solution. A performance verification using the 0.20 solution should be run once every 
calendar month and, when conducted, can also be used to meet the 24 hour requirement, 
eliminating the need to duplicate the performance verification with a 0.08 solution. The 
magistrate court found the proper procedures had been followed in regard to performance 
verifications. This Court agrees with the findings of the magistrate court. 
Defendant next contends the breath test results should have been suppressed, as the 
arresting officer did not properly conduct the fifteen minute observation period prior to breath 
testing. The magistrate court, after reviewing the video from the officer's dashboard camera, 
found the officer was at all times within two to three feet of Besaw, putting himself in a physical 
position that allowed him to utilize not only his sense of sight, but all his senses to accomplish 
the goal of the monitoring period. The trial court further found the officer's attention was not 
impeded to such a degree that his various senses were diverted from the Defendant. After 
viewing the video, this Court agrees. 
During the fifteen minute observation period, the officer at all times stayed within two to 
three feet of the Defendant and in a position where he was able to use his sense of sight, hearing, 
and smell. He at all times remained focused on the Defendant, engaged in conversation with 
3 Defendant in his briefing argues that the defmition of calibration in the Lifeloc Reference Manual, found as 
Defendant's Exhibit 2 and admitted into evidence at the May 6, 2011 motion hearing, makes the logged dates of the 
most recent 0.20 performance verification "suspect". The Court finds no "suspect" language in the manual 
definition, but rather finds Defendant fails to distinguish between a password sensitive calibration that must be done 
in the lab and a performance verification which checks the accuracy of the instrument by running a test against a 
known sample. Defendant further argues that the procedural differences for breath tests done relative to a minor in 
possession/consumption investigation versus a DUI investigation makes the standards suspect. The Court declines 
Defendant's invitation to imply suspect motives to differences in procedure, as any differences are irrelevant to the 
instant matter as it does not involve a charge of minor in possession/consumption. 
8 
State v. Besaw 
Opinion & Order on Appeal 
him, and the officer averted efforts by others to gamer his attention. The Court in State v. 
Remsburg, 126 Idaho 338, 882 P.2d 993 (Ct.App.1994) and in State v. DeFranco, 143 Idaho 
335, 144 P.3d 40 (Ct.App.2006), held that an officer need not stare fixedly at a driver during the 
fifteen minute observation period, but may utilize all of his senses to observe the driver to assure 
he does not burp, belch or vomit prior to performing breath testing. "So long as the officer is 
continually in position to use all of his senses, not just sight, to determine that the defendant did 
not belch, burp or vomit during the observation period, the observation complies with the 
training manual instructions." State v. Stump, 146 Idaho 857,860,203 P.3d 1256 
(Ct.App.2009). 
In the instant matter, the officer clearly remained focused on Defendant Besaw at all 
times and was in sufficient proximity to be able to use all his senses to assure no event occurred 
that might skew the test results. The Court finds the magistrate court did not abuse its discretion 
in denying Defendant's motion to suppress the breath test, as there is substantial evidence in the 
record to support the trial court's finding that as a matter of law, the officer complied with the 
requirements of the SOP by properly and timely performing performance verifications on the 
Lifeloc-FC20 and in conducting the fifteen minute observation period. 
(B) FIELD SOBRlETY TESTS 
Defendant contends the magistrate court erred in allowing the officer to testify regarding 
the field sobriety tests ("FST") performed by the Defendant. In particular, the Defendant 
contends there was insufficient foundation laid, the FST's were irrelevant, and their probative 
value was outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. However, rather than provide the Court 
with facts and legal support relative to three grounds stated, the Defendant has chosen to 
challenge the reliability of the science behind field sobriety testing, in particular the HON test. 
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The issue of whether field sobriety tests are admissible as evidence at trial has been 
addressed on numerous occasions by Idaho's Supreme Court and Court of Appeals. The most 
challenged of the FST's is the horizontal gaze nystagmus test, or HGN. V\1hile it is the law in 
Idaho that field sobriety tests are not admissible to show a degree or level of intoxication, it has 
long been established in Idaho that the tests may be admitted as indicators of possible 
intoxication for purposes of establishing probable cause to arrest. Idaho's Supreme Court long 
ago ruled the tests scientifically sound and ruled them admissible through the testimony of a law 
enforcement officer who has been trained in conducting and evaluating the tests. See State v. 
Garrett, 119 Idaho 878, 811 P.2d 488 (1991) and State v. Gleason, 123 Idaho 62,844 P.2d 691 
(1992). The trial court correctly analyzed the admissibility of FST's and recognized the limits to 
be placed on testimony regarding FST'S.4 
Finally, Defendant's contention that the trial court was required to conduct a Rule 702 
hearing to determine the scientific reliability ofFST's is without support in the law. Rule 702 of 
the Idaho Rules of Evidence reads, "If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will 
assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness 
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto 
in the form of an opinion or otherwise." As long as a proper foundation is laid establishing an 
officer as an expert on the subject ofFST's based on his knowledge, skill, experience, training or 
education, the court may allow such evidence to be presented to the jury if it is determined such 
evidence will assist the trier-of-fact. The Court finds the trial court made a reasoned analysis 
4 In briefing, the Defendant takes issue with the trial court's failure to address the National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration standards regarding field sobriety tests. The Court finds no error on the part of the trial court for not 
addressing standards that are without legal effect in Idaho other than as they have been incorporated into Idaho case 
law, statutes, rules, and regulations. The admissibility question in regard to field sobriety tests has been resolved by 
Idaho's Appellate Courts, making analysis under NHTSA standards unnecessary and irrelevant. 
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regarding FST's and correctly determined they were admissible within the limitations established 
by Idaho's Appellate Courts. 
(C) THE IDAHO STATE POLICE STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES MANUAL 
The Defendant contends the most recent revision of the SOP manual should be found by 
the Court to violate the duties given to the Idaho State Police ("ISP") in I.e. § 18-8004, wherein 
ISP is charged with the duty of promulgating standards for the administration of breath alcohol 
testing. The Defendant raised this issue with the trial court and now argues the court abused its 
discretion by failing to find the SOP revision resulted in there being essentially no standards as 
required by Idaho Code. This Court, however, concurs with the magistrate court's ruling. 
The Defendant contends the revisions by Idaho State Police Forensic Services were not 
based on science, but on finding ways to eliminate challenges in court. The Defendant's 
argument relies primarily, if not solely, on interdepartmental email exchanges relative to revising 
the SOP manual. While the Court is sensitive to Defendant's concern that certain procedural 
standards were revised by eliminating mandatory language such as 'must', and replacing it with 
non-mandatory language such as 'should', the Court is unable to find such changes problematic 
without evidence that it reduces the scientific reliability of test results. 
Like all technology, breath testing is ever evolving and hopefully improving. While the 
trial court and this Court have been presented with no evidence that the revisions are the result of 
improved technology, neither has any evidence been presented indicating the changes reduce the 
reliability of test results obtained with the Lifeloc-FC20 breath testing instrument. The role of 
the courts is not to dictate to ISP how they are to fulfill their statutory duties, nor has the 
Defendant presented any authority that would allow the Court to do so. For this Court to say 
there are no standards merely because revisions have been made to some, but not all, portions of 
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the SOP manual, without evidence that the changes negatively affect test results, would work an 
absurdity. Therefore, the Court declines the invitation to second guess Idaho State Police 
Forensic Services. 
ORDER 
The ruling ofthe magistrate court denying Defendant Besaw's Motion to Dismiss and/or 
Suppress and/or in Limine is hereby AFFIRMED. 
Dated this 
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/hIL 
daY~12. 
r. ; ........ n 
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